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Abstract 
Ethical naturalists argue that normative properties are, in some sense, nothing over and above 
natural properties. Some philosophers think that all forms of naturalism must fail. They present, 
what Jonathan Dancy calls, ‘Blockbuster arguments’, which they think rule out every kind of 
naturalism. In this thesis I argue that these arguments do not succeed. In the first two chapters, I 
argue that both analytic and synthetic naturalists have good responses to G.E. Moore’s open 
question argument. Derek Parfit, as well as other non-naturalists, have presented a number of 
supposedly separate arguments against naturalism which are not meant to rely on any 
considerations about meaning; I argue against these in chapters 3 and 4. Non-cognitivists argue 
that all descriptivist theories like naturalism fail to explain the necessary connection between 
normative judgements and motivation. I argue, in an oblique way, that the kind of motivational 
internalism needed to ground this argument is not a threat to naturalism in chapter 5. In chapter 
6, I turn to what I take to be more serious problems for naturalists arising from Terry Horgan 
and Mark Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiments. I argue first that tackling these 
thought experiments is a problem that all major metaethical theories share. The fact that 
everyone needs to address these problems makes more palatable the responses I then go on to 
develop. First, I argue that we might be able to accommodate these cases if we accept that 
people can disagree even if the semantic content of their utterances are not logically inconsistent. 
Second, I argue that we can debunk the intuitions that Moral Twin Earth cases are supposed to 
pump. I end by summarising what I have argued in the thesis. 
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Introduction 
A central metaethical question concerns the nature of normative properties. There is no easy way 
to define normativity and there is disagreement among philosophers over just which properties 
are the normative ones. For instance, some philosophers think that semantic properties like a 
word’s meaning are normative.1 Other philosophers think that being in a particular mental state, 
e.g. having a belief that P, is a normative matter.2 I sidestep these issues by focusing primarily on 
paradigmatically normative properties such as moral and prudential properties like goodness, 
badness, rightness, wrongness, etc. I defend a naturalist view of normative properties against some 
influential arguments found in the metaethics literature. 
Following David Enoch, I will understand ethical naturalism as the view that normative 
properties are, in a sense, nothing over-and-above natural properties.3 This characterisation is 
deliberately vague because I wish, for the most part, to remain neutral over whether the 
naturalist should say that the relationship between normative and natural properties is one of 
identity, reduction, constitution, grounding, or something else.4 Most of the time I will simply say 
that naturalism’s central claim is that normative properties are identical to natural properties. I 
think that this claim can be defended against the objections I consider in this thesis, but if there 
is a better way to characterise naturalism then I would be happy to adopt it.  
This characterisation is also vague in that it does not make clear what it means for a property to 
be natural. This is a large and difficult topic which I will largely skirt around as well. The 
standard account is that natural properties are those properties which could play explanatory 
roles in the natural sciences and psychology, and perhaps also the social sciences.5 For instance, 
 
1 Kripke (1982) is the locus classicus for this position. 
2 e.g. Blackburn (1998, Appendix). 
3 Enoch (2011, ch.5). Graham Oddy (2005, Ch.1) does the same. 
4 I do discuss one way we could understand the relationship between normative and natural properties in chapter 1, 
but I do not rule out other ways that we could do this. 
5 Moore (1993) is an early proponent of this account. 
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since an object’s mass will feature in the explanations of natural phenomena given by physicists, 
a property like, has a mass of 1kg, will count as a natural property on this account. I do not think 
that this will ultimately prove to be the best way to characterise natural properties. However, I 
also think that if ethical naturalism turns out to be true then normative properties will be among 
the properties that could figure in the natural and social sciences as well as psychology. 
Additionally, I think that the claim that normative properties are among the properties that figure 
in the natural and social sciences as well as psychology, is defensible against the arguments I am 
going to go on to consider. That being so, the standard account of what a natural property is will 
suffice for my purposes. 
At first blush, naturalism appears to have several advantages over rival theories. I will mention 
just two. First, naturalism promises to vindicate many of our ordinary normative judgements 
with appeal only to a purely naturalistic ontology. This is in contrast to robust realist views, 
which have it that normative properties are non-natural, sui generis and irreducibly normative.6 It is 
argued, rightly in my view, that such properties would be mysterious and objectionably ‘queer’.7 
Relatedly, if normative properties are just natural properties then we might come to know that 
something is, say, morally right in the same kinds of ways that we learn which natural properties 
a thing has. This again contrasts with rival views, according to which we (sometimes) learn which 
normative properties a thing has using some kind of mysterious reasoning process or a special 
intuitive faculty.8 
Second, naturalists have an easy time explaining why normative properties supervene on natural 
properties, or, why there could not be worlds which are the same in all natural respects but 
 
6 David Enoch (2011) offers, in my view, the best recent defence of this view. 
7 Mackie (1977, ch.1) is the locus classicus of this complaint. 
8 I add ‘sometimes’ in parentheses because rival accounts can allow that much of the time we learn what normative 
properties a thing has derivatively, i.e. by making inferences based on our knowledge of the other normative 
properties we know the thing to have. There must, however, be some way for us detect at least certain normative 
properties non-derivatively on these views, otherwise the process of normative deliberation could never get started. 
That non-derivative normative deliberation could not be understood in purely naturalistic terms. 
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which are different in normative respects. This normative supervenience claim is almost 
universally accepted; it just seems obvious that there could not be a world which was identical in 
every single natural respect to ours but in which, say, it was morally permissible to torture people 
for fun.9 Since every set of properties trivially supervenes on any set of properties of which it is a 
subset, naturalists can easily explain why normative properties supervene on natural properties. 
Rival theories meanwhile must accept that supervenience is simply a brute metaphysical fact or, 
to quote Simon Blackburn, “an opaque, isolated, logical fact, for which no explanation can be 
proffered.”10 
Naturalism appears to be a promising theory, but many philosophers think that there is little 
hope of its proving to be true. In my view, establishing that naturalism is the correct view would 
require that we identify just which natural properties are identical to which normative properties, 
in a way that is consistent with, and make good sense of, the kinds of things we do and say using 
normative terms and normative concepts. Some philosophers disagree. They think that it is not 
necessary to examine particular identifications of normative properties with natural properties, 
since we know in advance that normative properties could not be natural properties. They 
present, what Jonathan Dancy calls, “blockbuster arguments”, which are designed to refute every 
kind of naturalism. 11 
In this thesis, I look at these general anti-naturalist arguments and argue that they do not 
succeed. In the first two chapters, I argue that naturalists have good responses to G.E. Moore’s 
open question argument. Derek Parfit, as well as other non-naturalists, have presented a number 
of arguments against naturalism which are not meant to rely on any considerations about 
meaning; I refute these arguments in chapters 3 and 4. Non-cognitivists argue that all 
descriptivist theories like naturalism fail to explain the necessary connection between normative 
 
9 Though see Sturgeon (2013) for some of the complexities and complications associated with characterising 
normative supervenience claims. I gloss over these issues for brevity’s sake. 
10 Blackburn (1993, p.119), his italics. Dreier (2015) shows that this problem affects quasi-realist views as well. 
11 Dancy (2006) 
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judgements and motivation. I argue, in an oblique way, that the kinds of internalism needed to 
ground this argument are not a threat to naturalism in chapter 5. In chapter 6, I turn to problems 
for naturalists arising from Moral Twin Earth thought experiments. I argue first that tackling 
these kinds of thought experiments is a problem that all major metaethical theories share, for 
reasons that have not been appreciated in the literature. The fact that everyone needs to address 
these problems makes more palatable the responses I then go on to develop. First, I argue that 
we can accommodate these cases if we accept that people can disagree even if the semantic 
content of their utterances are not logically inconsistent. Second, I argue that if the first strategy 
does not work then we can always debunk the intuitions that Moral Twin Earth cases are 
supposed to pump. Having refuted the main general arguments facing naturalism, I provide, by 
way of conclusion, a brief summary of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1: The Open Question Argument Part 1 
The most famous ‘blockbuster argument’ against naturalism is G.E. Moore’s open question 
argument.12 For many years, it was widely believed that Moore’s argument had defeated 
naturalism for good, or at least refuted many significant versions of naturalism. Nowadays, his 
arguments are more often seen as flawed, particularly in Moore’s original formulations of them. 
At the same time, it is also widely thought that Moore’s arguments contain some important 
insight, development of which proves fatal to at least some forms of naturalism. In this chapter, 
I argue that the main responses that naturalists have given to even the strongest forms of the 
open question argument stand up to scrutiny.  
§1 
At the beginning of Principia Ethica, Moore sets out to find the meaning of ‘good’. 13 14 He thinks 
that this is an important task because he takes ‘good’ to be the notion on which all ethical theory 
depends.15 It is Moore’s contention that ‘good’ cannot be defined. By saying that ‘good’ cannot 
be defined, Moore means that it cannot be analysed.16 According to Moore, when we analyse 
some notion we describe the various parts of the object to which it refers.17 For example, to 
analyse ‘horse’ we can describe the composition of a horse, which Moore does as follows:  
“[I]t has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of them arranged in definition relations to one 
another”.18  
By describing horses in this way we can inform someone of the meaning of ‘horse’. Terms like 
‘good’ or ‘yellow’, however, denote only simple properties. The property goodness has no parts 
 
12 Moore (1993). 
13 ibid, p.58. 
14 I will put inverted commas around words to denote linguistic expressions (like ‘good’), italicised words to denote 
properties (like goodness) and chevrons around words to denote concepts (like <good>). 
15 ibid. p.192 
16 ibid. p.5, p.61 
17 ibid. p.59.  
18 ibid. p.60 
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that we can enumerate in order to describe to someone who is unfamiliar with it what it is.19 
Because of this there is very little that we can say about goodness. Moore writes: 
“If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good and that it is the end of the matter.”20 
Any attempt to analyse ‘good’ just mistakes goodness for some other, non-simple property. 
It might be the case that all objects which are good, necessarily also share some natural property. 
For example, everything that is good might also cause pleasure, and if that were the case then it 
would be correct to say, ‘Pleasure is good’. However, that would not mean that the property 
goodness was identical to the natural property pleasurable, nor would it mean that the term ‘good’ 
could be analysed as ‘pleasure’. Moore thinks that naturalists get confused because claims like 
‘Pleasure is good’ have the same basic form as identity claims like ‘Water is H2O’.
21 Because they 
fail to disambiguate the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication, they confuse goodness itself with 
some property that is distinct from goodness, but necessarily co-extensive with it. Moore famously 
calls this kind of mistake, “the naturalistic fallacy”.22   
Moore argues in a few different, but related, ways that ‘good’ cannot be analysed and that goodness 
is a simple property. Some of these arguments are variations on arguments I talk about in later 
chapters so I pass over them here. For instance, at one point Moore seems to think that we can 
tell that ‘good’ is distinct in meaning from any natural predicate by introspection. He writes: 
Everyone does in fact understand the question ‘Is this good?’ When he thinks of it, his state of mind is 
different from what it would be, were he asked ‘Is this pleasant or desired, or approved?’ It has a distinct 
meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of 
 
19 Moore refers to the property goodness as just ‘good’, but I do not follow him in this for clarity’s sake. Additionally, 
Moore sometimes puts inverted commas around the word ‘good’ to denote the property goodness but sometimes he 
does not, so some of the passages I quote may be misleading, but I think I have provided enough context to avoid 
this. 
20 ibid. p.58 
21 ibid. p.66 
22 ibid. p.62. Confusingly, Moore also uses the expression ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ to refer to at least four other kinds 
of (what he considers to be) errors (Baldwin (1993), pp.16-20). Subsequent writers have used it in yet more ways, for 
example, Steven Pinker (2002, ch.8), identifies the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ with, “the belief that what happens in nature 
is good”. In what follows, I ignore these other ways that ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ has been understood. 
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‘intrinsic value’ or ‘intrinsic worth’ or says that a thing ‘ought to exist’, he has before his mind the unique 
object – unique property of things by which I mean ‘good’.23 
The claim we can tell that goodness is distinct from natural properties by introspection is a central 
part of the normativity argument against naturalism. I return to this argument in chapter 3. 
Moore also questions how philosophers with different ethical views could disagree if naturalism 
were true.24 If one philosopher uses ‘good’ to mean ‘pleasure’ and another uses it to mean ‘the 
object of desire’ then it is puzzling how these philosophers could disagree over whether the 
claim ‘good is pleasure’ is true. One possibility Moore raises is that the philosophers are 
disagreeing about how the term ‘good’ is typically used, but if this is the case then they are not 
really having an ethical disagreement at all. Alternatively, one philosopher might just mean by 
‘good is pleasure’ that pleasure is identical to pleasure, but if that is the case then there is no 
possibility of sensibly disagreeing with their utterance. ‘Pleasure is pleasure’ is trivially true, so if 
‘Pleasure is good’ were identical to it, it too would be trivially true. Either way, the naturalist 
cannot make sense of ethical disagreement. I return to issues around naturalism and 
disagreement in chapter 6.  
Moore’s most famous argument against naturalism and the one I focus on in this chapter is, what 
has come to be known as, the open question argument. This argument focuses on the difference 
in cognitive significance of normative and natural terms/concepts. Moore argues that if ‘good’ could 
be analysed as ‘pleasure’ then the claim ‘Pleasure is good’ would have the same meaning as 
‘Pleasure is pleasure’.25 Moore argues that these claims cannot have the same meaning because 
someone could doubt that the former claim is true but no one could doubt that the latter is 
true.26 Since these claims cannot have the same meaning, the property goodness cannot be the 
same as the natural property pleasurable. The same applies to any other way of defining ‘good’. If 
 
23 Moore (1993, p.68) 
24 ibid. pp.62-4 
25 ibid. p.64 
26 ibid. p.68 
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‘good’ could be analysed as some naturalistic expression, ‘N’, then ‘N is good’ would have the 
same meaning as ‘N is N’, but for no value of N is this the case. No one can doubt that whether 
any claim in the form ‘N is N’ is true, but it is always possible to doubt whether ‘N is good’ is 
true. Therefore, goodness cannot be a natural property. 
Shortly after introducing this argument, Moore makes the same point in a slightly different way. 
He writes: 
“[W]hen we think we have a definition [of ‘good’], we cannot logically defend our ethical principles in any 
way whatever, we shall also be much less apt to defend them well, even if illogically. For we shall start with 
the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our 
opponent’s arguments or to cut them short with the reply, This is not an open question: the very meaning 
of the word decides it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion.” 
Moore here is pointing out that if ‘good’ could be analysed as, say, ‘pleasure’ then a question like, 
‘Is pleasure good?’ would be closed, meaning that its answer could not be doubted except by 
someone who was conceptually confused. The question would be closed because it would follow 
trivially from the fact that ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ have the same meaning that the answer to the 
question was ‘Yes’. We may as well be asking, ‘Is pleasure pleasure?’.  
Moore thinks that every question of the form, ‘Is N good?’, will be open. For any possible 
analysis, N, we might offer it will always be possible for someone to doubt, without conceptual 
confusion, that the answer to, ‘Is N good?’, is positive. Since, ‘Is N good?’, is always an open 
question, it cannot be the case that ‘good’ can be analysed in natural terms. Since ‘good’ cannot 
be analysed into natural terms, goodness cannot be a natural property. The same argument applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to all other normative and natural terms.27 Therefore, normative terms in general 
cannot be analysed in natural terms and that means that normative properties cannot be natural 
properties, or so the argument goes. In this chapter, I will focus on naturalist accounts of ‘good’ 
 
27 Moore targets the view, which he attributes to Jeremy Bentham, that ‘right’ has the same meaning as ‘conducive to 
general happiness’ (ibid., pp.69-72).  In arguing for this view, Bentham commits the naturalistic fallacy, according to 
Moore.  
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in particular and put aside other normative terms. We could summarise Moore’s argument as it 
applies to naturalist accounts of ‘good’ as follows: 
(1) For every possible naturalistic analysis, N, of ‘good’, the question, ‘Is N good?’ will be 
open. 
(2) If, ‘Is N good?’, is open, then ‘N’ cannot be an analysis of ‘good’. 
(3) If ‘N’ is not an analysis of ‘good’, then ‘N’ and ‘good’ do not refer to the same 
properties. 
(4) Therefore, ‘good’ cannot refer to any natural property. 
§2 - Partners in Guilt 
Before going on to look at Moore’s argument in more detail it is worth pointing out that the 
argument does not just apply to naturalist theories. In fact, it seems to apply to most metaethical 
theories. This seems to be a reason to doubt the soundness of Moore’s argument. 
Moore recognises that his argument does not just apply to views which say goodness is identical 
to some sensible property, i.e. a property we can detect through the senses. In the fourth chapter 
of Principia Ethica, Moore applies his argument to what he calls “metaphysical” theories. 
According to these theories, the term ‘good’ refers to some supersensible property. An example 
might be a form of theological voluntarism which holds that ‘good’ refers to the property of being 
approved of by God.28 Philosophers who defend metaphysical theories like these are just as guilty of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy as naturalists. Moore writes, 
“Just as, when Mill supposed that ‘to be good’ meant ‘to be desired’, the question ‘What is good?’ could be 
and must be answered solely by an empirical investigation of the question what was desired; so here, if to 
be good means to have some supersensible property, the ethical question can and must be answered by a 
metaphysical enquiry into the question, What has this property? What, then, remains to be done in order to 
 
28 Assuming that God’s will cannot be known by naturalistically respectable means. Moore uses as his examples the 
ethical theories put forward by the Stoics, Spinoza and Kant. 
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destroy the plausibility of Metaphysical Ethics, is to expose the chief errors which seem to have led 
metaphysicians to suppose that to be good means to possess some supersensible property?”29 
It is easy to see why Moore thinks this, since we can easily apply his open question argument to 
metaphysical theories. If goodness, the argument would go, were the same as being approved of by God 
then the predicate ‘is approved of by God’ would have the same meaning as ‘good’. But these 
predicates cannot have the same meaning since we cannot doubt the claim, ‘That which is 
approved of by God is approved of by God’, whereas we can doubt the claim ‘That which is 
approved of by God is good’. So, goodness cannot be the same as being approved of by God. 
But if to be good is not to possess some supersensible property, nor is it to possess some natural 
property, just what is it? Here things get a bit more complicated. The only remaining option, as 
Moore sees it, is that normative properties do not exist but, somehow, still are. He compares 
normative properties to the number two, of which he says, “Two is somehow, although it does 
not exist.”30 The same is true of goodness, according to Moore. It does not exist, nor is it real, and 
yet it still is and various natural objects instantiate it.  
Contemporary non-naturalists put forward accounts which are a bit more clear. They argue that 
the open question argument rules out all reductionist theories but leaves us with the view that 
normative properties could exist, if their nature was sui generis and irreducible. I think that this is 
the kind of account of normative properties that Moore had in mind.31 However, this account is 
also a bit unclear because it is difficult to spell out just what it means for normative properties to 
be sui generis and irreducible. One solution is to say that normative terms are sui generis and irreducible 
in the sense that they cannot be referred to using any non-normative terms. This distinguishes the view 
from “metaphysical” theories because on those theories goodness can be referred to using non-
 
29 ibid. p.174 
30 ibid. p.169 
31 This way of understanding talk of the existence of universals is along the same lines that Bertrand Russell talks 
about it (e.g. Russell (1990, ch.9)). Moore plausibly has the same view of the existence of universals as Russell.  
17 
 
normative expressions like “approved of by God”.32 But so understood most non-naturalists 
views will be as vulnerable as naturalism is to the open question argument, or so I shall argue 
very shortly. 
Other alternatives to naturalism are views that say that Moore is correct to think that normative 
concepts do not reduce to natural concepts but wrong to think that they successfully refer to any 
property. Error theorists think that we attempt to refer to some irreducible normative properties 
with our normative terms but fail because no such properties exist.33 Non-cognitivists, 
meanwhile, argue that normative terms do not try to refer at all but instead express something 
like a desire.34 It does not take too much to see that Moore’s argument applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to these theories too. 
While these theories do not reduce normative concepts to any non-normative concepts; they do 
tend to analyse some normative concepts in terms of other normative concepts.35 This is 
especially clear on Moore’s own theory. Consider these remarks: 
“Every judgement in practical Ethics may be reduced to the form: This is a cause of a good thing.”36 
““right” does and can mean nothing but ‘cause of a good result’ and is thus identical with ‘useful’”37 
“‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the assertion ‘This action will produce the 
greatest amount of good in the Universe”38 
 
32 A complication with this solution is that it seems like we should be able to refer to sui generis, normative properties 
with non-normative expressions like: “the property that the Germany-language term ‘gut’ denotes”. To solve this we 
need to finesse the account to say that normative properties are those properties that cannot be ascribed by non-
evaluative expressions unless those expressions contain a non-evaluative phrase which denotes a normative property 
without ascribing it. An expression like “has the property that the German-language term ‘gut’ denotes” denotes a 
property without ascribing it, whereas “is approved of by God” both ascribes and denotes a property. This problem 
and its solution are lifted from Streumer (2011). 
33 Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001), Lillehammer (2004), Olson (2014).  
34 Ayer (1936), Stevenson (1944, 1975), Hare (1952, 1963), Blackburn (1984, 1993, 1998), Gibbard (1990, 2003). The 
possibility of quasi-realism complicates matters in ways I do not go in to here. 
35 An exception would be theories which deny that there are conceptual or analytic truths involving normative 
concepts. The fact that there are possible exceptions does not undermine my point however, since if there are no 
conceptual or analytic truths Moore’s argument does not get off the ground and naturalists are off the hook. 
36 Moore (1993, p.196) 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
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“a virtue may be defined as a habitual disposition to perform certain actions, which generally produce the 
best possible results.”39 
Value fundamentalists, like Moore, think that we can understood ‘right’ and ‘ought’ in terms of 
‘good’ and other evaluative terms/concepts. The open question argument can be used against 
this theory. We could argue that the claim, ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’, could 
not be identical in meaning to a claim, ‘This action will produce the greatest amount of good in 
the Universe’ on the same grounds that Moore uses to rule out naturalism. It seems impossible 
to doubt whether the claim, ‘I am morally bound to perform actions that I am morally bound to 
perform’, is true, but it is possible to doubt whether the claim, ‘I am morally bound to perform 
actions which produce the greatest amount of good in the Universe’, is true. Deontologists, for 
instance, do not typically believe that we are always morally bound to perform whatever action 
promotes the most good. According to Moore’s own argument then, Moore’s theory of ‘right’ 
cannot be correct.40 
It is not just a problem for value fundamentalists like Moore, the open question argument also 
applies to the current orthodoxy, reasons fundamentalism. According to this view, concepts like 
<good> and <right> are fundamentally to be understood in terms of reason-concepts like <has 
most reason to>.41 This is common ground between many non-naturalists, error theorists and 
non-cognitivists nowadays. We could argue against this theory in a Moorean vein. We could 
argue that a claim like “That was the best thing to do” could not possibly have the same meaning 
as “The balance of reasons favoured doing it” since it is possible to doubt whether the best thing 
to do is what the balance of reasons favours, but not possible to doubt whether the best thing to 
do is the best thing to do. 
 
39 ibid. p.221 
40 Something that Russell (1903) points out and Moore concedes (1968). cf. Hare (1954, pt. 2). 
41 See e.g. Parfit (2011a, p.38). Scanlon (2000, p. 97. 2014, p.2) 
19 
 
The same argument can be repeated for most accounts of normative concepts. They mostly 
involve, in some form or another, analysing some normative concepts in terms of others or the 
identification of one normative concept with another, or the reduction of one normative concept 
to another, where those analyses, reductions and identity claims are possible to doubt. The fact 
that there is so much disagreement amongst moral philosophers regarding whether reasons 
fundamentalism, or evaluative fundamentalism, or some other theory is correct suggests as 
much. So, most ethical theories are potentially vulnerable to the open question argument. ‘Is X 
good?’ is plausibly an open question whether X refers to a natural predicate like ‘that which 
maximises happiness’ or to a normative predicate like ‘that which I have a reason to do’. So, the 
naturalist is in a similar position to the anti-naturalist. This should give the naturalist grounds to 
be optimistic that something has gone wrong with the open question argument; it seems more 
likely that the open question argument is flawed than that there is no correct account of 
normative language. 
This partners in guilt/partner in innocence response would, however, not be much good if the anti-
naturalist could respond to the open question argument in ways that the naturalist cannot. Since 
the open question argument is, as I have reconstructed it, valid, the way to reply to it is to reject 
one of the premises. So, the main replies to the argument would be: 
Reject Premise 1: Argue that, ‘Is X good?’, is in fact closed for some values of ‘X’. 
Reject Premise 2: Argue that even if, ‘Is X good?’, is in fact always open that does not show 
that good cannot be analysed as ‘X’. 
Reject Premise 3: Argue that even if ‘good’ cannot be analysed as ‘X’ that does not show 
that the property goodness is not identical to the property referred to by ‘X’. 
However, each of these lines of argument can plausibly be used to defend naturalism against the 
open question argument. Whether or not these responses are as plausible when applied to 
20 
 
naturalism as to other theories remains to be seen. I move on now to look at each of these 
replies in turn. 
§3 
Several philosophers have argued that Moore begged the question against the naturalist. Moore 
assumes that there is no naturalistic expression N for which the question. ‘Is N good?’, is 
closed.42 This begs the question against analytic naturalists, since whether there is some analysis 
of ‘good’ on which the question, ‘Is N good?’, is closed is exactly what is at issue between Moore 
and the analytic naturalist (assuming for the moment that Moore is right that on any successful 
account of goodness questions like ‘Is N good?’ would be closed). 
Moore’s claim that questions of the form, ‘Is N good?’, are always open seems to be based on a 
generalisation from a small number of examples of possible naturalistic analyses. Moore 
considers whether ‘good’ might be analysed as ‘pleasure’, ‘desired’, ‘approved of’, ‘tends to 
increase quantity of life’ or ‘being that which we desire to desire’. For each of these analyses, 
Moore claims that, ‘Is N good?’, is an open question. From that, Moore seems to infer that it will 
always be an open question whether something with certain natural qualities is good. If that 
generalisation were warranted then Moore could avoid the charge of begging the question against 
the naturalist since he would have independent grounds for believing that questions of the form, 
‘Is N good?’, are never closed. The problem for Moore is that the generalisation does not seem 
warranted. Since Moore considers so few cases it seems hasty to infer that no analysis will work. 
We do not think in other cases of analysis - e.g. the analysis of ‘free choice’ or of ‘knowledge’ - 
that because five or so proposals have not been successful, no proposal could be successful.  
Additionally, the proposed analyses that Moore examines are all quite simple. Moore looks at 
whether ‘good’ could be analysed by some single term or short phrase, but the analysis of ‘good’ 
 
42 Broad (1934), Frankena (1939, 1973), Sturgeon (2003), Finlay (2014) 
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might be much more complex than that. Frank Jackson, for example, offers an analysis of ‘good’ 
according to which it refers to the particular natural property that would make true a sufficient 
number of the normative claims that we would regard as platitudinous in particular idealised 
circumstances. On Peter Geach’s analysis, ‘good’ picks out the relational property of meeting the 
standard which is most relevant in the conversational context. For example, if we call a toaster 
‘good’ then on Geach’s view, in ordinary conversational circumstances, we would say that that 
toaster met the functional standards we judge toasters by; that they toast bread evenly, safely, 
without consuming much electricity, etc. To infer that there is no analysis of good even of the 
complexity of the analyses that Jackson or Geach offer from the fact that ‘good’ cannot be 
analysed as ‘pleasure’ or ‘desired’, does not seem warranted. 
To be fair to Moore, it should be mentioned that these more complex naturalistic analyses had 
not yet been proposed when he was writing and that he does quite a good job covering most of 
the major analyses that were on the table at the time.43 It should also be mentioned that on none 
of the more complex analyses of ‘good’ that have been offered since Moore was writing does the 
question, ‘Is N good?’, appear closed to most who have considered them. Charles Pigden argues 
that the continued failure to find any analysis of ‘good’ on which questions like, ‘Is N good?’, are 
closed gives us good inductive evidence that there is no such analysis waiting to be found.44 Since 
for every proposed analysis, N, that we have looked at so far the question, ‘Is N good?’, has been 
open we can be reasonably confident that for future proposed definitions we will look at the 
corresponding questions with also be open. Pigden admits that this weakens the anti-naturalist’s 
position since we can never be wholly certain that there will not be some future case that runs 
counter to the trend observed so far. At the same time, we rely on and are confident about all 
 
43 See Nuccatelli and Seay (2007, p.12) for more detail. 
44 Pigden (2012). 
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kinds of results reached by induction, so the anti-naturalist has a large, though defeasible, 
advantage over the naturalist as the dialectic stands, or so Pigden argues. 
The problem is that this is not a good induction, as Stephen Finlay points out.45 The anti-
naturalist is not merely saying that, since on analyses that we have looked at so far questions of 
the form, ‘Is N good?’, have been open, we know that on the next analysis we look at the 
corresponding questions will also be open, rather, they are arguing that every future question will 
be open. This inference is not licensed by the data. Since on the naturalist picture there can be at 
most one correct analysis of ‘good’, we would expect all but one of the indefinitely many 
questions of the form, ‘Is N good?’, to be open. The fact that questions of the form of, ‘Is N 
good?’, that we have so far considered have been open is not good inductive evidence that all 
such questions are open. That evidence equally supports the hypothesis that just one of the 
indefinitely many possible questions of the form, ‘Is N good?’ is closed and we have not yet 
come to consider it. 
The anti-naturalist might point out at this point is that the analyses we have so far considered 
were not randomly selected; they were the product of a great deal of deliberation on the part of 
some very clever philosophers. Many philosophers have devoted a great deal of energy to finding 
analyses of normative terms and on none of them so far considered has the question, ‘Is N 
good?’, appeared to be closed. Some anti-reductionists have argued that the best explanation of this 
fact is that all possible analyses are in fact open.46 This is the basis of the abductive version of the 
Open Question Argument. The idea is that we rule out analytic naturalism on the basis that it is 
much more plausible that there is no naturalistic analysis of ‘good’ than that there is an analysis 
which we just have not found yet, given our apparent failure to find any such analysis heretofore. 
 
45 Finlay (2014), Lenman & Lutz (2018). 
46 Smith (1994), Strandberg (2003), Ridge (2008) 
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Finlay argues that this argument faces its own induction problem since we cannot be confident 
that this is the best explanation until we consider all the other possible explanations.47 I do not 
agree with Finlay on this point. Presumably, we have never considered every possible explanation 
of any data. There are, I take it, indefinitely many possible explanations, many of them 
outlandish and grossly implausible, which could, in principle, be proposed for any data. 
Nevertheless, we feel confident that in many cases we have secured the best available 
explanation. It would surely prove too much to rule out abductive arguments on the grounds 
that we cannot consider every possible explanation of any data.48 
However, I do not think the hypothesis that there is no naturalistic analysis of ‘good’ offers the 
best explanation of the fact that on the analyses we have considered so far these questions have 
been open, for two reasons. First, it is doubtful that successful analyses will always be obviously 
correct to all competent language users. This means that there could be a naturalistic analysis of 
‘good’, even if ‘Is N good?’ is always an open question. Taking this line is to reject the second 
premise of Moore’s argument so I will return to this issue in the next section.  
Second, even if we think that on any correct analysis A of some concept C, the question ‘Is A C?’ 
will be closed, the fact that we have not found such an analysis for ‘good’ yet should come as no 
surprise. As Finlay noted, naturalists expect that at most one instance of, ‘Is N good?’, will be 
closed, so the fact that on all the instances we have considered so far the question seems open is 
not in need of much explaining. Unless that is, we have particularly good reason to expect that 
we ought to have found the right analysis by now. I do not see that we do have good reason to 
 
47 Finlay (2014, p.14) 
48 Finlay’s objection against abduction also applies to his own metaethical theory. Further down the page I just 
referenced Finlay writes, “My case for the end-relational theory will be that it provides the best explanation of our 
practices of normative speech and thought”. We might ask Finlay how he can be confident that his theory does 
offer the best explanation given that the possibility remains that there is a better explanation of our practices of 
normative speech and thought that may be found. Of course, I am not suggesting that that is in fact a good 
objection to Finlay’s theory, rather, I am highlighting that his objection to the abductive version of the Open 
Question Argument would apply to all abductive arguments including the one he makes for his own theory. 
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expect this. Though some very clever philosophers have tried to find analyses of normative 
terms, they do not number very many people and they have not been looking for all that long. 
There have been, at most, fairly few analyses A of philosophically interesting concepts C on 
which the question ‘Is A C?’ would be closed (some would argue that there have not been any). 
The debate concerning how to analyse <knowledge>, for example, is seemingly interminable and 
the literature on it is voluminous, but most philosophers do not take that as a reason to think 
that knowledge cannot be analysed.49 Even analyses of seemingly humdrum concepts like 
<bachelor>, <chair> or <paints> are open to doubt.50 The analysis of <bachelor> as being 
equivalent to <unmarried adult male> is often treated as the paradigmatic example of conceptual 
analysis but, as many philosophers have pointed out, cases like that of widowers and clergymen 
are possible counterexamples to it. If philosophers have not found an analysis of even 
<bachelor> on which the question ‘John is X but is he a bachelor?’ is not open, it is not 
surprising that we have not found a naturalistic analysis of <good> - which is potentially much  
more complex than <bachelor> - which makes, ‘Is N good?’, closed. 
A bolder way that the analytic naturalist can respond is to deny that there is anything to explain 
by showing that we have in fact already found successful analyses of normative terms. Finlay, 
Paul Ziff, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Frank Jackson, Michael Zimmerman and others have put 
forward analyses of normative terms on which it is not outrageous to suggest that, ‘Is N good?’, 
is closed. It does not seem that we can dismiss out of hand that, after due consideration and 
philosophical deliberation, we will see that these accounts do find some natural term which is 
more or less what we mean when we say that something is good and that anyone who, after due 
reflection, doubts the analysis is, to some extent or other, at least a little bit confused about how 
the concept <good> works. I do not want to defend any particular analysis here but it is worth 
 
49 Though see Fricker (2007), who suggests that <knowledge> may not be analysable, partly on the basis that 
attempts to analyse it so far have been futile and unedifying.   
50 Quine (1951), Fodor (1981, 1998a, 2004), Fillmore (1982), Margolis and Laurence (1999, 2003, 2004). 
25 
 
pointing out that anti-naturalists do not usually take any time to show that on these particular 
analyses questions of the form, ‘Is N good?, are open. Instead, they tend to just assume that, ‘Is 
N good?’ will always be open based on a very small number of simple toy examples, such as the 
view that ‘good’ means ‘pleasant’. I am not claiming that any of the more complex analyses are 
correct, just that the open question argument does not show that all of these accounts are not. 
We cannot be confident that on all these accounts ‘Is N good?’ will be open until we examine 
them. So, the open question argument has not proven to be the “blockbuster argument” by 
which we can know that all naturalistic accounts fail without examining the particular details of 
individual analyses.51  
To summarise, the naturalist is entitled to challenge Moore’s claim that all questions of the form, 
‘Is N good?’, are open. We have found very few, if any, analyses of philosophically interesting 
concepts, which are not open to doubt. If we are to remain open to the possibility that such 
analyses may still be found then there is no reason for us to think that the analysis of ‘good’ will 
be an exception. If we are happy to go along with Moore’s assumptions regarding meaning then 
we could test naturalistic analyses according to whether they make, ‘Is N good?’, closed. We do 
not have sufficient reason yet to conclude that every naturalistic analysis will fail this test. It may 
be that one such analysis has already been presented which passes the test and even if not, for all 
that Moore says, there remains the possibility that some future analysis could.  
§4 
That said, I am, as it happens, doubtful that if there is an analysis of ‘good’ (or of ‘knowledge’, 
‘free choice’, ‘truth’ and most other philosophically interesting terms) it will not be open to 
doubt. The analytic naturalist can argue that this is not a problem because successful analyses can 
 
51 Dancy (2006). 
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be non-obvious, at least in some cases. Adopting this approach is to reject the second premise of 
Moore’s argument.  
Many philosophers have linked Moore’s argument to the paradox of analysis.52 The paradox of 
analysis says that no informative analysis is possible. If, on the one hand, the analysans and 
analysandum have the same meaning then the analysis will be uninformative, but if, on the other 
hand, the analysans and analysandum do not have the same meaning then the ‘analysis’ is not 
really an analysis at all (though it may truly state that two things are identical). 53 Moore makes the 
same basic move with his open question argument; either, ‘pleasure is good’, is equivalent to the 
trivial claim, ‘pleasure is pleasure’, or, ‘pleasure is good’ relates two distinct concepts, 
undermining analytic naturalism. That two expressions could have the same meaning without it 
being obvious to competent speakers might seem prima facie surprising. It seems plausible that 
competence with a term consists in knowing its meaning. If X means F and Y also means F, and 
I know the meaning of both X and Y, then surely it should also be obvious to me that X and Y 
both mean the same thing.54 
At this point, some naturalists go in for a kind of partners in innocence response.55 We know that 
there are unobvious synonyms and unobvious analyses. It is everyone’s problem to explain how 
this can be so. Whatever the correct account of unobvious synonymy and analyticity turns out to 
be, the naturalist can just plug it into their story. For all that Moore says, normative terms and 
natural terms might be among the terms which stand in a non-obvious analytic relation to one 
another. If the correct analysis, ‘N’, of ‘good’, is synonymous with ‘good’ but not obviously so, 
then it is no surprise that the question, ‘Is N good?’, would appear open. 
 
52 e.g. Black (1944), Langford (1968), O’Connor (1982). 
53 Black (1944, 1945), White (1945, 1948), Church (1946), Feyerabend (1956) and Lewy (1976) offer useful 
discussions of the paradox. 
54 Michael Dummett  (1978, p.131) claims that this is an “undeniable” feature of meaning 
55 e.g. David Lewis (1988) and Smith (1994). Schroeder (2006) does not commit himself to a view of normative 
concepts but he suggests a similar response to the open question argument. 
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A classic example of unobvious synonyms are the terms ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’, which both refer to 
the same plant.56 These terms are synonymous but, so the thought goes, someone could be 
competent with both terms and not know this. They might know that both terms refer to shrubs 
with yellow flowers, which are native to Western Europe and North Africa and which looks 
such-and-such a way, etc., while being unsure whether they refer to exactly the same kind of 
shrub or merely similar-looking shrubs. The upshot is that the question, ‘I know that X is Furze, 
but is it Gorse?’, could be open to someone who we would class as competent with the use of 
both ‘Furze’ and ‘Gorse’. If that is correct then the same might be said of normative and natural 
terms. 
Other cases concern singular terms and co-referring descriptions. An example from C.H. 
Langford is of the analysis of ‘cube’ as ‘regular polyhedron with twelve edges’.57 ‘Regular 
polyhedron with twelve edges’ seems to give a good analysis of ‘cube’ by reducing it to simpler 
parts, but someone could conceivably doubt that a cube is a regular polyhedron with twelve 
edges. 
One might object to this by challenging the examples. It could be argued that competence with 
both ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ requires possessing enough information such that one could not fail to 
realise that they were synonymous. This seems to set the bar for competence very high since we 
could possess rather a lot of information about the terms while still being open to the possibility 
of their referring to two different natural kinds rather than one. I do not think it matches what 
we would intuitively believe ‘competence’ to require, but we do not need to get bogged down in 
that issue. If the bar for competence with ‘Furze’ and ‘Gorse’ is set so high that one could not be 
competent with both without realising that they are synonyms, then the naturalist can argue that 
we are in a similar position concerning normative and natural terms. It might be that we possess 
 
56 Kripke (1979) 
57 Langford (1968) 
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enough information about both the normative terms and natural terms such that we are 
confident when they should apply, have a reasonable idea of what follows from them, etc. but 
that we are shy of knowing that they are synonyms and so technically not competent with them.  
However, I do not think that these examples are ultimately very helpful for the naturalist. There 
seem to be limits on what competent speakers can believe about ‘cube’ or about ‘furze’ and 
‘gorse’ for which we do not find analogous limits in the case of normative terms. If someone 
thinks that ‘X does not have 12 edges and X is a cube’ then we will start to doubt their 
competence with the term ‘cube’. If they still believe that claim after being given time and 
opportunity to reflect upon the matter then our belief that they do not really understand what a 
cube is will grow much stronger. Similarly, one can be unsure whether all furze are gorse and be 
competent with the terms ‘Furze’ and ‘Gorse’, but it seems less likely that someone might be 
competent with both terms while thinking ‘X is Furze and X is not Gorse’. If someone 
confidently thinks that furze shrubs are not gorse, then it seems unlikely that they really mean by 
‘Gorse’ what they mean by ‘Furze’.  
By contrast, it seems possible that someone could think that some action was good, while also 
thinking that it does not, say, cause pleasure. The same seems to apply, mutatis mutandis, to other 
cases of normative and natural terms. Seemingly, we can be competent with normative terms 
while also believing that actions to which those terms apply either have or do not have particular 
natural properties, even after given chance for reflection. 58 The examples of ‘cube’ and ‘furze’ 
and ‘gorse’ then do not seem to be perfect analogies for the naturalist’s purposes. There seem to 
be limits on what competent speakers can intelligibly believe about ‘cube’, ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’, at 
least after reflection, that do not apply to normative terms.  
 
58 Strandberg (2004) makes a similar point. 
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Better examples for the naturalist’s purposes are cases of philosophical analysis. Concepts like 
‘knowledge’, ‘causation’, ‘free will’, etc. are difficult to analyse. An analysis like, ‘knowledge is true 
justified belief with no false lemma’, seems neither obviously correct nor obviously incorrect to 
speakers who are competent with the term ‘knowledge’, even after reflection. The fact that 
proposed analyses are not obviously correct or incorrect suggests that if there are analyses of 
these concepts then they will be nonobvious. The naturalist can claim that the same is true of 
normative terms. Whichever way is found to explain how non-obvious analysis is possible could 
be appropriated by the naturalist to respond to the open question argument. 
§4.1 
A worry about the partners in innocence response it that it is by no means obvious that everyone 
must explain how analysis is possible. There are powerful arguments against the idea of 
conceptual analysis, at least as it has traditionally been understood. The failure to find any 
uncontroversial cases of analysis is used as evidence that conceptual analysis of philosophically 
interesting terms is bunk.59 A second worry, is that even if we can show that there are analyses of 
terms like ‘knowledge’ there is no guarantee that the solution can be applied to normative terms. 
It would be good if analytic naturalists went beyond a simple partners in innocence response and 
said something about how analysis works. 
One solution to the paradox of analysis is to disambiguate between two ways which someone 
could be said to know the meaning of an expression. One way is to have what we might call 
conscious knowledge of the meaning of an expression whereby we consciously associate with the 
expression, and would be able to report if asked, some description, or prototypical features, or 
(depending on your theory of meaning) whatever other semantic value might constitute the 
meaning of the expression. The other way of knowing the meaning of an expression might be a 
 
59 Fodor (1998a), Margolis and Laurence (1999, 2003, 2004). 
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case of tacit knowledge or of knowledge-how. This could consist of some kind of disposition or 
pattern of usage, which demonstrates that we are competent at using the expression, but which 
does not require that we would be able to report anything like a definition or analysis of the 
expression. Because the latter kind of knowledge does not require conscious acknowledgement 
this gives us a way to answer the paradox of analysis. If we only know the meaning of the 
analysans in some kind of tacit sense it becomes possible that an analysis might be informative to 
us, since something’s being informative to us partially consists in its becoming apparent to us on 
the conscious level. 60 
This solution can be adapted so as to apply to the open question argument. The reason that, ‘Is 
N good?’, appears open to competent language users, might be that we only associate ‘N’ with 
‘good’ in some tacit or unconscious way. In other words, ‘N’ and ‘good’ might only have the 
same meaning in virtue of the fact that we have the same kinds of dispositions in how we use 
these expressions. Since these dispositions do not require that we recognise that synonymous 
expressions are synonymous we can explain why ‘Is N good?’ looks open to us even though ‘N’ 
is an analysis of ‘good’. Stephen Finlay takes a view along these lines.61 
A second solution to the paradox of analysis is to deny that in successful analyses the analysans 
and analysandum are always synonyms. This makes some intuitive sense. Identity of meaning is a 
symmetrical relation whereas we tend to think of analysis in asymmetrical terms. For instance, we 
might say that ‘justified true belief with no false lemma’ is an analysis of ‘knowledge’, but we 
would not offer ‘knowledge’ as an analysis of ‘justified true belief with no false lemma’. If 
analysis just uncovered synonyms then we would need to explain why analysis is asymmetrical.  
This suggestion makes the problem of explaining how there can be informative analyses 
tractable. If ‘knowledge’ can be analysed as, but does not have the exact same meaning as, 
 
60 See Rey (1993) and Peacocke (1992). 
61 Finlay (2014, ch.1). 
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‘justified true belief with no false lemma,’ then it makes sense that we could be competent with 
the term ‘knowledge’ but not already know how it is to be analysed.  
However, if analysis is not the uncovering of synonymity, what is it? According to Jeffrey King, 
analysis discovers the structure of the properties referred to by the various terms or concepts 
that are being analysed.62 If we discover that ‘bachelor’ can be analysed as ‘unmarried adult man’ 
then we discover that the property being a bachelor has as its components the properties being 
unmarried, being an adult and being a man. These properties may in turn be composed of other 
properties. There is not space for a defence of this kind of account of properties but it is worth 
noting one of the main advantages of this account; it offers a straightforward explanation of 
property entailment. 63 If being a bachelor has as one of its components the property being a man 
then it is easy to see why everything that is a bachelor is necessarily a man. 
King’s solution to the paradox of analysis suggests a way for the analytic naturalist to refute the 
open question argument. They could maintain that ‘good’ can be analysed as, say, ‘causes 
pleasure’, but that these expressions are not strictly synonymous. Since these expressions do not 
have identical meaning, a competent language users could think that, ‘Is that which causes 
pleasure also good?’, is an open question. Someone could understand the meaning of ‘good’ 
without necessarily recognising an analysis of it when they see it, since the analysans would have 
a separate meaning. 
A potential problem with the analytic naturalist adopting King’s account of analysis is that it 
might seem to go against the motivation for being an analytic naturalist in the first place. On 
King’s account ‘being alcohol’ can be analysed as ‘being composed of C2H5OH molecules’ since 
the property referred to by ‘being alcohol’ is plausibly composed of the simpler properties 
referred to by ‘being composed of C2H5OH molecules’. This kind of analysis can only be 
 
62 King (1998). 
63 For a full defence of this account see King (1998) and Schroeder (2007, ch.5).  
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uncovered by scientific investigation however. The analytic naturalist does not want to say that 
identity claims between normative and natural terms can only be uncovered by scientific 
investigation; they want to make sense of the idea that normative inquiry is, to a significant 
extent, an a priori process.  
Fortunately, King makes some distinctions between different kinds of analysis which are helpful 
for the analytic naturalist. He distinguishes between scientific analyses (like the alcohol example), 
trivial analyses (like the analysis of ‘brother’ as ‘male sibling’) and philosophical analyses (like the 
analysis of ‘knowledge’). These kinds of analysis are distinguished from one another along 
epistemic lines. Competence with a term that has a trivial analysis requires that one would 
recognise that the property picked out by the analysandum is composed of the properties picked 
out by the analysans. For example, to be competent with ‘brother’ requires that one would be 
able to recognise that, ‘X is a brother but is x a male sibling?’, is a closed question. Philosophical 
and scientific analysis meanwhile do not require this. However, philosophical analyses do require 
that competent language users might, at least in principle, be able to recognise that at least some 
of the component properties picked out by the analysans constitute the property picked out by 
the analysandum by reflecting sufficiently on their own usage of the term and on their intuitions 
about when the term correctly applies. 
This, I take it, is roughly what analytic naturalists want to say about competence with normative 
terms. They think that we can arrive at an analysis of normative terms by reflecting on our 
normative thought and practices; a process which is complicated enough that one need not 
recognise a correct analysis as correct when one sees it. Because analyses can be non-obvious on 
this model, questions of the form, ‘Is N good?’, could be open even if ‘N’ was an analysis of 
‘good’. So, King’s account of philosophical analysis is a good model for the analytic naturalist to 
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adopt when responding to the open question argument. It allows room for a priori normative 
theorising but also gives a ready explanation of why intuitively open questions are open.64 
As we have seen, there are at least two promising models of analysis on which non-obvious 
analysis looks possible. Either of these can also be used to explain why intuitively open questions 
are open. If, however, neither of these models proves to be any good, the naturalist can still 
always retreat back to a partners in innocence response. Moore never managed to solve the 
problem of analysis so he would have no way of barring this move.65 We have no reason for 
thinking that the solution to the paradox of analysis will not be open to the analytic naturalist. 
Alternatively, if there is no solution to the paradox and analysis is not possible, then we could 
reject the third premise of Moore’s argument. If concepts were not, in general, analysable then 
we would have no reason to maintain that distinct concepts cannot refer to the same properties. 
I move on to consider the third premise of Moore’s argument now. 
§5 
The third premise of Moore’s argument stated: 
(3) If ‘N’ is not an analysis of ‘good’, then ‘N’ and ‘good’ do not refer to the same 
properties. 
Perhaps the most popular response to Moore’s argument has been to reject this premise.66 We 
might go about doing this a few ways, which I go through below. 
§5.1 – Simple Natural Properties? 
 
64 Once we plug the story about philosophical analyses into King’s account it is, I think, in essentials very similar to 
the first solution. Finlay acknowledges his debt to King so this is probably no surprise. 
65 Moore (1968) admits as much.  
66 Durant (1970), Harman (1977), Putnam (1981, p.208), Lycan (1988), Sturgeon (1985), Boyd (1988/1995), Brink 
(1989), Railton (1989, 1993), Schroeder (2007).  
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Moore argues that because ‘good’ is unanalysable, goodness must be a simple property. That, 
however, does not show that goodness is non-natural since, as Moore accepts, there are natural 
properties which are simple. Moore’s argument does not block a kind of naturalism that says that 
‘good’ is unanalysable but that goodness is a simple, natural property. 
Moore recognises the possibility of this kind of reply but pledges to show that it cannot work 
later in Principia Ethica.67 However, the argument he comes back with is unconvincing. 
Throughout the book Moore moves between different ways of understanding what counts as a 
‘natural’, but he eventually settled on the idea that natural terms and natural properties are the 
kinds of terms or properties that are countenanced in the natural sciences and psychology.68 The 
kinds of properties that natural sciences and psychology study, Moore says, are those that exist in 
time.69 Moore argues that we can test whether goodness exists in time, and hence whether goodness 
is natural, in the following way: 
“Can we imagine ‘good’ as existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural object? 
For myself, I cannot imagine it, whereas with the greatest number of properties of objects – those which I 
call the natural properties – their existence does seem to me to be independent of the existence of those 
objects. They are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which attach to 
it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not even a bare substance.”70 
This is a flawed test. I cannot imagine any property as existing by itself in time. The property being 
six feet tall is a natural property that many objects have but it is scarcely possible to imagine the 
property being six feet tall as existing by itself in time, separate from any object with a particular 
height. I can also make little sense of the idea that we might take away the property being six feet 
tall from an object and in doing so remove one of that object’s parts but leave the rest of its 
properties. So, Moore’s test is no help in distinguishing natural from non-natural properties. 
Consequently, he has no basis for saying that goodness could not be a simple, natural property. 
 
67 Moore (1993, p.65). 
68 ibid., pp.13-5, p.92. 
69 ibid, p.93 
70 ibid. 
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Nicholas Sturgeon has argued that goodness is a natural property but that it cannot necessarily be 
denoted by, or analysed in terms of, purely non-normative terms.71 If goodness is causally 
efficacious (as Sturgeon thinks it is) then it is broadly a natural property, but there is no 
guarantee that all natural properties can be denoted by a term from the natural sciences or 
psychology. It may be that goodness is too multiply realisable in scientific or psychological terms to 
be denotable by anything other than ‘good’ and equivalent ethical terms. Moore has no way to 
refute Sturgeon’s position. 
There is, however, an argument that has been made by Frank Jackson and others that convinces 
me that if normative properties were natural properties then they could be picked out by non-
normative natural predicates. 72 I talk about this argument in the next chapter. I said earlier that 
the best way for a non-naturalist to understand talk of normative properties being sui generis and 
irreducible was that they could not be referred to by any non-normative predicates. This means 
that if Jackson’s argument is successful then normative properties are not simple in the relevant 
sense. Since I think that Jackson’s argument is successful, I prefer not to argue that normative 
properties could be simple in order to refute Moore’s argument so I move on instead to a 
different response.  
§5.2 – Frege’s Puzzle 
I talked in the last section about the parallels between the open question argument and the 
paradox of analysis. Another problem regarding meaning which closely resembles the open 
question argument is Frege’s puzzle.73 Intuitively, claims like, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, and 
,‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, differ in meaning, even though ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are co-
referring. Someone could doubt that, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, is true (many people did), but no 
 
71 Sturgeon (2005). 
72 Jackson (1998). 
73 A similarity noticed by Church (1946), Kalderon (2004), Schroeder (2007) and Cullison (2008). 
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one could doubt that, ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, is true. That being so, having the same reference 
cannot be sufficient for two names to have the same meaning, or so the argument goes.74 
The open question argument is more or less the same argument but applied to predicates rather 
than names. Moore challenges us to explain how, if goodness is identical to the natural property 
pleasurable, it is possible to doubt that, ‘Pleasure is good’, is true. If goodness is the same as 
pleasurable, then, ‘Pleasure is good’, should be equivalent in meaning to, ‘Pleasure is pleasure’. We 
know that these claims are not equivalent in meaning since we can doubt the former claim but 
not the latter. The same applies, Moore argues, to all identity statements containing normative 
and natural terms. So, goodness cannot be a natural property. 
I suggested in the last section that in response to the open question argument, the analytic 
naturalist might just adopt a partners in innocence response, arguing that since everyone needs an 
account of non-obvious synonymy to answer the paradox of analysis anyway, the analytic 
naturalist is no worse off than anyone else. With Frege’s Puzzle in mind, the naturalist might 
adopt a different partners in innocence response. They might argue that since everyone needs some 
account of how it is that we can doubt identity statements, the naturalist is no worse off than 
anyone else. We could solve the open question argument by adapting whichever solution we find 
to Frege’s Puzzle.75 
That being said it would, again, be more satisfying if we had something more positive to say. 
Frege’s solution to his puzzle was to suggest that the meaning of an expression is not exhausted 
by its referent. This opens up the possibility that normative and natural terms might have 
different meanings but still have the same reference. Just as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ differ 
in meaning even though they both refer to Venus, so might ‘causes pleasure’ and ‘good’ differ in 
meaning even though they both refer to the same natural property.  
 
74 Frege (1997). 
75 This is Mark Schroeder’s main response to the open question argument (2007, ch.5). 
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This suggestion could be used to explain why, ‘Is N good?’, is an open question. Where two 
expressions refer to the same property but are not identical in meaning, it is possible for 
competent language users to doubt identity statements containing those terms. The classic 
example used in the literature is, ‘Water is H2O’. Just as, ‘Is Water H2O?’, could appear open to 
people who were competent with both ‘Water’ and ‘H2O’, so, ‘Is N good?’, could appear open to 
people who were competent with both ‘N’ and ‘good’. These forms of naturalism can explain the 
intuitive openness of questions like, ‘Is N good?’, on the grounds that on their view normative 
concepts are not reducible to (and hence have a different cognitive significance to) natural concepts, 
even though normative properties are natural properties. 
This is a different response to the open question argument to those that I have considered up to 
this point. Previously, I suggested ways that the naturalist could maintain that normative 
concepts are analysable in natural terms. Now, the suggestion is that the naturalist might agree 
that we could not discover that, say, goodness is causing pleasure by analysis alone, but still maintain 
that normative properties are natural properties. It cannot be discovered by analysis alone that, 
‘Water is H2O’, is true but that does not make us doubt that being water and being H2O are the 
same property. The naturalist can say that the same is true in the case of identity claims 
containing normative and natural terms. 
§5.3 – Horgan and Timmons’ Objection 
There have been some interesting challenges to naturalist theories which argue that normative 
and natural terms might work like the, ‘Water is H2O’, case. Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, 
have argued that the open question argument works even against these forms of naturalism.76  
On 2-dimensional semantics, an a-intension is a proposition which fixes the referent of a 
particular term. The proposition depends on various folk platitudes concerning the term in 
 
76 I consider some of Horgan and Timmons’ other arguments in chapter 6. 
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question. On Frank Jackson’s 2-dimensional semantics, for instance, the a-intension of the term, 
‘Water’, is something like ‘Water is the clear potable liquid that fills our oceans and lakes’.77 On 
this view, knowledge of the a-intension of a term is necessary for conceptual competence with 
that term. A result of this is that though we can doubt that ‘Water is H2O’ is true, we should not 
be able to doubt that ‘Water’ denotes the clear, potable liquid that fills our oceans and lakes. 
Another way to put this might be to say that, while ‘X is water, but is X H2O?’ may be an open 
question, ‘X is water but is X the clear potable liquid that fills our lakes and rivers?’ is not.  
At this point Horgan and Timmons point out that the same is not true in the normative case. 
Jackson assigns to ‘good’ the a-intension ‘the property that would play the goodness-role in 
mature folk morality’. Fulfilling the goodness-role requires making true enough of the claims 
about ‘good’ that we would regard as platitudinous in certain idealised circumstances. In other 
words, ‘good’ refers to whatever natural property makes true as many of the platitudes of 
“mature folk morality” as possible. For example, in mature folk morality we might deem that 
‘killing someone is not typically a good thing’ is a platitude. Whichever natural property would, if 
it were the referent of ‘good’, make true as many of these mature folk morality platitudes as 
possible, is the natural property that is identical to goodness on Jackson’s account. For example, 
killing someone does not typically cause people pleasure, so the natural property pleasurable would 
make true the platitude ‘killing someone is not typically a good thing to do’. If the supposition 
that ‘good’ denotes pleasurable also makes true more of the mature folk moral platitudes than the 
supposition that ‘good’ denotes some other natural property, then pleasurable is the natural 
property denoted by ‘good’. 
Horgan and Timmons argue that if such an account were correct then the question, ‘X has the 
property that would play the goodness-role in mature folk morality, but is X good?’ would be a 
closed question, just as, ‘X is water but is X the clear potable liquid that fills our lakes and 
 
77 Jackson (1998) 
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rivers?’, is. But, the normative question does not seem to be closed. It might be the case that 
people are normatively misguided, such that the natural property that would make true most of 
their mature folk morality’s platitudes would not be goodness. It seems to be a contingent matter 
what natural property would fulfil the goodness-role in mature folk morality, but not a 
contingent matter what is good. For example, it might turn out that mature folk moralists are all 
utilitarians and that pleasurable fulfils the goodness-role. This would not settle the matter of 
whether good is that which causes pleasure. In other words, it would still be an open question 
whether utilitarianism was true. So, the ‘Water is H2O’ example is not a good analogy for the case 
of normative and natural terms. 
That may seem to be just be a problem with Jackson’s particular semantic account. But Horgan 
and Timmons think that it generalises to any account of how the reference of ‘good’ gets fixed.78 
For example, on causal theories of meaning goodness is the natural property that causally regulates 
our use of the word ‘good’. But, ‘X is good but does X have the property that causally regulates 
our use of the word ‘good’?’ also seems to be an open question. It might be that our use of 
‘good’ has been guided by some natural property which, in fact, many bad actions have. 
§5.4 – Responses to Horgan and Timmons 
There are three main responses to this argument. All these responses correspond to the three 
main responses to Moore’s Open Question Argument so I do not dwell on them here lest I 
labour the point. 
First, we could argue that on the correct account of the reference-fixing relation the following 
really will be a closed question: ‘X is good but does X have the property R [the natural property 
that that fixes the referent of ‘good’?] Or, we could at least argue that we are not in a position to 
know that all questions of that form are open. For all we know there might be some way of, for 
 
78 See Horgan & Timmons (2000, p.149). 
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instance, spelling out just what mature folk morality, such that we really would not be able to 
question whether the things that the mature folk moralists call ‘good’ are in fact good. 
Second, we could argue that even though the question, ‘X has the property that would play the 
goodness-role in mature folk morality, but is X good?’ is open, that does not mean that it is not 
an analytic truth that goodness is the property that plays the goodness-role.79 We might only know 
that that goodness is that which plays the goodness-role by doing the kinds of philosophical analysis 
that I spoke about in the last section, and philosophical analysis can be informative and non-
trivial. Arriving at a correct semantic account by philosophical analysis will be a complex and 
controversial process, so it really would not be surprising if it was non-obvious. 
Third, we could deny, pace Jackson, that questions like, ‘X is water but is X the clear potable 
liquid that fills our lakes and rivers?’, are closed or that that they are even answerable by analysis 
alone, preserving the analogy between the water case and the normative case. Stephen Laurence 
and Eric Margolis make a good case for this point: 
“Recall that being watery is, roughly, a matter of being clear, liquid, drinkable, falling 
from the skies as rain, filling the rivers, lakes, oceans, etc. But liquid can’t be part of the a 
priori specification of its a-intension, since this would rule out water in its gaseous and 
solid forms. Similarly, whether water is clear depends to a large extent on the amount and 
type of impurities in a given sample, and since what counts as an impurity is itself subject 
to empirical investigation, clear isn’t a better candidate than liquid. Consider also the 
situation of someone who grows up with no exposure to lakes or oceans - maybe a 
nomad in the Sahara. If Jackson’s analysis is right, such a person should be able to know 
a priori that water fills oceans and lakes or else she lacks the concept WATER altogether. 
We take it, however, that neither of these possibilities is at all plausible, so one has to 
 
79 Jackson gives this response (1998). 
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cross off fills the oceans and lakes as well. In fact, we doubt that any of Jackson’s purported 
“watery” characteristics are immune to revision.”80 
In other words, ‘X is water but is X the clear potable liquid that fills our lakes and rivers?’, really 
could be doubted by someone who was competent with the term ‘water’, so there is no 
disanalogy with the normative case.  
This might seem just to be a problem with Jackson’s theory of reference, but the same point can 
be applied to other theories of reference too. Take a Boyd-style causal theory of reference. When 
it comes to the normative case, Laurence, Margolis and Angus Dawson point out that we should 
not expect the question, ‘X is good but does X have the property that causally regulates our use 
of the word ‘good’?’ to be closed.81 Even if the causal theory of reference is correct, determining 
that it is so will be the result of a long, complex and contentious theoretical enquiry. The results 
of such an enquiry will undoubtedly not be obvious to every competent language user. 
Nor need the a-intension of a term be something which we could know purely a priori through 
philosophical analysis. Though there is not space to do the matter justice here, it can be argued 
that semantic theories are really more like natural science hypotheses than they are the result of 
pure armchair reasoning.82 Semantic theories are, on this view, empirical theories which explain 
how and why human beings use various sounds and symbols in the ways that they do. They are 
as open to revision by, and dependent on, empirical information as any other empirical theory. If 
that were the case, then there would be no reason to expect that every competent language user 
could come to recognise the correct theory of reference, even in principle, through philosophical 
analysis alone. If that is the case then then normative terms will not have an a-intension which all 
competent language users necessarily know (or are in a position to know) purely a priori. There 
 
80 Margolis & Laurence (2003, p.262) 
81 Laurence, Margolis & Dawson (1999). 
82 See Millikan (1987) and Dowell (2016). 
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would then be no disanalogy between the case of ‘water’ and the case of normative terms, so 
Horgan and Timmons’ revival of the open question argument would fail. 
The same responses that were available to Moore’s original argument are also available to 
Horgan and Timmons’ attempt to revive the argument. These responses are more or less as 
effective against Horgan and Timmons’s argument as they are against Moore’s, which is no 
surprise since the arguments are fundamentally very similar. Since, as I have argued, we have 
good reason to suppose that the standard responses to the open question argument stand up, we 
also have good reason to doubt Horgan and Timmons’ variation on that argument. 
§5.5 – Bedke’s Challenge 
Matthew Bedke offers a different and interesting challenge to the applicability of the ‘Water is 
H2O’ example to the normative case.
83 He takes an argument from David Chalmers and Frank 
Jackson against certain reductive accounts in the philosophy of mind and applies it to reductions 
in metaethics.84 Chalmers and Jackson are interested in ‘phenomenal gap’ accounts, which hold 
that brain states are identical to conscious states but that brain-state concepts are non-equivalent to 
consciousness concepts.85 This supposed ‘phenomenal gap’ between thinking about brain states 
and thinking about conscious experience is used to rebut some of the standard objections to 
reductionism about consciousness, such as the conceivability of philosophical zombies. The 
apparent conceivability of zombies - which have brain states but no consciousness – is supposed 
to present a problem for reductionists. ‘Phenomenal gap’ accounts have it that we can conceive 
of beings with brain states but no consciousness because brain-state concepts and consciousness 
concepts have a different cognitive significance, even though they both refer to the same thing.  
 
83 Bedke (2012). Gibbard (2003, ch.5) makes a similar point. 
84 Chalmérs and Jackson (2002). 
85 See e.g. Papineau (2002), Perry (2001), Levine (2001).  
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The relevance of this kind of account to the open question argument is obvious.86 If we can 
maintain that the difference between phenomenal and brain-states concepts can explain why we 
can judge that a question like, ‘X has such-and-such brain states but is X having such-and-such a 
conscious experience?’, is open, then we can use the difference between normative and natural 
concepts to explain why, ‘Is N good?’, is open. 
In response to the phenomenal gap account, Chalmers and Jackson argue that if x-properties are 
identical to y-properties then knowledge of all the y-facts would suffice for knowledge of all the 
x-facts. They return to the example of water and H2O. While the concepts <water> and <H2O> 
are distinct, knowing all the H2O-facts, plus possession of the concept <water>, would lead to 
us knowing all the water facts. A complete picture of all the H2O-facts leaves out nothing 
relating to water. They go on to argue that, by contrast, we could know all the facts pertaining to 
people’s brain states without knowing all the facts about their conscious experience. This 
suggests that brain-state concepts and consciousness concepts cannot really be picking out the 
same properties after all. The brain-state concepts leave out some important information that the 
consciousness-concepts contain. Therefore, brain states cannot be identical to conscious states. 
In the same vein, Bedka argues that if we knew all the natural facts then we would not know all 
the normative facts, meaning that normative properties cannot be natural properties. On this 
picture, even if normative and natural concepts are distinct, they can only count as coreferring if 
there are certain semantic entailments between them. Particularly, it needs to be the case that an 
ideal agent could, given all the natural truths and the normative concepts, infer all of the 
normative truths. They should be able to do this by simply applying the normative concepts to 
the natural truths they have. So, if ‘good’ just referred to the natural property pleasurable, an ideal 
agent, given all the natural facts and given the application conditions for the concept <good>, 
 
86 Yetter-Chappell and Chappell (2012) and Laskowski (2019) both adapt the phenomenal gap account to respond to 
the open question argument. 
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should be able to determine all the facts about which things are good. But, Bedke alleges, an ideal 
agent clearly would not be able to do this. He concludes that we need to invoke properties 
beyond the purely natural ones to make normative claims come out as true. 
§5.6 – Responses to Bedke 
The naturalist has two main ways to respond to Bedka. First, naturalists could reject the claim 
that if we knew all the natural facts then we would not know all the normative facts, or to at least 
deny that we are in any position to know that this claim is true. If we knew all the natural facts, 
including all the facts about meaning, metaethics and metasemantics87, then, for all we know, we 
may well come to know all the normative facts. I take it that normative naturalism has a non-
zero chance of turning out to be true. That being so, there is at least a chance that once all the 
facts were in we would have learned that normative properties are natural properties, and so 
would be able to infer all the normative facts from our knowledge of natural properties. The 
assumption that we would not know all the normative facts upon learning all the natural facts 
may just be a failure of imagination. Our ability to accurately judge what we could infer once we 
knew every single natural fact is significantly limited at best.88 
The other response is to challenge the claim that where x-properties are identical to y-properties, 
knowledge of all the x-facts would necessarily suffice for knowledge of all the y-facts. There are 
two main ways that we can understand fact-talk. If we understand ‘facts’ as being something like 
states of affairs then knowledge of x-facts will necessarily suffice for knowledge of y-facts if x-
properties are y-properties. If some normative property is identical to a particular natural 
property then an action’s having that normative property is the same state of affairs as that 
action’s having the natural property. In that case, the normative fact that that action is, say, good, 
would be the same fact as the natural fact that that action, say, causes pleasure. However, if this 
 
87 Assuming, controversially, that facts about meaning, metaethics and metasemantics are natural facts. 
88 Bedke (2012, p.120) recognises the possibility of this reply but simply dismisses it.  
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is the case then knowledge of all the natural facts will suffice for knowledge of the normative 
facts, if naturalism is true. If some natural fact consists of the same state of affairs as some 
normative fact, then knowing that natural fact trivially suffices for knowledge the normative fact, 
since those states of affairs are one and the same. For example, if an action’s causing happiness is 
the same state of affairs as its being good, and knowing a fact just requires knowing the that the 
states of affairs that it consists in obtains, then knowing that an action causes pleasure suffices 
for knowing that that action is good since these are the same facts. Of course, anti-naturalists will 
deny that normative facts are natural facts so they will not think that the knowledge that a 
particular natural state of affairs obtains will suffice for knowledge of a normative fact, but 
would they need an independent argument for this claim. 
Bedke needs to understand talk of facts differently. He might instead understand ‘facts’ as 
referring to true interpreted sentences. We can know that one sentence is true without knowing 
that another sentence which refers to the same state of affairs is true if we are unaware that the 
terms used in those sentences refer to the same properties. Understood this way though 
knowledge of all the natural facts might not suffice for knowledge of all the normative facts. I 
might for instance be fully opinionated on which sentences, which use only natural concepts, are 
true of a situation without having any view about which sentences, which use normative 
concepts, are also true. 
This need not mean that normative properties cannot be natural properties, however. Take the 
example of indexical concepts. In John Perry’s classic example, a man pushes a shopping trolley 
around a supermarket trying to determine who has spilled a line of sugar on the floor.89 
Unbeknownst to him, a bag of sugar in his own shopping cart has a tear in it and he is in fact 
following a trail left by himself. The man seems to know that the claim ‘The shopper with the 
torn bag of sugar is making a mess’ is true, but he does not believe the claim ‘I am making a 
 
89 Perry (1979) 
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mess’, even though he is the shopper with the torn bag of sugar. The moral of the story is that 
we can have knowledge of all the non-indexical facts without having knowledge of all the 
indexical facts.90 However, we do not take that to mean that the person referred to by his use of 
‘I’ is somehow ontologically distinct from the person with the leaking bag of sugar.91 Similarly, it 
could be argued that we could know all the natural facts (in the true-sentence sense of fact) without 
knowing all the normative facts, even if normative properties were natural properties, if natural 
concepts are distinct from normative concepts. At least, I do not see what reason (beyond the 
fact that it follows from certain, controversial, semantic theories)92 that Bedke gives us to accept 
that this could not be the case.  
So, if we understand fact-talk the first way then to claim that knowledge of all the natural facts 
does not suffice for knowledge of all the normative facts begs the question. While, if we 
understand fact-talk the second way then we have no reason to expect that knowledge of all the 
natural facts should suffice for knowledge of all the normative facts. 
It might be argued that indexical concepts are a special case and that we cannot infer anything 
about the relation between natural and normative concepts from them.93 We could then point to 
other potential examples but these will all be a bit more controversial. Many philosophers are of 
the opinion that chemical and biological objects are nothing (ontologically speaking) over-and-
above their microphysical constituents but that there are nevertheless no ‘bridge laws’ between 
 
90 It could possibly be argued that the man in the supermarket could in fact figure out that it was he who spilled the 
sugar from all the non-indexical facts. I do not think that the same could be argued in relation Perry’s other example 
of Rudolf Lingens in the library (Perry (1977), cf. Lewis (1979a)) however; an example which illustrates the same 
point.  
91 James Lenman suggested to me in conversation that a philosopher like Geoffrey Medell might argue that 
reflection on these kinds of cases supports a kind of substance dualism. The idea would be that ‘I’ refers to a non-
physical mind while non-indexical terms like ‘the shopper’ refer to a physical body. This would undermine the 
analogy I am trying to make since it would show that indexical and non-indexical terms are not co-referring. I 
cannot see how this could be made into a plausible position, however. ‘I’ in claims like, ‘I have two legs’, could not 
refer to a non-physical mind, and a non-indexical like ‘the shopper’ could not refer to a physical body that is distinct 
from a mind in claims like ‘the shopper believes that 2+2=4’. 
92 Neil Mehta (2013) offers a semantic theory on which there might be no semantic links between some coreferring 
concepts. He argues, convincingly to my mind, that his theory is more parsimonious and explanatorily powerful than 
the one that Bedke relies on. 
93 Chalmers (2004) presents some arguments against reductionism in a review of Perry (2001) that are in the same 
ballpark as Bedka’s but for which analogies to indexical concepts arguably do not help. 
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micro-physical concepts and chemical and biological concepts such that one could get all the 
biological facts from the micro-physical facts.94 Since these examples are controversial I do not 
think that they can be used to decisively settle the matter. However, as long as it remains 
unsettled whether we could always infer all the facts about some domain of properties from all 
the facts about the domain of properties where the first domain reduces to the second domain, 
the anti-naturalist cannot be said to have yet refuted naturalism. 
§6 – Conclusion 
The three main kinds of responses that naturalists have made to the open question argument 
seem to me to hold up. If we suppose that there are analyses of philosophically interesting terms 
that could not be doubted then we have no reason to think that ‘good’ and other normative 
terms are an exception. If analysis is not always obvious then there is no reason to expect that, 
‘Is N good?’, must be a closed question. Moreover, even if good cannot be analysed, that does 
not mean that goodness could not be a natural property. I now move on to look at some ways that 
people have reinterpreted Moore’s arguments so that they do not rely on any controversial 
assumptions about meaning or content. 
  
 
94 Block and Stalnaker (1999) make this point too.  
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Chapter 2: The Open Question Argument Part 2 
In the last chapter, I argued that G.E. Moore’s open question argument does not refute 
naturalism. Moore’s argument, at least as I interpreted it, relies on some dubious claims about 
meaning which the naturalist can reject. Andrew Altman and Peter A. Sutton have both argued, 
though in different ways, that we can interpret Moore in such a way that his argument does not 
rest on any claims about meaning.95 They argue that, so understood, the open question argument 
is not weak to the responses that have been standardly be made to it. I argue that Altman and 
Sutton’s versions of the open question argument are in fact weak to the standard responses (or 
slightly modified versions of them) and that their arguments also fail for other reasons. I focus 
mostly on Altman’s argument because I think that there is more to say about it and because I 
think that what there is to say about Altman’s arguments largely apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
Sutton’s argument. 
§1 
According to what Altman calls, “The Standard Interpretation” of the open question argument, 
Moore argues that goodness cannot be a natural property because ‘good’ has a different cognitive 
significance to all natural terms. This is the just the interpretation I looked at in the last chapter. 
Altman lays out the standard objections to Moore’s argument on the Standard Interpretation, 
which I also covered in the last chapter. By way of a reminder, here they are again: 
Question-begging - The open question argument is said to be question-begging in the sense 
that it assumes that no natural term ‘N’ has the same cognitive significance as ‘good’ to 
support the contention that every possible question of the form, ‘Is N good?’ will be 
open. This assumption is just what is in contention between (analytic) naturalists and their 
 
95 Altman (2004), Sutton (2014). 
49 
 
opponents (assuming that Moore’s other premises are correct), so the argument begs the 
question.  
Hasty generalisation - Moore’s argument generalises from our intuitions about a very 
limited numbers of naturalist theories to every possible naturalist theory. Moore only 
considers the views that goodness is identical to pleasurable, desired, approved of and that which 
we desire to desire, but there are many more views available. Moore is not justified in 
generalising about all cases from the limited number of cases that he considers. 
The Paradox of Analysis - Moore’s argument seems to require that there are no non-
obvious analyses. This is unfortunate since there seem to be many putative examples of 
non-obvious analyses. We should not infer from the fact that everyone would accept, 
‘pleasure is pleasure’, but not, ‘pleasure is good’, that ‘good’ cannot be analysed as 
‘pleasure’. 
Synthetic Naturalism96- Moore’s argument seems to assume that if two expressions have 
different cognitive significance then they must refer to distinct entities but this is not 
necessarily the case. It is often claimed that the predicates “Is water” and “Is composed 
of H2O molecules” both refer to one and the same property, being water, even though 
these predicates do not have the same meaning; people knew perfectly well the meaning 
of the predicate “is water” prior to the discovery in chemistry that water is composed of 
H2O molecules. The same might be said of ‘good’ and natural terms that refer to the 
same property. 
Altman is happy to accept that the standard objections refute Moore’s argument on the Standard 
Interpretation. He motivates his own interpretation of Moore’s argument largely based on the 
assurance that it is not subject to these objections. Because of that and because I already 
 
96 This is something of a misnomer since some analytic naturalists, such as Frank Jackson, can use a version of this 
objection. 
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discussed these objections at length in the last chapter, I will, in what follows, assume that if 
these objections apply to Altman’s argument then that argument is unsound.  
§2 – Altman’s Interpretation of Moore 
According to the Standard Interpretation, Moore was concerned to show that goodness could not 
be identical to any natural property because for any natural property, we can always doubt 
whether objects with that natural property are also good, whereas we cannot doubt that objects 
with that natural property have that natural property. This shows, Moore argues, that goodness 
cannot be identical to any natural property.  Altman finds a different reading. 
The passage from Principia Ethica that Altman most focuses on appears is §13. In this passage, 
Moore is trying to refute two alternatives to his view that goodness is a simple property. He 
considers whether it might be held that ‘good’ is meaningless and whether ‘good’ might denote a 
complex (analysable) natural property, in the same way that ‘horse’ might denote the complex 
property is a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus.97 Moore’s reply to the idea that ‘good’ denotes a 
complex property begins as follows: 
“The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with regard to the correct 
analysis of a whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever 
definition may be offered, it may always, be asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself 
good.”98 
Altman calls this the “key sentence” for his interpretation.99 At first blush, Moore seems not to 
be talking about whether it makes sense to doubt whether some object with a particular natural 
property must also have the property goodness, rather, he seems to be talking about whether it 
makes sense to say of a natural property that it has the property goodness. On Altman’s 
interpretation, the crucial point about the property goodness is that it cannot be have itself as one 
 
97 Moore (1903, p.60) 
98 ibid. p.67. My italics 
99 Altman (2004, p.397) 
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of its properties. Following Altman, I will say that when one property has another property, the 
first property exemplifies the second property or that the second property is predicated of or 
instantiated by the first. Altman thinks that goodness cannot exemplify itself (or, in other words, it 
cannot be predicated of itself) but that natural properties can exemplify goodness. This shows that 
goodness is not identical to any natural property, argues Altman. 
We might understand the question, ‘Is good good?’, to be asking if goodness is self-identical, but 
we might also understand it as asking whether the property goodness exemplifies itself. 
Understood in the second way the question, ‘Is good good?’, is, according to Altman, “literally 
meaningless”.100 Asking ‘Is good good?’, is like asking, ‘Is largeness large?’. The properties 
goodness and largeness just are not the kind of things that can themselves be good or large, 
respectively. Altman thinks that there are very few properties which can sensibly be said to 
exemplify themselves; properties like being a property or not being a number are some of the rare 
cases. Altman writes, “there is, as a rule, something philosophical awry with self-predication”.101 
Meanwhile, it seems to makes perfect sense to ask of any natural property whether it is good 
(here understood as asking whether it has the property goodness, not whether that property is 
identical to goodness). ‘Is pleasure good?’ is a perfectly intelligible question, for example. Here the 
naturalist has a problem, for if goodness can be intelligibly predicated of any natural property, but 
goodness cannot be intelligibly predicate of itself, then goodness cannot be identical to a natural 
property. This is a case of Leibniz’s law, since natural properties have the property of intelligibly 
having goodness predicated of them, whereas goodness does not have the property of intelligibly having 
goodness predicated of it, goodness cannot identical to any natural property.  
Altman argues that both the Standard Interpretation of Moore and his interpretation are 
supported by the text of Principia Ethica. However, Altman also thinks that on his interpretation 
 
100 ibid. p.404 
101 ibid., p.405 
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Moore’s argument is much more philosophically defensible. On his interpretation, Moore’s 
argument is not vulnerable to the standard responses, so it is a more charitable interpretation of 
Moore than the Standard Interpretation. I think that on examination we can see that Altman’s 
interpretation of Moore is not really supported by the text, but since my main concern is whether 
naturalism can be refuted, I leave these exegetical issues until the appendix. In what follows, I 
argue that Altman’s interpretation of Moore’s argument is not a problem for naturalists and that 
it is vulnerable to the standard criticisms of the Open Question Argument. 
§2.1 
On Altman’s interpretation of Moore’s Argument the key point is that it is an open question 
whether a given natural property exemplifies goodness, but not an open question whether goodness 
exemplifies goodness. As such, he thinks that on his interpretation Moore would not vulnerable to 
The Paradox of Analysis, since he is simply not concerned with whether normative predicates have 
the same cognitive significance as any natural terms. Altman’s concern is metaphysical (or so he 
argues). He is interested in the metaphysical question of which properties can exemplify goodness 
and not semantic questions concerning the meaning of ‘good’. Because of this, Altman does not, 
unlike Moore on the Standard Interpretation, require any dubious claims about meaning to be 
true for the argument to work. 
Altman also argues that Moore would not be vulnerable to Synthetic Naturalism on his 
interpretation. He does need the assumption that if a question of the form, ‘If X X?’, does not 
make sense, but, ‘Is X Y?’, does, then ‘X’ and ‘Y’ cannot be coreferential. But this assumption 
does not rule out that terms like ‘Water’ and ‘Being composed of H2O molecules’ may be 
coreferential yet distinct in meaning.  
Finally, Altman does not think that Hasty Generalisation or Question-Begging is a problem on his 
view either. He says that Hasty Generalisation is a problem for Moore because he only considered a 
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few of the popular naturalist theories of his day and not the more sophisticated theories that 
have since arisen. He then goes on to consider Richard Boyd’s view that good is a homeostatic 
property cluster involving the satisfaction of various human wants and needs.102 He says that 
since it clearly makes sense to ask, ‘Is Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster good?’, his view rules 
out Boyd’s view. The same would apply, he assures us, to other naturalistic theories too. So, his 
argument does not require a hasty generalisation; the generalisation is well founded, since it 
applies to the more sophisticated naturalist theories. Altman’s argument is also not guilty of 
begging the question since his claim that ‘Is N good?’ always makes sense is well grounded, or so 
he thinks. 
I will argue that Altman’s argument is weak to versions of all the standard responses and that it 
has other problems as well. To make it easier to refer to individual premises in what follows, 
here, almost verbatim, is how Altman sets out his argument: 
(1) Good does not admit of intelligible self-predication. 
(2) Good can be intelligibly predicated of [any natural property] P. 
(3) Properties cannot be identical with one another if one admits of intelligible self-
predication and the other does not. 
(4) Therefore, goodness is not identical to any natural property.103 
I will postpone discussion of premise (1) until §5. In the next section I give reasons to think that 
premise (2) is false and then in §4 I give a reasons to think that (3) is false. 
§3 – Objections to Premise (2) 
§3.1 – Is Goodness attributable to properties? 
 
102 Boyd (1988) 
103 Altman (2004, p.400) 
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Altman’s evidence for the second premise of his argument is just the intuition that questions of 
the form, ‘Is pleasure good?’, seem to make perfect sense to us. But we should not assume that 
questions like, ‘Is pleasure good?’, are necessarily asking of a property whether it is good, as 
opposed to asking, say, whether a set of objects that have a property like pleasurable also have the 
property goodness. Philosophers have different views about which kinds of entities are potential 
bearers of value and it is by no means uncontroversial that properties are among those entities. If 
goodness cannot be a property of natural properties then there is no asymmetry to explain between 
goodness and natural properties; neither can exemplify goodness. 
The example Altman discusses is the question, “Is being yellow good?” He says that the answer 
to that question would be something like, “In general, yellow is not good or bad, but in a 
particular painting or color scheme for a house, it may well be good or bad”.104 It is not clear to 
me whether, ‘Is being yellow good?’, is really asking of the property being yellow, whether it has the 
property goodness, as opposed to asking of yellow objects whether they also have the property 
goodness. It seems just as reasonable to say that it is yellow objects, or a state-of-affairs in which 
something is yellow, or the fact that something is yellow, which are really the potential bearers of 
goodness. Yellow objects might be good or bad in virtue of being yellow, but it would not follow 
that their colour properties are, strictly speaking, themselves good or bad. If X is F entails that X is 
G, it does not mean that X’s property being F, itself has the property being G. I think that we can 
go further and suggest that the property yellowness is a bad candidate for being a bearer of value. 
If it was yellowness itself which was the potential bearer of goodness then it would be puzzling why it 
has the property goodness in some cases and not others; after all, the property yellowness is the same 
thing everywhere it is instantiated.  
What about a question like, ‘Is being nationalistic good?’ The philosopher who thinks that, strictly 
speaking, properties are not bearers of value, is going to be able to give plausible enough 
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interpretations of this question. On one very natural reading, the question is shorthand for 
asking whether actions which demonstrate an individual’s being nationalistic are good actions. 
For example, if John advocates for the elimination of foreign aid on the grounds that the 
government should only look after its own citizens I might well ask, ‘Is being nationalistic 
good?’, to question whether John’s advocacy is a good thing. On another suggestion, the 
question is asking whether a state of affairs in which people have the property being nationalistic 
will also be a good state of affairs. Suppose I think that nationalism is good. I need not then 
think that, strictly speaking, the natural property being nationalistic has the property goodness. I might 
just think that all those states-of-affairs which consist in a person’s being nationalistic also have the 
property goodness. On a third account, the question asks whether the obtaining of the state of 
affairs that consists in people’s being nationalistic is good. In other words, it would be asking 
whether the fact that people are nationalistic is good. The linguistic evidence does not seem to 
offer a compelling reason to accept that properties themselves can, strictly speaking, themselves be 
good. 
It might be that objects are the only bearers of goodness, or actions, or states-of-affairs, or facts, 
or propositions, or worlds, etc. If (natural) properties are not possible bearers of goodness then 
the question of whether a natural property has the property goodness makes no more sense than 
asking whether goodness instantiates itself. Whether or not properties are bearers of goodness is 
too complex a topic to cover in detail here but we can sketch some reasons to resist the 
conclusion that properties do instantiate goodness. As N. M. Lemos points out, in the case of 
other normative properties it seems implausible that they can be exemplified by properties.105 
Rightness, for instance, can plausibly be attributed to actions but it seems strange to say that it is a 
property of the properties of actions. Suppose that giving to charity is right because it promotes 
happiness and alleviates suffering. It sounds odd to say that the property promotes happiness and 
 
105 Lemos (2005, p.183). c.f. Lemos (1991). 
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alleviates suffering is the bearer of rightness in this case, and not the act of giving to charity (or 
perhaps the state-of-affairs that consists in my giving to charity, or the fact that that state of 
affairs obtains). Plausibly, things are only right if they are voluntarily done, but it is actions, and 
not properties, which are voluntarily done by agents. Since some normative properties like ‘right’ 
do not seem to be exemplified by other properties, we need some reason to think that things 
work differently in the case of goodness.106  
Since this worry involves controversial issues in the metaphysics of normativity, I will put it to 
one side and assume in what follows that properties can be good. I will move on to see if 
Altman’s argument stands up granted that assumption.  
§3.2 – Hasty Generalisation and Begging the Question 
I think that Hasty Generalisation and Begging the Question can be applied to Altman’s argument. The 
objection originally went like this: if we grant Moore that in cases of successful analyses it will 
always be impossible to doubt that the analysans and the analysandum denote the same thing, we 
need some reason to think that this will not be the case for every possible analysis containing 
normative and natural terms. Moore seemed to assume that this would be the case based on his 
examination of very few candidate naturalistic analyses of normative terms, so Moore is guilty of 
making a hasty generalisation. For all Moore has told us, there could be some analyses N of, 
‘good’, on which we could not sensibly doubt that, ‘N is good’, is true. Since what is at stake 
between the naturalist and Moore (if Moore’s other premises are correct) is whether or not, ‘N is 
good’, is not obviously true for every value of N, Moore is also guilty of begging the question 
against his opponent. 
The same objections can be made, mutatis mutandis, to Altman’s argument. Altman seems to 
assume, from his consideration of a few questions of the form, ‘Is N good?’, that all such 
 
106 Moreover, if Altman’s argument only works against a Naturalist account of goodness and not a Naturalist account 
of rightness then its scope and power would be diminished. 
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questions will make sense. The naturalist could argue that on the correct analysis, N, of ‘good’, it 
really would not make sense to ask, ‘Is N good?’ In those conditions once we had arrived at the 
correct analysis of ‘good’ it would be clear to us that, ‘Is N good?’, was asking of N/good 
whether it instantiates itself. Supposing that Altman is right that it is meaningless to ask of a 
property whether it instantiates itself, it then really would be meaningless to ask, ‘Is N good?’, for 
the correct analysis ‘N’ of ‘good’. Altman’s claim that this would not the case for any value of N 
seems just as vulnerable to criticism as Moore’s assumption that the answers to all claims of the 
form, ‘N is good’, would be open to doubt. Altman considers whether it makes sense to ask if 
pleasurable has the property goodness, but he does not consider many other natural properties. 
Therefore, if Hasty Generalisation is a good objection against Moore then it seems to be a good 
objection against Altman too. 
Suppose that ‘brother’ can be analysed as ‘male sibling’. If that were the case then, plausibly, being 
a brother and being a male sibling would be the same property.107 In that case, the question, ‘Does 
John’s property being a brother have the property being a male sibling?’, would be understood by 
competent language users as asking whether a property exemplified itself. Altman would have to 
say that that question does not make any sense since he thinks that asking if a property 
exemplifies itself never makes sense. The naturalist could ask for a reason to suppose that 
something similar is not true in the normative case. If there is an analysis, N, of ‘good’ on which 
it is clear to competent language users that ‘N’ and ‘good’ refer to the same property then 
according to Altman the question,‘Is N good?’, should not make sense either. Altman has not 
given us a reason to doubt that there is an analysis of ‘good’, so he has not given us reason to 
think that, ‘Is N good?’, will always make sense.  
 
107 I am ignoring many of the issues I raised regarding analysis in the last chapter because they are more relevant to 
the Unobvious Analysis objection that I apply to Altman’s account later. 
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Following on, Altman’s argument could also be said to beg the question against the naturalist 
since (if we accept Altman’s other assumptions) exactly what is at stake between the naturalist 
and the anti-naturalist will be whether it makes sense to ask of every single natural property 
whether it is good. Since, Altman assumes that it will always make sense to ask of any natural 
property whether it is good, Altman begs the question as much as Moore did. Granted, Altman 
does not beg the question against the naturalist in exactly the same way that Moore was originally 
accused of doing, but a charge of begging the question is nevertheless just as applicable. 
Altman recognises the possibility of this response but he writes, “It is insufficient to charge 
Moore with hasty generalization unless one specifies the leading candidates that Moore 
overlooked.”108 Altman thinks that his argument is safe from Hasty Generalisation because it 
applies to (what he considers to be) the leading naturalist theories when he was writing, such as 
Richard Boyd’s account.  
However, this does not seem to be what the naturalist is getting at when they make objections 
along the lines of Hasty Generalisation. I think that they are really just challenging the non-
naturalist to give us a principled reason to suppose that no possible naturalistic analysis could 
make the relevant questions closed. Moore’s argument says that since all prior attempts to 
analyse good have failed, all future attempts will; a fairly brash inference. I do not see why 
Altman thinks that it would be insufficient for the naturalist to charge Moore with making a 
hasty generalization without also providing a counter-example proof analysis of their own. Since 
it is the case at most only one analysis could be the correct one, and since analyses can often 
extremely complicated, it does seem reasonable to question how much we can infer from the fact 
that a handful of attempts so far have failed. And, it seems that Altman’s argument is just as 
weak to this objection.  
 
108 Altman (2004, pp.402-3) 
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With all that said, I think that there are better objections than Hasty Generalisation and Question-
Begging that one can make to Altman’s argument so I move on to those. 
§4 – Objections to Premise (3) 
§4.1 – Relational Views of ‘Good’ 
According to Moore’s view, all uses of ‘good’ refer to some monadic property. In Good and Evil, 
Peter Geach offered a powerful argument against this view.109 According to Moore to say that, ‘X 
is a good K’, is to say that X is a K and that X is good. On Moore’s account ‘good’ is a predicative 
adjective. An adjective, A, is predicative if we can infer from the fact that X is A and the fact that 
X is identical to Y, that Y is A for any X and Y.110 ‘Red’ is a clear example of a predicative 
adjective. If a given car is red then it must also be a red vehicle, a red mode of transport, a red 
artefact, etc. An adjective is attributive if it is not predicative. ‘Big’ is an attributive adjective; we 
cannot infer from the fact that Jerry is a big mouse and from the fact that Jerry is an animal that 
Jerry is a big animal. Geach argued that, ‘good’, in, ‘good K’, works more like ‘big’ than it does 
like ‘red’; if John is a good lawyer and John is a dancer it does not follow than John is a good 
dancer. 
These considerations suggest that, ‘good’, in phrases like, ‘good K’, does not denote some 
monadic property. An alternative suggestion is that ‘good’ refers to a relational property. 111 
According to some semantic theories, words like ‘tall’, ‘fast’, ‘old’, etc. have an argument place 
for a particular standard. When I say ‘Michael Jordan is tall’ I might mean that he is tall by the 
standards of adult humans or something along those lines. The predicate ‘is tall’ in that sentence 
refers to the relation of meeting the contextually specified standards for being a tall adult 
human.112 According to relational views of ‘good’ works the same way. To say of a toaster that it 
 
109 Geach (1956). 
110 This definition is taken from Thomson (2008). It is in the same spirit as Geach’s account but it is a bit clearer. 
111 Ziff (1960), Katz (1966), Phillips (1998), Thomson (2001), Copp (2001), Shanklin (2011), Finlay (2014). 
112 Semantic minimalists challenge this view of predicates like ‘is tall’ but theirs is very much a minority view. 
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is good would say that the toaster meets certain standards, e.g., in an ordinary context, standards 
requiring that the object toast bread efficiently, safely, evenly etc.  
We could sensibly ask of a property whether it was good on this picture, because having a 
particular quality or property can be recommended or demanded by standards. Suppose that 
John harbours a desire to become a jockey and suppose I point out that he is quite short. You, 
unfamiliar with horseracing, ask, ‘Is being short good?’. By default in this context, your question 
will be understood as asking whether being short for an adult male is the kind of quality that is 
advantageous for winning horse races, or to put it another way, whether being short for an adult 
male is among the standards by which we judge potential male jockeys. Take another example. 
Suppose I ask, ‘Is being frugal good?’ I think that absent any other context this would be 
understood as asking whether being frugal is recommended (or perhaps demanded) by some 
particular practical or moral standards. 
Whatever problems it may have, this kind of account is well positioned to handle Altman’s 
argument. It will be no surprise on this account if the question, ‘Is good good?’, outside of a 
particular context, does not seem to make any sense. The question will not make sense because it 
will be unclear what relational property the two uses of ‘good’ are supposed to be denoting. This 
means that it will be semantically indeterminate which proposition the question is concerning. 
Since the predicate ‘is good’ can denote many different relational properties given different 
contexts and the different objects it can be applied to, there will be no standard ‘default reading’ 
of the question, ‘Is good good?’. Judith Jarvis Thomson, discussing something like this point, 
gives the example: “Was St. Francis better than chocolate?”113 Because it is unclear what is meant 
by ‘better than’, (it is unclear in just what respect St Francis is to be compared to chocolate), the 
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question will not seem meaningful to us. So, if, ‘Is good good?’, does not make sense, the 
naturalist has available to them a good explanation of this. 
At the same time, I think that we can come up with some examples where ‘Is good good?’ or an 
equivalent question could make sense. These will be cases where it is intelligible that the 
relational property picked out by the first use of ‘good’ has the relational property picked out by 
the second use of ‘good’. For example, consider this exchange: 
A: “Mary is a really good person. She gives 50% of her income to charity.” 
B: “Yes, but is being good good? After all, she can’t afford a car or a mortgage” 
In this case, “Is being good good?”, is understood as asking whether meeting certain moral 
standards meets certain other prudential standards. 
Or, consider these examples: 
A: “Mary is really good. She kills her targets without hesitation and her crimes are never 
traced back to her.” 
B: “Is her being good good though? Her actions cause so much heartbreak to the 
families of her victims.” 
A: “The guerrillas’ plan was very good. By targeting the capital on a Saturday they 
ensured that they caused maximum panic. 
B: “But is it good that their plan was good? Many civilian lives were lost.” 
In these cases, it is asked whether meeting some standard associated with effectively killing or 
with causing panic meets a moral standard. I admit that these examples do not sound perfectly 
natural (we would not usually relativise two instances of the same incomplete predicate to 
different standards in the same sentence because it invites confusion.) Nevertheless, the question 
uttered by B in these examples certainly do not seem meaningless.  
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Now Altman might object that this suggestion misses his point. When he says that “Is good 
good?” does not make sense, he is understanding “good” to refer to some simple monadic 
property good simpliciter or plain good. Altman could argue that it makes no sense to say that 
goodness simpliciter could itself be good simpliciter, but it does make sense to say that other 
properties are good simpliciter, showing that goodness simpliciter is not identical to any natural 
property. However, on these naturalistic views there is no such property as goodness simpliciter just 
as there is no such thing as being tall simpliciter. Some people like Peter Geach argue that talk of 
“good simpliciter” is just based on a confusion.114 Others like Stephen Finlay and Robert 
Shanklin offers vindicatory accounts of the meaning of the expression ‘good simpliciter’115 on 
which the expression is legitimate but on which it does not refer to some monadic property. In 
any case, Altman would need an independent argument to show that questions like, ‘Is pleasure 
good?’, are asking whether pleasure has a monadic property and not a relational property, if he 
was to put pressure on these relational kinds of naturalism. 
§4.2 – The Paradox of Analysis and Synthetic Naturalism 
Many naturalists think that uses of ‘good’, or at least certain uses of ‘good’, denote a particular 
monadic natural property. Even if Altman’s view is not effective against relational naturalistic 
views, if it were only effective against these non-relational views then that would be an 
impressive result. I now want to argue that it is not effective against these views either. 
Altman, responding to the potential objection that goodness does have itself as a property says, 
“there would be a strong presumption against the premise in light of the fact that the general rule 
seems to be that properties do not have themselves as properties.”116 Altman thinks that this 
 
114 Geach (ibid.) c.f. Aristotle (1096a 24-29) 
115 See Finlay (2014) and Shanklin (2011) 
116 Altman (2004, p.406) 
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‘general rule’ explains why the question, ‘Is good good?’, does not make any sense; properties do 
not exemplify themselves so it cannot make sense to ask of goodness if it has the property goodness. 
Suppose that that is all correct. In that case, the naturalist could simply say that whatever natural 
property is identical to goodness could not have goodness as one of its properties since that would 
contravene Altman’s non-self-exemplification rule. They can say there must be at least one 
natural property which necessarily does not have goodness as one of its properties. That is not 
quite enough to show that Altman’s argument is unsound. We would need an explanation of why 
the question ‘Is N good?’, seems to be intelligible while, ‘Is good good?’, does not. The fact that 
this question is intelligible, but ‘Is good good?’ is not, is Altman’s basis for saying that ‘good’ and 
‘N’ cannot refer to the same property.  
Now here is the important point: the naturalist can just say that the reason that that question, ‘Is 
N good?’, is intelligible is that it that it is not obvious that, ‘N’, and, ‘good’, denote the same 
property. Because it is not obvious that, ‘N’, and, ‘good’, denote the same property, it is not 
obvious that, ‘Is N good?’, is asking of a property whether it exemplifies itself, or a different 
property. Because of that, the question, ‘Is N good?’, appears to be intelligible. Since it is an open 
question whether ‘N’ and ‘good’ are co-referential, it is an open question whether or not, ‘Is N 
good?’, is asking whether a particular property exemplifies itself, or whether it asking if one 
property exemplifies some other distinct property. The question, ‘Is good good?’, by contrast, 
obviously asks of a particular property whether it has itself as a property since it features two 
uses of the same word.117 
This strategy then amounts to denying premise (3) of Altman’s argument. If, ‘Is good good?’, is 
not intelligible but, ‘Is N good?’, is, that need not be because ‘good’ and ‘N’ do not refer to the 
same property. It might just be because ‘Is good good’ is obviously asking if a property 
 
117 At least on the assumption that ‘good’ is not context-dependent in the way assumed by the relational views 
looked at in the last section 
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exemplifies itself, while it is unobvious that ‘Is N good?’ is asking of a property that it 
exemplifies itself. 
This strategy works for both analytic naturalism and synthetic naturalism. Analytic naturalists will 
say that ‘N’ and ‘good’ are synonyms but not obviously so, so it is not obvious that question, ‘Is 
N good?’, is asking of a property whether it has itself as a property. Synthetic naturalists can say 
that ‘N’ and ‘good’ are not synonyms but that they nevertheless refer to the same property. 
Because they are not synonymous the question, ‘Is N good?’ is intelligible to us as we might 
think that it is asking of one property whether it has a distinct property goodness. Therefore, it 
turns out that the naturalist can offer very similar responses to Altman’s version of Moore’s 
argument as they can to the standard version of Moore’s argument. 
The suggestion is that, ‘Is good good?’, and, ‘Is N good?’, are in a sense asking the same thing; 
they both ask if good has itself as a property (though they ask it under different guises). Altman 
might try to resist this on the grounds that, ‘Is good good?’, cannot be accepted whereas, ‘Is N 
good?’, might well be. However, this would just be to return to the standard interpretation of 
Moore’s argument. It would be to argue that ‘good’ and ‘N’ cannot refer to the same property 
because they have a different cognitive significance. As such, it would be guilty of all the faults of 
Moore’s argument on the standard interpretation; faults which Altman believed meant the 
argument was ‘pronounced dead’. 
At this point Altman might backtrack and claim that the metaphysical obstacle to goodness 
exemplifying itself is not a problem with self-predication but with regards to some other issue. 
Perhaps he might say that sui generis non-natural properties are not in the kind of metaphysical 
category to exemplify goodness whereas natural properties are. But it is hard to see why the 
naturalist should be persuaded by this. At this point the objection just looks like a variant of the 
Just Too Different Intuition that philosophers like David Enoch and Michael Huemer push; that 
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intuitively natural properties are just too different to normative properties to be identical to them.  I 
cover this kind of objection in the next chapter. 
§5 - Is it Meaningless to Ask if Goodness Instantiates Itself?  
So far, I have been taking it for granted that Altman was right to say that it was meaningless to 
suggest that good instantiates itself, but it is far from obvious that he is correct. I gave a few 
examples in §4.1 of contexts in which, ‘Is good good?’, seems to make sense but in those cases 
both uses of ‘good’ were not denoting the property goodness simpliciter or plain goodness.118 However, 
even if we restrict our discussion to talk of goodness simpliciter, it seems intuitive, to me at least, 
that, ‘Is good good?’, is not meaningless. In fact, I think it quite clearly has a meaning. ‘Is good 
good?’ means roughly ‘Does the property goodness have the property goodness?’. 
According to perhaps the default semantic account of interrogative sentences, the meaning of a 
question is a function from a world to the set of propositions which are possible answers to the 
question in that world.119 Understood this way ‘Is good good?’ can be assigned a meaning; it is a 
function from a world to the propositions Goodness is a property of goodness and It is not the case that 
goodness is a property of goodness. Perhaps that account of interrogatives sentences is not correct and 
on the correct account ‘Is good good?’ cannot be assigned a meaning, but Altman does not 
engage with this issue, nor does he at any point suggest what criterion of meaningfulness he is 
using, so we do not have to grant him premise (1). Meaningless questions do not usually have 
sensible answers but Altman seems to think that the question can be sensibly answered; he 
thinks that the answer is ‘No, since goodness cannot exemplify itself’.  Altman does not really say 
anything to defend premise (1).  
Instead, he hedges his bets, as it were. He argues that even if (1) is false, naturalism can still be 
refuted. Since Altman does not defend (1) and since there are some reasons to think that it is 
 
118 For the time being I ignore the potential differences between these properties. 
119 Hamblin (1973) 
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false, the naturalist could justifiably reject this premise, rendering Altman’s original argument 
unsound. I will now look at Altman’s Reformulated Argument, which does not rely on (1) being 
true. 
§5.1 - Altman’s Reformulated Argument 
If it were the case that, ‘Is good good?’, is in fact meaningful this would not help the naturalist, 
argues Altman, because he could just at that point reformulate his argument. If it does make 
sense to ask of goodness whether it is good then, by metaphysical necessity, the answer will always 
be negative, whereas for any given natural property, qua natural property, there is nothing 
metaphysically impossible about its being good. That being so, Altman argues, he could just put 
forward a variant of his argument:  
(5) Goodness is not identical to any natural property in virtue of the fact that goodness 
cannot, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, have itself as a property. 
(6) There is no metaphysical restriction against a natural property, qua natural property, 
having the property goodness.  
(7) Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, goodness cannot be the same as any natural property since 
goodness has the property cannot by metaphysical necessity be good, whereas natural properties do 
not have that property.  
This is Altman’s Reformulated Argument. 
§5.2 
There are two ways to tackle this argument; we could deny that, ‘Is good good?’, necessarily has a 
negative answer or we could argue that, ‘Is N good?’, necessarily does have a negative answer for 
some value of N. I will look at these both responses in order. 
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If we accept that, ‘Is good good?’, is meaningful but deny that the answer to it is necessarily 
negative then our others options are to say that the answer is necessarily positive, or that it is 
sometimes positive. It might seem surprising that the view that good does not admit of self-
predication would be attributed to Moore. Many people see Moore’s view as a kind of Platonism 
about good.120 The idea of goodness as a kind of simple, sui generis, non-natural property strikes 
many people as being strongly reminiscent of Plato’s idea of the Form of the Good. And Plato 
seemed to think that The Form of the Good was itself good, indeed it was good to the highest 
degree. Why should we suppose that Moore was not inclined to say the same thing about 
goodness?121 
Altman admits, “Moore provides no illumination as to why he might accept the premise [that 
good cannot be good].” But he goes on to speculate, “It is entirely possible that he is concerned 
to halt Plato’s famous third-man argument. Moore might have thought that a higher-order good 
would be required to make sense of the question whether good is good. And a still higher-order 
good would be needed to make sense of the question whether second-order good is good.” This 
is one way to motivate the suggestion that good does not admit of self-predication but it does 
not seem conclusive. There are solutions to the third-man argument which do not involve 
dropping the premise that the Form of F is F, so avoiding the conclusion of the Third Man 
argument does not require that we agree with Altman.122 
Altman also speculates that, “[Moore] may simply have thought that the self-predication premise 
was obviously and fundamentally true, i.e., that it was an “intuition” in his sense of the term.” 
Intuitively, properties cannot exemplify themselves, for example, it sounds very odd to say that 
the property of being intelligent is itself intelligent; properties do not seem to be the kind of 
 
120 e.g. Baldwin (1993) 
121 Sutton (2014) argues that Moore think that it is tautologous that the fact that X is good is good. 
122 See Rickless (2015) 
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things that can be intelligent. Altman says that given how intuitively unappealing the idea that 
goodness exemplifies itself is, the burden of proof is on the proponent of this claim.  
Altman admits that there are exceptions to the rule that properties do not exemplify themselves, 
e.g. being a property, being self-identical etc. That being so, the intuition that properties cannot, by 
metaphysical necessity, exemplify themselves, has no probative value, since Altman admits that it 
is false (if we even have that intuition in the first place). Altman probably intends for the relevant 
intuition to be weaker. He probably means for the intuition to be that properties cannot, by 
metaphysical necessity, usually exemplify themselves or something like that. However, this weaker 
intuition is compatible with the claim that good is good, since good might be one of the unusual 
cases of a self-exemplifying property.  
Altman might instead think it is just intuitive that goodness in particular cannot exemplify itself. 
However, it is not clear how strong this intuition is. For example, it does not seem unintuitive to 
say that Martin Luther King Jr.’s goodness was itself a good thing. It reasonable to say that it was 
good (simpliciter) that MLK was good (simpliciter), much better (simpliciter) than if he were bad 
(simpliciter). Examining this issue further would probably require getting more bogged down in a 
lot of issues in normative metaphysics so I move on to what I think is a better response. 
§5.3 
The preceding considerations tell against Altman’s ‘reformulated’ argument. They all suggest 
reasons to suppose that goodness might be able to exemplify itself, undermining the distinction 
that Altman wants to draw between goodness and a natural property. There is, however, a more 
damning objection we could make. We could undermine the distinction that Altman wants to 
draw in a different way, by arguing that for some natural property N, the answer to the question, 
‘Is N good?’, is necessarily negative if Altman’s other assumptions are correct. This is a variation 
on an objection I considered in the last section. Altman argues that if, ‘Is good good?’, makes 
69 
 
sense then the answer is necessarily ‘No’, since goodness, by metaphysical necessity cannot have 
itself as a property. This is a problem for the naturalist, argues Altman, because there is no 
metaphysical restriction on natural properties, qua natural properties, being good. Altman argues 
that since there is a metaphysical restriction that applies to goodness that does not apply to natural 
properties (qua natural properties), goodness cannot be a natural property.  
However, if, as the naturalist thinks, goodness is identical to a natural property N, then the answer 
to the question ‘Is N good?’ must also necessarily be ‘No’. If N is identical to goodness and if 
goodness cannot be good, then any property which is identical to goodness can obviously not be 
good either. Altman might be right to say that for any natural property there is no metaphysical 
restriction, qua natural property, to its being good, but that is neither here nor there since that claim 
is compatible with there being a natural property which, qua being identical to goodness, cannot itself 
be good. To reiterate, if there is no metaphysical restriction, qua natural property, to a natural 
property being good, that does not show that there is no metaphysical restriction, tout court, to 
natural properties being good.  It is not N’s being a natural property that means that it cannot 
exemplify goodness, rather, it is N’s being identical to goodness which means that it cannot itself 
exemplify goodness (if we grant Altman that goodness cannot exemplify itself). Of course, 
Altman does not think that any such natural property exists, but he needs an independent 
argument for that claim or he just begs the question against the naturalist. So, Altman’s 
reformulated argument is invalid.  
Altman might argue that the answer to, ‘Is N good?’, cannot be necessarily negative for every 
value of N since we can always doubt what the answer is, but this would obviously just be to 
return to the Standard Interpretation of Moore’s argument which Altman rejects. If goodness 
cannot self-exemplify because of a metaphysical restriction, as Altman suggests, then the fact that 
people can doubt whether, ‘Is N good?’, has a negative answer should not matter. If N cannot, 
by metaphysical necessity, be good (because N is identical to goodness), then the correct answer 
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to, ‘Is N good?’, is necessarily ‘No’, regardless of whether or not that is the answer people would 
in fact give. 
So all in all, there are many possible ways we might put pressure on Altman’s reformulated. 
argument. It is not clear that goodness cannot be predicated of itself, nor that it can be predicated 
of any natural property. This concludes all I want to say about Altman’s arguments, I move on 
now to briefly look at a very similar argument from Peter Sutton. 
§6 – Sutton’s Argument 
Peter Sutton also claims to have found a ‘new’ open question argument which centres around 
issues of self-predication, but the details of his argument differs from Altman’s argument.123 
Altman could, if what I have said up to now has been right, adopt this argument as a last ditch 
attempt to refute naturalism.  
Whereas Altman would say that a claim like, ‘The fact that X is good is good’ ,is either 
nonsensical or necessarily false, Sutton thinks that it is necessarily true.124 He does not give much 
support for this claim. He might be persuaded by examples like the Martin Luther King example 
that I considered in the last section or perhaps he is committed to some kind of Platonism from 
which he thinks the claim follows. In any case, it does not seem outrageous to think that a 
thing’s goodness is itself good, at least in some cases. I am happy to grant Sutton’s premise for the 
sake of argument. 
The claim, ‘The fact that X is good is good’, contrasts with a claim like, ‘The fact that X causes 
pleasure causes pleasure’, which, if true at all, are only contingently true, argues Sutton. Things 
that increase net pleasure might not increase net pleasure. If we are prudish, or anti-hedonistic, 
 
123 Sutton (2014). 
124 Sutton considers whether ‘The fact that X is good is good’ is nonsensical, but he says that it would not matter 
since he could just revert to using Altman’s argument if it were. Since I have shown that Altman’s argument does 
not work I think that it would matter. 
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or sadistic then perhaps the fact that certain things cause pleasure might cause net displeasure. 
This goes for any natural term we could substitute for ‘causes pleasure’; we can always imagine a 
world in which the fact that something has a particular natural property is not good. So, 
goodness cannot be the same as any natural property since, even in non-intensional contexts, we 
cannot substitute a natural term denoting that property for ‘good’ salva veritate. Naturalists are 
committed to saying that the truth conditions of a claim like, ‘The fact that X is good is good’, is 
the same as a claim like, ‘The fact that X causes pleasure causes pleasure’, so if the former claim 
is necessarily true and the latter claim is not, then naturalists have a problem. Like Altman, 
Sutton argues that his own version of Moore’s argument is superior to the traditional ones 
because it does not rely on any controversial assumptions about meaning or cognitive 
significance.  
I think it can be shown that Sutton’s argument does not work. First, I need to show that 
regardless of which metaethical theory turns out to be true it will be the case that normative 
properties are necessarily coextensive with some (broadly) natural property. Naturalists and non-
naturalists disagree in that non-naturalists think that goodness is something ontologically over-and-
above natural properties whereas the naturalist does not, but both naturalists and non-naturalists 
agree that moral goodness is necessarily coextensive with some (broadly) natural property.125 If a 
certain form of utilitarianism is true, for instance, then ‘good’ will denote a property which is 
necessarily coextensive with ‘causes pleasure’, whether naturalism or non-naturalism are true.  
It might be thought that the possibility of particularism shows that goodness need not be 
necessarily coextensive with any natural property. Particularists think that whether or not 
something is good is dependent on many different features of the particular context that that 
thing is in. They reject that there are any general normative principles like, ‘Good actions are 
 
125 It might be thought that theological voluntarists would disagree since properties like that which God approves of are 
not natural properties but we could understand ‘natural’ very broadly to encompass supernatural properties. They 
may sound absurd but it is a common practice in metaethics dating back to Moore. 
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those that cause pleasure’. The fact that something causes pleasure can be good in some contexts 
but bad in others (e.g. the pleasure a sadist derives from torture). The same applies, particularists 
argue, to all normative considerations; sometimes they count in favour of some action and 
sometimes against, depending on very particular features of the context the action takes place in. 
However, particularists accept that there is at least one normative principle.126 This just follows 
from the strong supervenience of the normative on the natural; a principle, which enjoys almost 
universal assent.127 The strong supervenience of the normative on the natural is a principle which 
says that two worlds cannot be different in any normative respect without being different in 
some (broadly) natural respect. This seems quite intuitive. Assuming the assassination of JFK 
was wrong in this world, it does not seem possible to imagine a world where every single natural 
fact was exactly the same but assassinating JFK was not wrong.  
Now if we take some possible good (simpliciter) thing we could give a complete description of the 
natural features of that thing, including all the natural features of the world in which it takes 
place, and call that w1. Because the normative supervenes on the natural, we know that there 
could not be a world which was identical to the world described by w1 but in which the relevant 
thing was not good. Next, we take another good thing and describe fully the natural features of its 
world and call that w2. We could repeat this process for every possible good thing. We then put 
all these descriptions into a massive disjunction; e.g. w1 v w2 v w3...v wn. Call this disjunction ‘W’. 
‘W’ does not feature any normative terms but it will be necessarily equivalent to the predicate 
‘good’. For any good thing it will be trivially true that it satisfies the long disjunction description 
e.g. w1 v w2 v w3...v wn since a complete description of that action will necessarily be one of the 
disjuncts. Particularists must concede that the normative principle, ‘Things which are W are good’ 
is true. This is not a problem for particularists since, if W is massively disjunctive, the principle 
 
126 See e.g. Dancy (2004) 
127 Nicholas Sturgeon raises some interesting objections to the supervenience thesis (2003, 2009) but I simply do not 
have space to answer them here. 
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could not be comprehended by agents and so would be useless for normative decision-making. 
The motivation for being particularist would then remain since there would not be general 
normative principles we could use in making normative decisions. The important point is that 
whatever view we accept, assuming the strong supervenience of the normative on the (broadly) 
natural, there will be some non-normative expression which is necessarily coextensive with 
‘good’. 
We could then call the natural property that is denoted by ‘W’, N. The normative property goodness 
will be necessarily coextensive with the property N, since any action which is good must also 
exemplify N.128 Whichever first-order ethical theory turns out to be true there will be some 
expression that only uses natural terms which denotes a property which is necessarily 
coextensive with ‘good’. The expression need not be an incredibly long disjunction, however. If a 
certain form of utilitarianism is true, for instance, then ‘good’ will denote a property which is 
necessarily coextensive with ‘pleasurable’. Naturalist utilitarians think that goodness just is the 
property pleasurable so they think that goodness is, trivially, necessarily coextensive with causes 
pleasure. Non-naturalist utilitarians meanwhile think that goodness and pleasurable are distinct 
properties, but nevertheless when something exemplifies one property it must also exemplify the 
other too. In either case, goodness will be necessarily coextensive with pleasurable.  
Now we have all we need to refute Sutton’s argument. Suppose for the moment that 
utilitarianism is true. Assume for contradiction that, ‘The fact that X is good is good’, is 
necessarily true and, ‘The fact that X causes pleasure causes pleasure’, is contingently true, if true 
at all. These claims are just the premises of Sutton’s argument.  
Since we have assumed utilitarianism, if, ‘The fact that X is good’, is true then, ‘The fact that X 
causes pleasure’, must also be true. If ‘good’ and ‘causes pleasure’ refer to necessarily coextensive 
 
128 Jackson (1998), Gibbard (2003), Dancy (2004), Ridge and McKeever (2005). 
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properties then any world in which it is true that X is good is also a world in which it is true that 
X is pleasurable. Since Sutton thinks that good is predicative the same must also go for higher-
order uses of ‘good’. So, if it is necessarily true that, ‘The fact that X is good is good’, then, ‘The 
fact that X is good causes pleasure’, must be necessarily true also. If the fact that X is good has 
the property goodness in every possible world, and if goodness is necessarily coextensive with 
pleasurable, then the fact that X is good must have the property pleasurable in every possible world. 
If that is the case then ‘The fact that X causes pleasure causes pleasure’ must be necessarily true 
also, again because we have assumed that goodness and causes pleasure are necessarily coextensive. 
However, we know that Sutton thinks that any claim like ‘The fact that X causes pleasure causes 
pleasure’ is, at most, contingently true. Since that claim is, at most, contingently true the claim 
‘The fact that X is good is good’ must be at most contingently true also. However, this 
contradicts the assumption we started with that ‘The fact that X is good is good’ is necessarily 
true. So, whether naturalism or non-naturalism is true, on the assumption that utilitarianism is 
true, it cannot not the case that ‘The fact that X is good is good’ is necessarily true and ‘The fact 
that X is good causes pleasure’ is, at most, contingently true. We can run the same argument, 
mutatis mutandis, for whichever first-ethical theory turns out to be correct. Therefore, Sutton’s 
argument fails. 
Assuming the normative supervenes on the natural then we know that there is some natural term 
which refers to a property which is necessarily coextensive with the property referred to by 
‘good’. That being so, it must be the case that for some natural term we could substitute it for 
‘good’ without changing the truth value of any claims in which it appears (if we exclude, for 
simplicity’s sake, intensional contexts). Since every object which is good is also N, any claim of 
the form, ‘X is good’, will be true iff, ‘X is N’. So, Sutton’s argument does not work. 
Sutton could perhaps argue against the supervenience of the normative on the natural. However, 
if he were to do that the naturalist could just adopt a position like Nicholas Sturgeon’s non-
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reductive naturalism. Since on that view it need not be the case that there is any natural term 
which picks out the natural property that (according to naturalists) is identical to goodness, the fact 
that no natural term can be substituted for ‘good’ salva veritate would not be a problem; in fact, it 
would be exactly what we would expect. So, whether or not the principle of supervenience holds, 
naturalists can answer Sutton’s challenge. 
§7 - Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have shown that three arguments against naturalism fail. Altman’s first 
argument was that since, ‘Is good good?’, is meaningless and, ‘Is N good?’, is not it cannot be the 
case that ‘N’ and ‘good’ denote the same property. Altman, I argued, fails to establish either that 
‘Is good good?’ is meaningless, or that ‘Is N good?’ is not meaningless for all values of ‘N’, so 
both premises fail.  
Altman’s second argument was that if, ‘Is good good?’, is meaningful then necessarily it has a 
negative answer, whereas, ‘Is N good?’, does not necessarily have a negative answer, from which 
it follows that ‘N’ and ‘good’ cannot denote the same property. I, again, challenged both 
premises and the validity of this argument. 
Sutton’s argument, meanwhile, was that since, ‘Is good good?’, necessarily has a positive answer, 
whereas questions like, ‘Is N N?’, do not, ‘N’ and ‘good’ cannot be co-referring. Both premises 
of Sutton’s argument cannot be at the same time correct. Since goodness, on almost everyone’s 
account, is at least necessarily coextensive with some (broadly) natural property, it must be the 
case that if, ‘Is good good?’, is necessarily true, then, ‘Is N N?’, is necessarily true also, for some 
value of N.  
Appendix – Has Altman interpreted Moore correctly? 
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Altman writes in the introduction of his paper, “my fundamental aim is philosophical rather than 
exegetical”. 129 At the same time, throughout his exposition Altman takes the time to cite textual 
support for his interpretation. If he were correct then it would undermine my reading of Moore 
in the last chapter, so the matter is worth looking at briefly, but if the reader is not interested in 
these exegetical matters then they are invited to skip to the next chapter. 
The first thing to acknowledge is that Altman does concede that there are passages in Principia 
Ethica which seem to contradict his interpretation and support the standard interpretation.130 But, 
he argues, when Moore first formulates his argument he does so in a way that does not chime 
well with the standard interpretation.131 If there are some passages that support his interpretation 
and others that support the standard interpretation, and if Moore’s argument is stronger on 
Altman’s interpretation than it is on the standard interpretation, then considerations of charity 
will push us to prefer Altman’s interpretation. I have already argued that Altman’s version of the 
argument is no threat to naturalism so his interpretation is not any more charitable than the 
standard one. But we can also see that Moore’s text does not support Altman’s interpretation 
either. In fact, the passage that Altman cites specifically to support his interpretation in fact gives 
very little support to that interpretation. 
I mentioned earlier that the passage from Principia Ethica that Altman most focuses appears in 
§13 of the first chapter. Here is the “key sentence” for Altman’s interpretation again: 
“The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with regard to the correct 
analysis of a whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever 
definition may be offered, it may always, be asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it 
is itself good.”132 
 
129 Altman (2004, p.396) 
130 e.g. Moore (1992, p.95, p.176) 
131 Altman (2004, p.397) referencing Moore (1992, pp.66-69) 
132 Moore (1992, p.67) 
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Moore seems to be concerned with whether it makes sense to say of a natural property that it has 
the property goodness. Altman argues that this is a problem for the standard interpretation because 
on that view the question, ‘Is pleasure good?’, is asking of objects which have a particular natural 
property (in this case the property pleasant) whether they also have the normative property 
goodness. On Altman’s interpretation the question, ‘Is pleasure good?’, asks whether the natural 
property that naturalists identify with goodness is itself good. The “key sentence” arguably makes 
more sense if we interpret Moore as Altman does than if we interpret Moore according to the 
Standard Interpretation. That is the first piece of textual evidence Altman gives for his view. 
Additionally, in this passage Moore says that it can always be asked “with significance” whether 
pleasure is good. According to the Standard Interpretation “with significance” means something 
like cognitive significance. The thought is that ‘good’ and any natural term N have different cognitive 
significance since ‘Is N good?’ can be doubted while ‘Is N N?’ cannot be doubted. Altman 
interprets Moore differently here. By, “with significance”, Altman takes Moore to mean, 
“intelligible”, taking his cue from the fact that Moore seems to use the term, “intelligible”, in 
place of, “with significance”, later in the same passage.133  
Altman takes “intelligible” to mean just ‘possesses meaning’. He argues that this is a problem for 
the Standard Interpretation. If “significance” is just intelligibility then the standard interpretation 
cannot be correct since trivial identity questions like, ‘Is pleasure pleasure?’, are perfectly 
intelligible. The identity question ‘Is pleasure [identical to] pleasure?’ may be trivial but it still has 
meaning; it is syntactically well-formed, all its constituent words are meaningful, etc. So, Moore 
cannot be primarily concerned with the fact that identity questions like ‘Is pleasure pleasure?’ and 
‘Is pleasure good’ have different significance, since “significance” is just meaningfulness, and 
both these questions are meaningful. Instead, he must be concerned with questions like ‘Is 
pleasure good?’ and ‘Is good good?’ understood not as identity questions but questions 
 
133 Moore (1993, p.67) 
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concerning whether one property exemplifies another property. Altman thinks that understood 
this way ‘Is pleasure good?’ is meaningful and ‘Is good good’ is not. 
To recapitulate then, Altman gives two reasons to think that this passage favours his 
interpretation over the standard one. First, Moore seems to be talking about whether a natural 
property is good, and not whether an object with that natural property is good. Second, Moore 
says that closed questions are unintelligible, but if closed questions were just asking of one thing 
if it was identical to itself then they would not be unintelligible.  
I think it would be puzzling if Moore meant what Altman says he does given what Moore goes 
on to say in the same passage. Shortly after the “key sentence”, Moore writes: 
“It may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is always good; perhaps, even the 
converse may be true: but it is very doubtful whether this is the case, and the mere fact 
that we understand very well what is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we have 
two different notion before our mind.””134 
Altman writes, “The open question, in its initial formulation then, is a question about the good 
of natural properties, and not a question about the good of objects possessing those 
properties”.135 But, in this sentence at least, it seems very much that Moore is asking whether the 
object that possesses the natural property being the thing we desire to desire, also possesses the 
property goodness. Moore here is saying that because we can doubt that those things which we 
know to be desired to desired are good it shows that being a thing we desire to desire is not the 
same as being good. Additionally, Moore here seems more concerned with the cognitive significance 
of believing of some object that it is good, rather than its meaningfulness. This lines up with the 
Standard Interpretation and conflicts with Altman’s. 
 
134 ibid. 
135 Altman (2004, p.397) 
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Now Moore does write in the same passage: 
“If we carry the investigation further, and ask ourselves “Is it good to desire to desire 
A?” it is apparent on a little reflection, that this question is itself as intelligible as the 
original question, “Is A good?” – that we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the 
same information about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly asked with 
regard to A itself. But it is also apparent that the meaning of this second question 
cannot be correctly analysed into “Is the desire to desire A one of the things which we 
desire to desire?”: we have not before our minds anything so complicated as the question 
“Do we desire to desire to desire to desire A?”136 
This passage might seem at first glance more congenial to Altman’s interpretation. Altman takes 
Moore here to be pointing out that the question, “Is it good to desire to desire A?”, is intelligible, 
because that tells against the view that goodness is identical to being that which we desire to 
desire. It tells against that view because good cannot predicated of good but can be predicated of 
being that which we desire to desire (though Moore never says this explicitly). 
But notice here that Moore’s question is not actually about whether the property of being that 
which we desire to desire is good, it is about whether the desire to desire A is good (see bolded text). 
In other words, Moore is talking about whether a mental state is good, not whether a property is 
good. Moore finds it very implausible that to ask whether that mental state is good is equivalent 
to asking whether that mental state is what we desire to desire since the second question is much 
“complicated” than the first (and so has different cognitive significance). Again, pace Altman’s 
interpretation, Moore seems to be concerned with the question of the good of things (in this 
case the mental state the desire to desire A) with a particular natural property (in this case being 
that which we desire to desire), and not whether the natural property itself is good. In line with the 
 
136 Moore (1992, p.67) 
80 
 
standard interpretation Moore here is questioning whether goodness is a natural property based 
on the differences in cognitive significance between questions containing the predicate ‘good’ 
and questions containing the predicate ‘being that which we desire to desire’. 
Altman also tries to find supports for his interpretation with what Moore says a bit further down 
the same passage. Altman says of this passage,  
“Moore reinforces the idea that his argument concerns the intelligibility of asking about 
the good, not of the objects which possess a given natural property, but of the property 
itself. He writes that, regardless of which property a naturalist theory picks out as 
identical to good, “Everyone does in fact understand the question, ‘Is this good’”. 
Accordingly, his argument appears to involve the thesis that, for any natural property (or 
set of them), the question of whether the property is good has meaning: the fact that 
“everyone” would understand a question establishes that it has meaning”.137 
To see why this is a misreading I need to quote the passage from Moore more fully than Altman 
does. Moore writes: 
“It is very easy to conclude that what seems to be a universal ethical principle is in fact an 
identical proposition; that, if, for example, whatever is called “good” seems to be 
pleasant, the proposition “Pleasure is the good” does not assert a connection between 
two different notions, but involves only one, that of pleasure, which is easily recognised 
as a distinct entity. But whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually 
before his mind when he asks the question “Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after all 
good” can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is 
pleasant. And if he will try this experiment with each suggested definition in succession, 
he may become expert enough to recognise that in every case he has before his mind a 
 
137 Altman (2004, pp.397-8) 
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unique object, with regard to the connection of which with any other object, a distinct 
question may be asked. Everyone does in fact understand the question “Is this good?” 
When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked, 
“Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?”138 
When Moore talks about “pleasure” here he is not talking about the property that a naturalist 
might identify with goodness, rather, he is talking about the set of objects that have that property, 
i.e. objects that are pleasant. This can be seen by the fact that he says that according to the 
naturalist “Pleasure is the good” concerns only one entity. Moore always uses the phrase “the 
good” to mean the set of good things, not the property goodness which he denotes simply with the 
adjective “good”.139 If according to Moore “Pleasure” is identical to “the good” on the naturalist 
picture, then “Pleasure” must denote a set of objects with a natural property, and not, pace 
Altman, the property itself. So, when Moore uses as an example the question “Is pleasure (or 
whatever it may be) after all good?”, he is not trying to demonstrate to us that goodness can be 
predicated of some natural property. And, when he then suggests “experimenting” by asking “Is 
this good?” for each naturalist suggestion and seeing if we understand the question, “this” does 
not refer to a natural property, but rather, the set of objects with that natural property. Hence, 
Altman’s interpretation is a misreading of Moore’s text. 
Additionally, the fact that Moore is talking about the fact that everyone “understands” the 
question, “Is this good?”, does not lend support to Altman’s interpretation. Altman wants us to 
believe that the talk of “understanding” favours his interpretation over the Standard 
Interpretation because on his picture Moore is interested in the fact that questions like ‘Is good 
good?’ do not make sense whereas on the Standard Interpretation Moore is concerned with the 
 
138 Moore, (1993, pp.68-9) 
139 See e.g. ibid. pp.60-1: “I do not mean to say that the good, that which is good, is thus indefinable… It is just 
because I think there will be less risk of error in our search for a definition of ‘the good’ that I am now insisting that 
good is indefinable. I must try to explain the difference between the two. I suppose it may be granted that ‘good’ is an 
adjective. Well ‘the good’, ‘that which is good’, must therefore be a substantive to which the adjective ‘good’ will 
apply: it must be the whole of that to which the adjective will apply, and the adjective must always truly apply to it.” 
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fact that questions like ‘Is pleasure pleasure?’ are tautological. The reason he thinks his 
interpretation is to be preferred is that tautological questions are perfectly understandable even if 
they are pointless, so the fact that closed questions are tautologous and open questions are not, 
cannot be Moore’s primary concern. But the fact that Moore talks about “understanding” here is 
not very significant. What Altman neglects to mention is that in this part of the text Moore has 
moved on to refuting the suggestion that “good” is meaningless. What he is doing is showing 
that since we understand the question, “Is this good?”, the predicate “good” clearly has a 
meaning. Then to back up his other point, Moore is making clear that we understand the 
meaning to be distinct from the meaning of terms like “pleasant”, “desired” and “approved”. 
Let us return now to the “key sentence” for Altman’s interpretation: 
“The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with 
regard to the correct analysis of a whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by 
consideration of the fact that, whatever definition may be offered, it may always, be 
asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good.” 
Though it is admittedly a bit unclear on first reading, it now seems that “the complex” Moore 
refers to is in fact the set of objects which possess the complex natural property that the 
naturalists identify with goodness, and not the property itself. Moore is not asking whether the 
complex property naturalists identify with goodness, has the property goodness, rather, he is pointing 
out to us that we can ask of the set of objects with that complex natural property whether it also 
has the property goodness; suggesting that those properties cannot be the same. If it seems strange 
to understand “the complex” here to refer to a set of objects with a complex property, and not 
the property itself, recall that Moore elsewhere uses the definite article to distinction between 
objects with a property and the property itself. Moore uses “the good” to denote objects which 
fall under the extension of the adjective “good”, and the adjective “good” to refer to the 
property goodness. I suggest he is doing the same with “the complex” in this passage. 
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What of the fact that Moore seems to use “with significance” and “intelligible” interchangeably? 
Altman uses this, plus the fact that trivially true statements like “pleasure is pleasure” are 
intelligible, as evidence against the standard interpretation. Altman says that he takes 
“intelligible” in “a straightforward way” to mean “possesses meaning”. Since he thinks that ‘Is 
good good?’ does not possess meaning, whereas ‘Is pleasure good?’ does, Altman can explain 
why Moore seems to use “intelligible” where he had previously used “with significance”. If the 
standard interpretation meanwhile required that we understand “intelligible” to have some other, 
very non-standard, meaning then that might count against that interpretation.  
However, there is a perfectly ordinary sense of “intelligible” that the standard interpretation can 
use. If someone, in an ordinary context and completely out of the blue, were to ask me, “Am I 
currently dead?”, I would be completely puzzled by their question even though it has meaning 
(in the sense that it is grammatically well-formed and the words in it are all meaningful).140 
Because I assume that they know that they are alive, because I expect people not to ask questions 
to which they already know the answer and because there is not any obvious alternative question 
that they might be implicating (in Grice’s sense of the word), I will be totally stumped. It would 
be perfectly felicitous in the context for me to say, “I’m sorry but your question is unintelligible 
to me. I do not understand what you’re asking”. In other words, I might say that a question is 
unintelligible to mean that it is unintelligible why the question is being asked. Similarly, the closed 
question, ‘Is pleasure pleasure?’, can be said to lack an intelligibility that ‘Is pleasure good?’ has. 
There is no reason to ask me if pleasure is identical to pleasure, since the answer is obvious so I 
might well say that the question is unintelligible. So, the standard interpretation has no problem 
on this count. 
 
140 By ‘ordinary context’ I exclude, for example, contexts in which we are playing a murder mystery game. 
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I conclude then that even the passage Altman brings up to provide textual support to his 
interpretation of Moore’s argument does not in fact provide support to his interpretation.  
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Chapter 3: The Normativity Argument 
For most of the time since the publication of Principia Ethica the open question argument has 
been seen as the most significant objection to naturalism but in light of now well-known 
problems with the argument anti-naturalists have increasingly argued that naturalism can be 
shown to fail in other ways. Some philosophers think that even if naturalists can say that 
normative terms are distinct in meaning from natural terms, it is just obvious that normative 
properties could not be natural properties. The idea that normative properties might be identical to 
certain natural properties is seen by some as obviously mistaken, or even absurd. 
Part of the debate might come down to a misunderstanding of what naturalism is. It is 
sometimes said that naturalists identify normative properties with non-normative properties.141 If 
that were the case then it would be easy to see why naturalists are accused of missing something 
crucial out of their account of normative properties. Were goodness, for instance, identical to some 
non-normative property N then goodness would not be normative since N is not normative and 
goodness is identical to N. However, the objection is too quick. The naturalist does not identify 
normative properties with non-normative properties; rather, they identify them with natural 
properties. Those natural properties, they are committed to saying, are normative. The anti-
naturalist might then insist that this cannot work since natural properties could not be normative, 
but they need to supply independent arguments for that claim, otherwise they just beg the 
question against the naturalist.  
One also comes across the idea that naturalism, qua a form of reductionism, entails that 
normativity does not really exist or that it is at least, in some important sense, less real than the 
non-naturalist believes it to be. We find this in Graham Oddie’s Value, Reality and Desire where he 
writes, “That which is reducible is less real than that to which it reduces”142. These complaints 
 
141 e.g. Miller (2003), Cline (2015). 
142 Oddie (2005, ch.1) 
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seem to me to miss the mark. The naturalist thinks that normativity is just as real as anything else 
that exists.143 They believe that things really are good, bad, obligatory, etc. Certainly, they have a 
different account to other philosophers of what something’s been good, bad, obligatory, etc. 
consists in, but that account is not committed to saying that normative properties are ‘less real’ 
than other properties. Following the rejection of vitalism and the adoption of the idea that being 
alive reduces to a number of purely physical states and processes, we have not started saying that 
being alive is somehow ‘less real’ than the physical states and processes that being alive reduces to 
or consists in. Similarly, we should not say that anyone who thinks that the normative reduces to 
the natural thinks that normativity is somehow less than fully real.  
Following G.E. Moore, philosophers have also invoked Bishop Butler's dictum - "Everything is 
what it is, and not another thing" - to suggest that reductions are unworkable. The thought is 
that when we offer a reduction of a normative property A to natural property B, we deny that A 
is A and say that it is B instead. We can find this kind of idea in Thomas Nagel, who writes: “If 
values are objective, they must be so in their own right, and not through reducibility to some 
other kind of objective fact. They have to be objective values, not objective anything else”.144 
That a thing is not itself is of course absurd. But this objection is unfair to the naturalist; if 
goodness is happiness-maximisation then goodness is still goodness and happiness-maximisation 
is still happiness-maximisation.145 And, to say that goodness reduces to happiness-maximisation 
is not to say that goodness is not really a normative property, rather, it is to say that happiness-
maximisation is a normative property. 
 
143 One might argue, along Platonist lines, that since naturalists think that normativity is natural they must think that 
it is in some sense less real than the kinds of perfect sui generis non-natural qualities that non-naturalists take 
normative properties to be. But the idea that the natural world is less real than some other reality is, I think, not one 
that has been at all established and it is not even clear to me what it means, so I think that we can avoid this 
possibility. Moore offers a nice criticism of this kind of view (1903, p.166-7). 
144 Nagel (1986, p.138). For discussion see Schroeder (2005, p.8) 
145 Frankena (1939, p.472), Prior (1949), Baldwin (1993), Sturgeon (2003), Schroeder (2005). 
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However, even once we correct these misunderstandings, naturalism still strikes many 
philosophers as implausible. According to these philosophers, whatever their commitments viz 
the meaning of normative terms or the content of normative concepts, naturalist accounts 
cannot succeed because they all make a fatal fundamental error in identifying normative 
properties with natural properties. By committing themselves to this metaphysical thesis 
naturalist accounts give up any hope of capturing the sense in which normative properties are 
normative. This is the Normativity Objection. 
When an action has some natural property like minimises suffering, that fact obviously could not be 
the same as that action’s being right. If rightness were just the same as some natural property then 
rightness would not have the particular normative quality that it in fact does have, or so these 
philosophers believe. This kind of normativity argument is pressed against the naturalist in a few 
different ways. In what follows I look at a few different cases for the normativity argument, 
leaning heavily on Derek Parfit’s discussion in the second and third volumes of On What Matters, 
since Parfit goes into more detail than non-naturalists tend to.  
§1 - The Just Too Different Intuition 
Sometimes non-naturalists argue that we simply know that normative properties are not natural 
on reflection. In identifying the normative with the natural the naturalist fails to capture the 
sense in which the normative is of its own special, sui generis kind. Normative properties, it is 
alleged, are intuitively distinct in kind from natural properties; to suggest otherwise is to commit 
a category error. Similar kinds of intuitions drive the case against reductions in other areas of 
philosophers, such as reductions in philosophy of mind of phenomenal states to physical states 
in the brain. 
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In part six of On What Matters Derek Parfit uses this intuition to form what he says is a 
“decisive” argument against naturalism. Parfit makes his case quickly and simply. Some things 
are very obviously not of the same kind, Parfit gives the following examples,  
“Rivers could not be sonnets, experiences could not be stones, and justice could not be – as some 
Pythagoreans were said to have believed – the number 4.”146  
The same, though “much less obviously”147, goes for natural facts and normative facts.148 Given 
the meaning of normative terms it could not turn out that they refer to natural properties, just as 
given the meaning of ‘heat’ it could not have turned out that heat was a particular shade of blue. 
Normative facts, if they exist, are in their own separate, distinctive category like mathematical 
facts. To argue that normative or mathematical facts are the same as some fact of another kind is 
to make a basic category error. 
Parfit uses as his target naturalist theory a kind of reasons internalism like that defended by 
Bernard Williams; roughly, the position that the normative property is what you ought to do is the 
same as the natural property is what would fulfil your present fully informed desires.149 Parfit thinks that 
it is obvious that Williams-style internalism cannot be correct. To illustrate this point Parfit turns 
to an example named Burning Hotel the details of which are as follows: 
“You are in some Burning Hotel, and you can save your life only by jumping into some canal. I am outside 
your hotel, which I know to be on fire, and I can see you at some window above the canal”.150 
The claim, ‘You ought to jump’, in this case could not state the same fact as, ‘Jumping would do 
most to fulfil your present fully informed desires, or is what, if you deliberated in certain 
naturalistically describable ways, you would choose to do’, given the difference in meaning 
 
146 Parfit (2011b, p.324) 
147 ibid., p.325 
148 We need not assume that there are irreducibly normative facts for this objection to work (ibid., p.327). Instead, 
we could just defend the claim that natural facts could not be normative. Error theorists could then accept this 
objection. So too, could some expressivists (e.g. Ayer (1936), Gibbard (1990) but not Blackburn (1998) or Gibbard 
(2003)). 
149 Williams (1981, ch.8). 
150 Parfit, (2011b, p.283) 
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between these claims. The fact that you ought to jump just could not possibly be the same as a 
causal or psychological fact. It might be thought that this objection misses the mark against 
synthetic naturalists who do not think that normative and natural claims have the same meaning, 
but Parfit does not require that these claims have the same meaning on the naturalist’s account. 
Parfit’s argument just requires that we can accurately tell from the respective meanings of 
normative and natural claims that they refer (if they are true) to facts in different basic categories. 
Some might argue that this cannot be right because there is no sharp distinction between the 
normative facts and natural facts as evidenced by the fact that truths containing ‘thick concepts’ 
are partly normative and partly natural. For example, to claim that some act was generous might 
be thought to imply both that it was proto tanto good and that it involved the transfer of resources 
from one person to another person or persons. Parfit argues that this response does not work 
because we can distinguish between the purely normative and purely natural parts of such 
concepts (as I just did with the concept generous) and see that these parts are evidently not of the 
same kind.151  
§2 - Responses 
§2.1  
David Enoch, a non-naturalist like Parfit, has a nice term for the intuition driving the thought 
that the normative just cannot be natural, he calls it the “Just Too Different Intuition”.152  But 
while Enoch finds this intuition plausible he does not think that simple appeals to it constitute 
any kind of fatal objection to naturalism.153 He notes that many people simply do not share this 
intuition, so the naturalist and the non-naturalist find themselves at an impasse from which he 
thinks no fully satisfying general argument against naturalism can be generated. He writes,  
 
151 ibid. p.326 
152 Enoch (2011). Other philosophers who report having these kinds of intuitions include Donagan (1981), Johnston 
(1989), Dancy (2005, p. 132), Scanlon (2000, pp. 57–8) and Huemer (2005) 
153 Enoch (2011), ch.5 
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“[A]ny argumentative move here will likely start either with accepting or with rejecting the just-too-
different intuition, thus in a way begging the question against the other party to the reducibility debate.”154  
Enoch, in my view, judges the dialectical situation correctly. The normativity argument is not one 
that you feel will convince many who were not already strongly predisposed against naturalism. 
To illustrate, see how Michael Huemer, arguing along very much the same lines as Parfit, 
presents one argument against naturalism: 
(1) Normative properties are radically different from natural properties. 
(2) If two things are radically different, then one is not reducible to the other. 
(3) So, normative properties are not reducible to natural properties.155 
The first premise of this argument is just a flat denial of naturalism and the only people that are 
going to find it convincing are those that were already inclined to reject naturalism anyway. The 
same kind of issue seems to affect Parfit’s normativity argument. The argument does not seem to 
amount to much more than simply saying that naturalism seems incorrect.156 
§2.2  
I think we should also worry about the examples used in Parfit’s presentation of the argument. 
First, he points out that things like rivers and sonnets, or experiences and stones, are clearly of a 
different kind. There is an important disanalogy between these kinds of examples and the case of 
the normative and the natural, however. Facts about rivers do not supervene on facts about 
sonnets (or vice versa) and facts about experiences do not supervene on facts about stones (or vice 
versa) but it is widely agreed that normative facts do supervene on natural facts; an action that is 
right in one world could not be wrong in a world where all the natural facts were the same.157 
Plausibly, part of the reason that it seems obvious to us that stone-properties and experience-
 
154 Enoch (2014), p.108 
155 Huemer (2005), p.94. Huemer actually talks about ‘value properties’ rather than ‘normative properties’. I changed 
it just so that the argument was consistent with the rest of my discussion. I do not think that it is a philosophically 
significant change 
156 Schroeder (2009), Fleming (2015). 
157 Railton (2016) also points this out. 
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properties could not be the same is that their extensions are so different. We can easily imagine a 
world in which there are many stones but no conscious experiences, and vice versa. The same is 
not true of the normative and the natural; given the supervenience of the normative on the 
natural there must be some broadly natural property with the same extension as a normative 
property. So, the first kinds of examples that Parfit uses as analogies are potentially misleading. 
Second, Parfit then illustrates how his argument applies to the case of the normative and the 
natural by returning to talk about Williams-style internalism and the Burning Hotel example. He 
argues that we can clearly see that in this example the fact that it jumping the course of action 
that would do most to fulfil my present fully informed desires is different to the fact that it is 
what I ought to do. If we suppose for the sake of argument that that is true, it does not tell us 
that every other form of naturalism cannot work. Again, part of what is doing the work here 
might just be that internalism offers an extensionally inadequate theory of what we ought to do. 
Faced with the example I might think, ‘Yes, Parfit is right, what I ought to do could not be the same 
as what does most to fulfil my present fully informed desires, since it would still be the case that I ought to 
jump even if jumping did not do most to fulfil my present fully informed desires.’ But this would 
just show that internalist theories face a kind of extensional inadequacy problem, it would not 
show that naturalists in general are guilty of a category error. Non-naturalists often argue in the 
following way; they take one very simple and implausible naturalistic reduction of a normative 
property, point out that it is intuitively unappealing, and then claim without much argument that 
this result must generalise to show that no naturalistic reduction is possible. That may not be 
exactly what Parfit is doing with the normativity argument, but his use of the Burning Hotel 
example to support it does, I think, trade on the same kind of intuitions. 
§2.3 
Even if we give credence to the just too different intuition it hardly seems, as Parfit claims, that it 
would be decisive. Naturalism may simply be a view which sounds a bit implausible to us initially 
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but which makes up it for it by having significant theoretical advantages, e.g. ontological 
parsimony, a straightforward explanation of the supervenience of the normative on the natural, 
etc.  
Huemer does not agree. He argues that we can simply see that all forms of naturalism are false 
and that beyond that no further argument is needed. Someone who cannot see that, say, 
goodness is not a different kind of thing from any natural property just does not understand 
what goodness is or what natural properties are, and they need not be argued with further. 158 
Against this, one can point to the fact that many people clearly have no such intuition to cast 
doubt on the idea that the falsity of naturalism is quite so obvious and that naturalists have no 
understanding of normative concepts. Additionally, we can point to people who have strong 
intuitions that normative properties are natural properties. In my experience these people tend to 
be utilitarians who think that it is just obvious that rightness is maximising happiness (or 
something else along similar utilitarian lines like desire-satisfaction) and that people who have 
views to the contrary are lead astray by self-interest, religious belief, residual attachments to 
outdated ideas like honour, or a kind of squeamishness around making sacrifices for the greater 
good.159 I do not think that this view is plausible, but I do not know any independent reason for 
thinking that these intuitions are unreliable while the just too different intuition is not.  
Additionally, many people who may not have the intuition that normative properties are natural, 
do have intuitions that seem to entail it. For instance, many people have the intuition that the 
only facts there are are broadly natural facts, and they have the intuition that there are some 
normative facts, e.g. that it is a fact that torturing people for fun is wrong. Together these 
intuitions would seem to entail that normative facts must be natural facts.160  
 
158 Huemer (2005, ch.4) 
159 e.g. E. and M. Clark (1941), Peter Singer (1993), Harris (2010). 
160 It might be thought that naturalism is not entailed by these intuitions because quasi-realism is an option. There is 
not space to discuss the matter properly here but quasi-realists have in recent years increasingly turned away from 
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And of course, many people have the intuition that non-naturalism is fantastical or even 
downright ridiculous. Lots of people react to non-naturalism with a kind of disbelief that anyone 
might suppose that normative properties are sui generis and non-natural, and that we come to 
know about them through some mysterious faculty of ‘intuition’ (Huemer) or through ‘non-
causal responses’ (Parfit). The point is not that these intuitions suggest that naturalism is right, 
rather, it is that we would need some reason beyond the bare fact that some people have the just 
too different intuition to doubt that naturalism is right. There may be some story about why we 
should take the just too different intuition seriously but not any conflicting intuitions, but I do 
not think that non-naturalists have yet given us it. With all these different, conflicting intuitions 
in the air one is tempted to think that the fact that some people have a particular given intuition 
on the matter is, by itself, really neither here nor there.  
§2.4 
Even if we accept that people feel that the normative is intuitively different to the natural there is 
scope for claiming that that intuition is consistent with some forms of naturalism, for it is not 
clear whether the intuition, to the extent we have it at all, really concerns normative properties as 
opposed to normative concepts. Suppose it is said that the just too different intuition is supposed 
to be a pre-theoretical feeling that many of the folk are disposed to have. It seems plausible to 
wonder in that case whether folk intuitions are really fine-grained enough to distinguish between 
issues about normative facts and properties on the one hand and normative concepts or the meaning 
of normative terms on the other. If asked whether goodness seems to be a different kind of thing 
to any natural property someone might ask themselves, ‘Well, I can think that something is good 
without thinking that it has any particular natural quality, so being good must be a different kind 
of thing to natural qualities.’ I suspect that in this kind of way the kinds of intuitions underlying 
 
claiming that all facts are natural facts precisely because it is fits awkwardly with their commitments to both the 
irreducibility of normative concepts on the one hand and a kind of deflationism about fact-talk on the other. (e.g. 
Toppinen (2014), Ridge (2014), Price (2013), Bex-Priestley (2018)) 
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the open question argument might get mistaken for the just too different intuition. I think that 
Parfit encourages this with the way he discusses The Burning Hotel. He writes: 
“You know that, unless you jump, you will soon be overcome by smoke. You might then believe, and tell 
yourself, that you have decisive reasons to jump, that you should, ought to, and must jump, and that if you don’t 
jump you would be making a terrible mistake. If these normative beliefs were true, these truths could not 
possibly be the same as, or consist in, some merely natural fact, such as the causal and psychological facts 
stated by (C).” 
Parfit starts by getting us to think about normative thought processes, and then he moves 
straightaway to claiming that the referents of these thoughts could not possibly be natural facts. 
It is easy to feel that a kind of sleight-of-hand is going on here. It may be intuitive that thinking 
that I ought to jump could not be the same as thinking that jumping does most to fulfil my 
present desires, but is it so intuitive that the property referred to by one thought could not be the 
same as the property referred to by the other? Compare this example: 
You know that there is water in the glass. You might then believe, and tell yourself, that it is drinkable, that 
light passes through it, that it is the same material that fills our lakes and rivers. If these beliefs were true, 
these truths could not possibly be the same as, or consist in, some mere chemical fact such as the facts stated 
by claims about hydrogen and oxygen atoms. 
The first sentence leads us down the garden path, prompting us to see a difference between folk 
concepts and chemical concepts, only then for the second sentence to push us to the intuition 
that water facts and chemical facts are not the same. If this is the kind of reasoning process going 
on in the normative case however then the intuitions are no threat to synthetic naturalists who 
agree that normative concepts are very different from natural concepts. It is not even a worry for 
analytic naturalists who have developed multiple strategies for accounting for the intuitive 
difference in cognitive significance between normative and natural concepts, as seen in the last 
two chapters.  
§2.5 
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Alternatively, it might be that the just too different intuition is not supposed to be some 
pretheoretical hunch had by the folk, but is instead meant to be a kind of compelling conviction 
that assails one once one has reflected on and digested issues in the metaethical literature. It 
would be uncharitable to suppose that philosophers with this intuition were not properly 
distinguishing properties and concepts that pick out those properties. 
But if this is the case then, again, it is striking that there are so many naturalists/reductionists 
around. Additionally it is reasonable to suspect that the just too different intuition might be a 
product of ‘theory contamination’; that is, an intuition that arises out of someone’s theoretical 
commitment to non-naturalism as opposed to an antecedent datum supporting it. If the just too 
different intuition just amounts to the thought had by non-naturalists that non-naturalism seems 
right and naturalism seems wrong, then it does not seem very troubling. 
Huemer does speculate that the reason that people are opposed to non-naturalism is because, “it 
does not fit with the spirit of the modern age” and that because of “biases”, including irrational 
“scientistic”, “politically correct” or “cynical” attachments, people have been lead to think that 
opposing metaethical views might be workable.161 If that were the case then we might think that 
we can disregard intuitions that normative properties might be natural properties on the basis 
that philosophers who have these intuitions did not come to their views in rational or reliable 
ways. But, first, I do not think that Huemer says enough to ground this piece of speculation so I 
think that we can safely pass over it. Second, we can point to examples of philosophers who did 
not seem to have the just too different intuition but who either predate the ‘modern age’ (e.g. 
Jeremy Bentham) or who do not seem to be scientistic, cynical or unduly concerned with being 
politically correct (e.g. Peter Geach). 
§2.6 
 
161 Huemer (2005, pp.240-247) 
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Finally, even if we suppose for the sake of argument that the just too different intuition is 
widespread and that it really does concern properties and not just concepts, why should we think that 
it has any probative force? Perhaps time and motion do not intuitively seem to be relative and 
perhaps water does not intuitively seem to be H2O but this does not lead us to reject any theories 
which suggest otherwise.  
Parfit and Huemer both argue that there is an important difference between the just too different 
intuition and these scientific cases.162 It did not seem obvious to competent users of the pre-
scientific concept <water> that water could not turn out to be H2O.  By contrast, argue Parfit 
and Huemer, it does seem obvious that given the content of the concept <good> the property 
good could not turn out to be some natural property. Parfit thinks that it follows from the very 
meaning of ‘good’ that good could not be a natural property. To suppose otherwise is just to 
change the subject and talk about something other than good. The same is not true of thinking 
that water is not a molecule or that time is not relative. 
But are things really this clear cut? Mark Schroeder gives the following example: 
It does seem pretheoretically obvious that splitting a drop of water must always yield smaller 
drops of water. But the thesis that water is H2O entails that this is false. It entails that water is 
made out of smallest bits. But water does not seem to be made out of smallest bits; it seems to be 
continuous.163 
The same goes in the case of time. Here is an example from Eric Margolis and Stephen 
Laurence: 
[N]othing seems more inviolable than the belief that if a is older than b today, then a will be older than b 
next year too; but Relativity Theory implies that this isn’t so. 164165 
 
162 Parfit (2011b). Huemer (2005, ch.4). 
163 Schroeder (2009, p.202) 
164 Laurence and Margolis (2003), p.271. 
165 Another example might include the idea that heat is intuitively a kind of substance (Railton’s example, 2017). 
Putnam’s Robot Cats (1962a) example may also be used.  
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It may have seemed obvious to people that certain claims which entail that water is not a 
molecule or which entail that time is not relative must be true, but these people are mistaken. 
Other examples could include the idea that heat is intuitively a kind of substance166 or Putnam’s 
Robot Cats example.167 At first blush it might seem obvious to some that it follows from the 
concept <cat> that cats are animals, but if prompted to imagine a world in which it turns out 
that what we believe to be cats are in fact robots many (though not all) have the intuition that we 
would have learned that cats are robots and not that there are no cats, suggesting that it is not a 
conceptual truth that cats are animals after all. 
I am not suggesting that it was part of the content of the pre-scientific concept <water> that 
water is not a molecule; we are not inclined to say that people living prior to circa 1750 were not 
using the same concept as us when they spoke about ‘water’. Rather, I am suggesting that what 
may seem obvious to us regarding some object need not be a very good guide to the content of 
the concepts that picks that object out. This opens up the possibility that even if it seems 
intuitively obvious that the property good could not be a natural property (which I am not 
convinced of), that does not necessarily tell us that it follows from the meaning of the term 
‘good’ or the content of the concept <good> that good could not be a natural property.168 
Laurence and Margolis point out,  
“There’s always the possibility that an apparent a priori analysis is really just a reflection of a lack of 
theoretical imagination.” 169 
I think that the same could be said about the normative case. Even if it is true that the just too 
different intuition is widespread and stable, we need not think that it represents a conceptual truth 
or forms part of the meaning of our normative terms, as Parfit and Huemer seem to think.  It 
may just be like the false intuition that time is absolute.  
 
166 Railton (2016) 
167 Putnam (1962a) 
168 Putnam (1962b) 
169 Laurence and Margolis (2003), p.271. 
98 
 
All in all then, the normativity argument does not seem too convincing. It is not obvious that 
people, by and large, have the intuition that normative properties cannot be natural properties 
and even if they do it is not obvious that that gives us much reason to reject naturalism. It is hard 
to know whether Parfit intends to put much stress on this argument. While he does say that he 
thinks it is “decisive”, he also says that it is “much less obvious” that the normative and the 
natural are distinct than that, for instance, rivers and sonnets are.170 He also goes on to say that 
despite his many years of attacking naturalism, some of the central claims of synthetic naturalism 
can seem plausible to him, which presumably would not be the case if naturalists were guilty of 
an obvious and egregious category error.171 In any case, the normativity argument as he first 
presents it does not seem to put much pressure on naturalism.  
§3 - The Normativity Argument Revived 
Sometimes when philosophers present something like the normativity argument they go further 
than simply saying that naturalism is obviously false on reflection, they also try to identify a 
feature that normativity has that the natural lacks in order to prove, by Leibniz’s law, that one 
cannot be identified with the other.  
Often they have trouble articulating clearly just what this feature is. Richard Joyce, for example, 
argues that naturalism cannot make sense of the “practical oomph” that morality in particular 
has.172 But Joyce never gives us a clear sense of what “practical oomph” is and even seems to 
suggest that it is not possible to explain this feature of normativity in an illuminating way.173 At 
times, Parfit also talks as if this special feature of normativity is something totally ineffable.174  
 
170 (2011b, p.325) 
171 ibid., p.349 
172 Joyce (2006, ch.2, ch.6. 2011 p.) 
173 Though he tells us (2011, p.525) that it is not a categorical reason-giving force, which would seemingly be the 
most obvious candidate.  
174 e.g. Parfit (2016, pp.73-4.) cf. Wittgenstein (1965) 
99 
 
Without being especially clear on what the explanada are, it feels unfair to burden the naturalist 
(and everyone else who is not a non-naturalist) with having to explain it. Citing some mysterious, 
ineffable quality that normativity has, and arguing that no naturalist could hope to capture it is 
no real advance on simply stating that naturalism seems wrong. If the naturalist has to deny that 
normative properties are normative in some sense that cannot be expressed or clearly stated then 
it does not seem costly to do so. 
At other times though, anti-naturalists are a bit clearer about what normativity requires. Parfit 
argues that naturalists can capture some of the senses in which a claim can be normative, but not 
the sense in which they can involve reasons to act. Here is how he spells out this idea: 
On the reason-involving conception, normativity involves reasons or apparent reasons. 
When I call some claim 
“normative in the reason-implying sense, I mean roughly that this claim asserts or implies that we or 
others do or might have some reason or apparent reason.” 175 
Other non-naturalists like Jean Hampton, T.M. Scanlon, Joseph Raz and Jonathan Dancy also 
seem to have something like this in mind when they say that naturalists miss out on the 
normativity of the normative.176 177  
§4 – Response 
There might be scope for the naturalist to bite the bullet. At least when it comes to moral claims, 
the naturalist could argue that we do not necessarily have any reason to do that which we morally 
ought to do. Given that most people usually have desires or goals which are furthered if others 
are treated decently, and if their welfare is promoted, etc. it so happens that we usually have a 
 
175 Parfit (2011b, p.267) 
176 Hampton (1998), Scanlon (2000), Raz (1999) and Dancy (2006) 
177 Another way to understand what is meant by a property’s being normative might be that believing that some 
action has that property necessarily entails some link to believer’s motivation. I consider the issue of whether 
naturalists can and should say that normative property are normative in this sense in chapter 5.  
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reason to do what is right. We can use this fact to try to explain why it seems to us that behaving 
morally is rational. But nothing on this picture guarantees that it is always rational to behave well. 
Philippa Foot puts this point in a memorable way: “We are not conscripts in the army of virtue, 
but volunteers”.178 
Faced with examples of strange hypothetical agents who by stipulation have no desires or end 
furthered by behaving morally naturalists could either insist that it is actually more intuitive that 
they have no reason to behave morally, or they could argue that such a person is not possible.179 
But, among other problems, this kind of response does not translate very well to handling 
normative concepts like <all things considered ought>. The idea that I have no reason to do 
what I morally ought to do might be coherent, whereas the idea that I have no reason to do that 
which all-things-considered I ought to do borders on unintelligibility. It seems reasonable to 
expect that an account of normative concepts should explain why at least some of them seem to 
entail claims about reasons. 
A better response for the naturalist is to agree that there is a reason-implying sense of 
normativity and to capture it in naturalist terms. The naturalist can agree with the non-naturalist 
that if I ought all-things-considered to do something then I have a reason to do it. Take the 
Williams-style reasons internalist theory that Parfit often using as his target. According to this 
view, I have a reason to do something if it would fulfil one of my present fully-informed desires, 
and I ought all-things-considered to do something if it would do most to fulfil my present fully-
informed desires. On this picture it is easy to see why the concept <all things considered ought> 
is reason-implying; if something would do most to fulfil one of my present fully-informed desires 
then that implies that I have a reason to do it, since having a reason to do something, on this 
 
178 Foot (1979, p.170.) 
179 Sharon Street, Bernard Williams, David Sobel and others argue take the first kind of response. Mark Schroeder, 
Michael Smith and Kantian constructivists use the latter kind of response. These philosophers would not however 
deny that we have reason to do that which all things considered we ought to do. 
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picture, consists in its fulfilling one of my present fully-informed desires.180 In other words, if 
something does most to fulfil my present fully-informed desires then a fortiori it must fulfil one of 
my present fully-informed desires. So, on this naturalist account, if something is what I ought to 
do all things considered that (almost trivially) entails that I have a reason to do it. 
Other naturalists can adopt the same pattern, they can say that if something has the natural 
property picked out by <all things considered ought to> then that implies that it must also have 
the natural property picked out by <has a reason to>. The naturalist can capture why other 
normative concepts are reason-implying along similar lines. Suppose that the non-naturalist says 
that an action’s being good implies that there is a reason to do it. The Williams-style internalist 
could say, for example, that an action is good iff it would fulfil someone’s present fully-informed 
desire. This would straightaway imply that if an action were good for a person to perform then 
they also have a reason to do it. And, they can as easily explain why the normative concept of 
<has a reason to> is itself normative in the reason-involving sense, since every claim trivially implies 
itself. 
If the kind of reasons fundamentalism/buck-passing account of normative concepts favoured by 
so many non-naturalists is correct then the way ahead for naturalists is clear. They can offer a 
naturalistic reduction of the concept <has a reason to> and then show how other normative 
concepts reduce to that concept, i.e. show that when an action has the natural property picked 
out by a normative concept it must also have whatever property is picked out by the concept 
<has a reason to>.181 Mark Schroeder suggests that all naturalist reductionisms should take this 
form.182 But if, instead, something like the concept <good> is fundamental, then naturalists 
 
180 A potential caveat concerns cases where no possible action would fulfil my present fully-informed desires. In that 
case, trivially, any action would do most to fulfil my present fully informed desires even though no action would 
fulfil any of my desires. A think that the nternalist could easily finesse their account to handle this but since I am not 
interested in defending internalism specifically I do not pursue the best way to do this. 
181 Schroeder (2005, 2007), Smith (1994), Copp (1995) 
182 Schroeder (2007, Ch.5). 
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could still show that normative concepts are reason-implying, they would just have to then also 
show how the concept <has a reason to> reduces to <good>. 
Of course, this does not show that Williams-style internalism or any other naturalist reduction 
actually succeeds in explaining why normative concepts are reason-implying. To do that they 
would need to put forward a specific reduction of the concept <has a reason to> which captures 
the things we want to say about reasons, which is in other ways theoretically plausible, and which 
has the right links to the other normative concepts. But nothing the non-naturalist says suggests 
that this is in principle impossible. So, I think that naturalists are perfectly safe from this version 
of the normativity argument. 
There is another slightly different way that Parfit argues that naturalists cannot explain why 
normative properties are normative. Sometimes when Parfit talks about the sense in which 
concepts can be normative he does not say that they must involve reasons per se, but that they 
must involve irreducibly normative reasons.183 It is this that shows that naturalism is unworkable, he 
thinks. Clearly, naturalists cannot say that normative concepts are normative in that sense, but 
that does not matter because the complaint straightforwardly begs the question against the 
naturalist.184 Whether there are irreducibly normative reasons, or whether reasons admit of 
naturalistic reduction, is exactly what is at issue between the non-naturalist and the naturalist, so 
this way of framing the normativity objection is no advancement on simply asserting that 
normative properties do not seem to be natural. I move on now to look at Parfit’s final 
formulation of his normativity argument. 
§5 - The Normativity Argument Revived Again 
§5.1 
 
183 e.g. Parfit (2016, p.70) 
184 Frankena makes this point about a similar argument (1939, pp. 473-4) 
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In the third volume of On What Matters, Parfit concedes that the naturalist has a plausible 
response to his normativity argument as he originally set it out. This time he uses in his examples 
hedonic act utilitarianism (HAU), the view that says that acts are right if and only if, or just when, 
these acts minimize the total sum of suffering minus happiness. If HAU is correct then an 
action’s having the natural property minimizes suffering makes it the case that that action has the 
normative property is right. If both naturalism and HAU were correct then minimizes suffering 
would also be identical to is right. 
Previously, Parfit had just flatly denied that the natural property that makes acts right could also 
be the same as the property rightness. This, he thought, counted strongly against naturalism which 
is committed to saying that a property like minimizes suffering makes that act have the normative 
property is right and is identical to is right. Discussing how a hedonic act utilitarian might respond 
to this objection, Parfit writes: 
 “These Naturalists might reply: 
Your claims are mere assertions. You agree that 
(J) having molecular kinetic energy both non-causally makes an object hot and is the 
same as being hot. 
We believe that, if HAU were true, we could similarly claim that 
(K) being an act that minimizes suffering both non-causally makes an act right and is the 
same as being right. 
Why do you deny that (K) could be true? Where is the disanalogy? 
This reply is, I concede, plausible. Given the similarity between (J) and (K), it may seem 
dogmatic to declare that being an act that minimizes suffering couldn’t be the same as 
being right.”185 
 
185 Parfit (2016, p.79) 
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As we can see in this passage, Parfit came to agree that his original normativity argument was 
question-begging, as I have been arguing. 
He does however go on to suggest a new way to put his normativity argument. He does this by 
identifying a feature that the normative has that the natural does not, but this time he does not 
make the equally question-begging assumption that normative claims must involve irreducibly 
normative reasons. This argument is quite different from the other formulations, so much so 
that I am not sure that it should really be called a normativity argument, but since Parfit 
considers it to be so I will address it here.  
Parfit’s new argument focuses on the relation, non-causal making. That a liquid is made of H2O 
molecules makes it the case that the liquid is water, but a liquid’s being made of H2O molecules 
does not cause that liquid to be water; causes cannot the same as their effects. Similarly, that a 
figure is closed and has three sides makes it the case that that figure is a triangle, but it does not 
cause the figure to be a triangle.186 Parfit agrees that natural properties can non-causally make 
actions have particular normative properties. What he wants to argue is this could not be true if 
those natural properties were also identical to those normative properties. 
§5.2 
Parfit’s first move is to argue that the claims (J) and (K) in the quoted passage above are not 
analogous. He writes: 
(J) and (K) are not, I believe, relevantly similar. The wording of these claims suggests that what 
corresponds to being hot is being right. But that is not so. Heat is the property that can have certain 
effects—such as causing certain sensations, melting solids, etc. What corresponds to heat is not the 
property of being right, but the property that makes acts right. What is relevantly similar to (J) is not (K) 
but 
 
 
186 Schroeder’s example (2005), (2007, ch.4) 
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(L) being an act that minimizes suffering both non-causally makes an act have the 
property that makes acts right, and is the same as having the property that makes acts 
right. 
I should have claimed that, unlike (K), (L) might be true. (L) is like the true claim that 
(J) having molecular kinetic energy both non-causally makes an object hot and is the 
same as being hot. 
Parfit’s point here is subtle and potentially confusing. If you tell someone that something is ‘hot’ 
then you tell them that that thing has other, distinct properties like boils liquids, melts solids, etc., 
whereas telling someone that ‘something has a certain molecular kinetic energy’ does not tell 
them that it has those other properties. Parfit thinks that that is just part of the respective 
meanings of the expressions ‘heat’ and ‘molecular kinetic energy’. (J) is informative because it 
tells us that when something has a particular molecular kinetic energy that makes it have the, 
other, different properties, e.g. boils liquids, that we associate with the term ‘heat’. 
Synthetic naturalists want to say that ‘being hot’ is analogous to ‘is right’ and that ‘having a 
certain molecular kinetic energy’ is analogous to ‘minimises suffering’ (or whatever natural 
expression that denotes the natural property that is identical to being right) but Parfit thinks that 
this is mistaken. ‘Being hot’ is more analogous to ‘makes acts right’, while ‘being right’ is more 
analogous to ‘boils liquids’. This is because an object’s having the property boils liquids is a result 
of it having the property has a certain heat (which is the same property as having a certain molecular 
kinetic energy). Since an action’s being right is (assuming utilitarianism) a result of its having the 
natural property minimises suffering, being right is more analogous to boils liquids (the effect) than it is 
to being hot (the non-causal maker). Therefore, (J) is more like (L) than it is like (K).  
With that cleared up, Parfit moves on to argue that a natural property could not both be the 
property that make acts right and be identical to the normative property being right just as the 
property being hot could not both non-causally make it the case that liquids boil and be identical 
to the property boils liquids.  
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Something cannot be the same as one of its properties, Parfit claims. The Sun cannot be the 
same as its brightness, for example. This goes for properties as well as for objects, e.g. a square 
cannot be the same as its property of being square, which in turn cannot be the same as its higher-
order property, being a shape property. The claim that no property can be the same as one of its 
higher-order properties entails that if a property has a particular effect, then that property cannot 
be the same as its higher order property being the property that has such-and-such an effect. Additionally, 
where a property has a particular effect, that property could not be identical to the effect it has.  
 Parfit uses the following example:  
“(R) Just as the Sun couldn’t be the same as the Sun’s property of being bright, the Sun’s brightness 
couldn’t be the same as any of this property’s higher-order properties, such as the property of being the 
property that makes the Moon shine. Nor could the Sun’s brightness be the same the as the property of 
being made to shine, or of shining.” 
Even though the making relation mentioned in (L) is not, unlike in (R), a causal relation the same 
goes for (L), claims Parfit. The naturalist must say that there is some natural property N which 
makes act right but which is also identical to the normative property being right. However, N 
cannot be the same as its higher-order property being the property that makes acts right. N could also 
not be the same as the properties being made to be right or the property being right. Therefore, the 
naturalist’s identification of N with being right must be incorrect.  
Parfit then says that the naturalist might reply that the scientific analogy concerning heat shows 
that the following is true: 
 (U) the relation of non-causal making always implies being the same as.  
But (U) is not true. Non-causal making is an asymmetrical relation, having molecular kinetic energy 
makes something hot, but not vice versa. Whereas, being the same as is a symmetrical relation. 
Additionally, non-causal making often holds between different properties, being killed by a 
meteorite makes you unlucky but the property being killed by a meteorite is not the same as being 
unlucky.  
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So, Parfit concludes, where an action’s having a natural property non-causally makes it have a 
normative property, those properties cannot be the same. 187 
§6 - Response 
The first thing to say is that the naturalist has no need to defend (U). No naturalist argues that 
because having a particular molecular kinetic energy both makes things have a particular heat and 
is the same as having a particular heat, so being right must be the same as whatever natural 
property non-causally makes it the case that acts are right. Rather, naturalists argue that examples 
like the case of heat show us that it merely could be the case that some natural property is the 
same as a normative property and that reference to that natural property can figure in 
explanations of why certain actions have that normative property.188 In other words, the 
naturalist uses the heat example to show that there might be synthetic identity claims relating 
natural and normative properties. They do not use the example to try to show that normative 
properties must be natural properties. So while Parfit is correct to say that (U) is false, it is of no 
cost to the naturalist because they would not, and need not, defend (U). 
The second thing to say is that if Parfit’s argument were sound it would be a potential problem 
for his positive metaethical view too. Parfit is a reasons fundamentalist. He takes reasons to be in 
a sense fundamental to other normative properties. On this view, normative properties like 
goodness or wrongness are nothing over and above certain reason properties. For example, to call 
something good (in the reason implying sense) is, roughly, to say that certain facts about that 
thing’s nature that would give us strong reasons to respond to it in a positive way, such as 
wanting it or using it.189 I take it that Parfit would accept that if a thing’s nature gives us strong 
reasons to respond to it in a positive way that non-causally makes it good. We can run Parfit’s third 
normativity objection against his own view. If that objection works then goodness must be 
 
187 McNaughton and Rawling (2003) make a similar argument. 
188 See e.g. Railton (2016) 
189 Parfit (2011a, p.38). cf. Scanlon (2000, p. 97. 2014, p.2) 
108 
 
something distinct from gives us strong reasons by its nature to respond to in a positive way. Similar moves 
could be made, mutatis mutandis, against any view which reduces normative concepts to other 
normative concepts. So, like the open question argument, Parfit’s argument overgeneralises; a 
good reason to suspect that it does not work. 
With those preliminaries out of the way, I will move on to address his argument directly. Parfit’s 
argument is that, contra naturalism, it could not be the case that where an action has a property 
that makes that action have another property, those properties are identical. That has some 
intuitive appeal. If one thing makes another, it sounds very odd to suggest that they could then 
be one and the same. But talk of ‘making’ in this case might be misleading because it suggests 
some kind of causal, creator-creation relationship. ‘Making’ in the normative cases, however, is 
supposed to be non-causal and so could be denote some relation compatible with naturalism. 
Naturalists can say that just as being a closed a figure with three sides both non-causally makes 
something be a triangle and is identical to the property is a triangle, so for some natural property, 
that natural property non-causally makes something have a normative property and is the same 
as that normative property. 
 It will be useful to have labels for some properties in what follows: 
 n – Maximises happiness. 
 m – Being Right 
 o – Being the property that makes acts right. 
According to the naturalist suggestion on the table n is the natural property that makes acts right, 
o is one of n’s higher-order property and m is the same property as n. Parfit argues that, if HAU 
is true, then n cannot be the same as o because o is one of n’s properties and nothing is the same 
as one of its properties. Parfit is wrong to say that nothing can be the same as one of its 
properties, as we saw in chapter 2. The property is a property plausibly has itself as one of its 
properties. So does the property is not a number. Parfit gives us no reason for thinking that 
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normative properties are not also examples of properties that have themselves as a property.  
That issue does not really matter however since the naturalist does not think that n and o are the 
same property anyway; rather, they think that n and m are the same. I do not see why this part of 
Parfit’s argument is even relevant. Parfit is trying to refute the suggestion that having the natural 
property that makes acts right is the same as being right, but the property that makes acts right on 
the naturalist account is n, not o. 
Parfit does however also argue the property that makes acts right (n) cannot be the same as being 
right (m). The analogy he uses is of the property that makes the moon shine (the Sun’s 
brightness) which he says cannot be the same as one of the Moon’s properties being made to shine. 
Similarly, if n makes acts right, then n cannot be the same as being right (m). 
But we can accept that if one of the Sun’s properties makes the Moon have a property then 
those properties are not the same while arguing that it works differently in other cases. The Sun’s 
brightness makes the moon shine by causing it to shine. We know that the Sun’s brightness cannot 
be the same as the Moon’s shining because we know that causes cannot be the same as their 
effects. But the making relation that holds between natural and normative properties is supposed 
to be non-causal, so we have no reason to think that the what goes for Parfit’s example will 
generalise to non-causal cases.190 Though Parfit assures us that what is true of examples of causal 
making will also be true of examples of non-causal making, he does nothing to ground that claim. 
His Sun example is a red herring. 
Parfit does however touch on potential example of non-causal making too. It seems right to say 
both that heat is molecular kinetic energy and that having a certain molecular kinetic energy 
makes something hot. This seems like an example of non-causal making that holds between 
identical properties; this is why it is a good example for naturalists. However, as we have seen, 
 
190 Parfit agrees that on anyone’s account the connection between something’s natural property and the normative 
properties that it is made to have by having those natural properties, cannot be a causal connection. Parfit (2011a, 
p.299) 
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Parfit thinks that this example is not a good analogy for the relation between normative and 
natural properties. Saying that something is hot is really saying that it causes certain effects, e.g. 
boiling liquids, melting solids. So, when we say that having a certain molecular kinetic energy 
makes an object hot, what we are really saying is that it causes the object to have certain effect 
like boiling liquids. A more apt analogy for the relation between normative and natural properties 
then would be the relation between molecular kinetic energy and its effects, e.g. boiling liquids, 
melting solids etc. But just as a property like boils liquids could not be the same as the property 
that causes it - having a certain molecular kinetic energy - so being right could not be the same as the 
property that makes acts right. So, once we examine the analogy more closely, Parfit thinks, we 
see that it actually undermines naturalism. 
This argument is not very convincing, however. There are two possibilities: either the relation 
between having a certain molecular kinetic energy and having certain effects like boiling liquids is 
a causal relation or it is not. If it is a causal relation then, just as with Parfit’s Sun example, the 
example is disanalogous to what the naturalist wants to say about the relation between normative 
and natural properties. In other words, if we want to say that having a certain molecular kinetic 
energy causes liquids to boil, then the fact that the property having a certain molecular kinetic energy is 
distinct from the property causes liquids to boil, is of no importance, since the naturalist does not 
say that the relation between having a particular natural property and having a normative 
property is a causal one.  
Alternatively, if the relation is non-causal then it is not clear that Parfit is right to say that the 
property having a certain molecular kinetic energy and the property having such-and-such an effect are 
necessarily distinct properties. In order to see this let me give a more specific example. Imagine 
some water is heated to 100 degrees centigrade at sea level so that it boils in a particular way (e.g. 
it evaporates at such-and-such a rate, it bubbles with a certain amount of force, etc.). Let us refer 
the property of having the amount of molecular kinetic energy that that water has, E. Having E, 
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we might say, non-causally makes it the case that that water (at sea level) boils in the particular way 
that it does.191 It is not that having that amount of energy causes the water to boil in the way that 
it does, we might suggest. Boiling in the way that it does is plausibly just part of what it is for 
water (at sea level) to have that particular amount of molecular kinetic energy. 
But if the relation between E and the water’s boiling in a particular way is a non-causal relation, 
then it is not obvious that E and is boiling in such-and-such a way are necessarily distinct properties. I 
think that, pace Parfit, the reverse is actually more intuitive; it seems more plausible than not that 
they are the same property. Having a particular amount of molecular kinetic energy just is what it 
is for water at sea level to have the property of boiling in the particular way that it does in this 
scenario. The water’s boiling in the way it does and its having a certain energy do not intuitively 
seem to be distinct qualities of the water, they are one and the same quality. If that is right then 
there can be cases of non-causal making between identical properties. This is just what the 
naturalist wants to say about the relation between normative and natural properties, which is that 
a certain natural property is identical to being right and that it makes actions right. 
But even if Parfit is right about the water case, we can point to other cases. It is legitimate to say 
that the fact that some shape is a closed figure with three sides makes it a triangle and it also 
seems fine to say that the property of is a closed figure with three sides is the same property as is a 
triangle. Some naturalists want to say that something similar happens in the case of n and m.192 
They think that we can offer constitutive explanations of an act’s being right, wrong, good, bad, 
etc. in terms of that act’s natural properties. Nothing that Parfit says seem to show that that is 
not possible. So, even if Parfit were right about the water case then, it would not be costly for 
the naturalist since there are some other examples of non-causal making between identical 
 
191 I say ‘boiling in the particular way that it does’ because, of course, water boils when it has greater amounts of 
molecular kinetic energy too. Water does not however, boil in exactly the same way, (e.g. does not evaporate at the 
same rate, does not bubble with the same force), when it has more kinetic energy than water at 100 degrees does. 
192 See especially Schroeder (2007, ch.4) and Finlay (2014, ch.1). Their views are heavily influenced by Jeffrey King’s 
(1998) work on analysis which I discussed in chapter 1.  
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properties that they can appeal to. Parfit has to show that there are no cases of non-causal 
making between identical properties, not just that there are some cases of non-causal making 
between distinct properties. So far he has not done that. 
Finally, what of the fact that non-causal making is an asymmetrical relation, whereas being the same as 
is not? If normative properties are just natural properties then why does the fact that an act has a 
natural property make it the case that that act has a normative property, but not vice versa?  
This is admittedly a puzzling issue at first blush, but there are a few different suggestions in the 
literature for how to understand constitutive reductive explanations. On most proposals, the 
asymmetry of non-causal making claims is explained by the fact that ‘P makes Q’ conveys different 
information to ‘Q makes P’. For example, ‘Having a certain molecular kinetic energy makes it 
have particular heat’ offers us an informative scientific explanation of heat in terms of molecular 
kinetic energy, whereas, ‘Having a certain heat makes it have a certain molecular kinetic energy’, 
in a sense, gets things backwards as heat is not fundamental to our understanding of molecular 
kinetic energy.  
There are then different suggestions for understanding why some non-causal making 
explanations are informative whereas others are not. I will run through some of these quickly 
without evaluating how plausible they are or whether they can truly explain the asymmetry of 
non-causal making explanations. 
One suggestion is that the claim, ‘P makes Q’, informs us that one linguistic expression which we 
did not previously know the extension of, ‘Q’, picks out the same property as another linguistic 
expression that we did know the extension of, ‘P’.193 For example, discovering that minimising 
suffering makes something right informs us that the extension of the term ‘right’ are all those 
actions that minimise suffering.   
 
193 Jackson (1998, p.123) 
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According to another suggestion, constitutive explanations inform us that we can come to know 
that something has a particular property in the same kind of way that we come to know that it 
has another property.194 For example, if we discover that minimising suffering makes something 
right, we come to know that we can learn that something is right through broadly empirical 
means, namely, by measuring how much suffering it causes.  
A third suggestion has it that non-causal making claims help us to understand the structure of 
the property in question, e.g. learning that being a unmarried adult man makes you a bachelor is 
to learn that the property being a bachelor is composed of the properties is unmarried, is an adult and 
is a man.195 Complex properties are composed of simpler ones but not vice versa, so the 
asymmetry of non-causal making is accounted for on this suggestion. 
A fourth suggestion is the same as the third suggestion except that, rather than these constitutive 
explanations telling us about the structure of a property, they tell us about the structure of a 
concept.196  
We do not need to determine which, if any, of these suggestions is correct. Everyone needs some 
account of non-causal making to explain why it is legitimate to give constitutive explanations 
like, ‘Being a closed figure with three sides makes it a triangle’. There are several potential 
accounts in the literature already. So, the naturalist need not be worried by the fact that 
according to their account an action’s having a certain natural property makes it have normative 
another, even though those properties are the same. 
Conclusion 
 
194 Shafer-Landau (2003). He does not consider himself to be a naturalist, but he does argue that normative 
properties are constituted by natural properties. This makes him a naturalist as I have been using the term since on 
such views normative properties are not, ontologically speaking, over and above natural properties in a relevant way. 
195 Schroeder (2007, ch.4) 
196 Finlay (2014). 
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I have reviewed three ways that we might understand the normativity argument against 
naturalism and I have found them all wanting. That naturalism might seem incorrect to some 
philosophers is not a very pressing objection against naturalism. Nor is it very difficult for 
naturalists to explain why normative properties are normative in the reason-implying sense, or 
why natural properties can both non-causally make things have particular normative properties 
while being identical to those properties. I now move on to consider Parfit’s other principal 
argument against naturalism. 
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Chapter 4: The Triviality Argument 
 
Parfit thinks that the normativity argument decisively rules out naturalism but, acknowledging 
that many people will be unconvinced, he also offers other arguments. The one he believes to be 
most significant is the triviality argument, which he devotes the most discussion to and names a 
chapter after.197 This argument has generated much discussion, but most of the replies have 
misunderstood the point that Parfit is trying to make. However, once we understand the point 
that Parfit is trying to make we can see that one of the premises of the triviality argument just 
begs the question against the naturalist. Parfit claims that he does not beg the question because 
he has offered decisive auxiliary arguments for the premises of his argument. It is these auxiliary 
arguments and not the triviality argument, which is of the most philosophical interest. I identify 
the main auxiliary arguments and show that they do not work. I also, along the way, dampen the 
hopes of Parfit and Peter Railton, that naturalists and non-naturalists might come to agree with 
one another. 
§1 – The Triviality Argument 
The triviality argument is designed to show that normative claims, understood along naturalist 
lines, could not be both substantive and positive. In order to be substantive a normative claim must 
be significant, in the sense that we could disagree with it or it could tell us something we do not 
already know. To be positive a normative claim must state or imply that when some act has a 
natural property, like maximises happiness, it also has some other, different normative property. 
Throughout, Parfit uses the example of the utilitarian claim 
(A) When some act would maximise happiness, this act is what we ought to do. 
 
197 Parfit (2011b, ch.26) 
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On the kind of non-naturalist account that Parfit favours (A) tells us that acts which have the 
natural property maximises happiness, also have the non-natural, non-ontological, irreducibly 
normative property being what we ought to do. It is easy for philosophers who hold this account to 
explain why (A) is substantive and positive. (A) is substantive since we might not have already 
known that acts which maximise happiness also have the different normative property of being 
what we ought to do. Additionally, someone could sensibly disagree with (A); they might believe 
instead that only actions with some other natural property are the actions we ought to do or they 
might believe that there is no such property as being what we ought to do. Non-naturalists can 
straightforwardly explain why (A) is positive too since being what we ought to do is, on their account, 
a different normative property from the natural property maximises happiness. 
Naturalists meanwhile cannot explain why claims like (A) are both substantive and positive. 
Naturalist utilitarians are committed to something like the following claim: 
(C) When some act would maximise happiness, this property of this act is the same as the property of 
being what we ought to do. 
But (C) is incompatible with the fact that (A) is substantive and positive, so naturalist 
utilitarianism must be false, or so Parfit argues. Accepting (C) does not require accepting there is 
any analytic link between the meaning of the expressions ‘maximises happiness’ and ‘is what we 
ought to do’, or between the content of the concepts <maximises happiness> and <is what we 
ought to do>. (C) only requires that normative terms and concepts pick out the same property as 
some natural terms and concepts. As such, Parfit’s argument applies equally to both analytic and 
synthetic forms of utilitarian naturalism. 
Parfit presents his argument in the following form:  
(1) (A) is a substantive normative claim, which might state a positive substantive normative fact. 
(2) If, impossibly, (C) were true, (A) could not state such a fact. (A) could not be used to imply that when 
some act would maximise happiness, this act would have the different property of being what we ought to 
do, since (C) claims that there is no such different property. Understood along Naturalist lines (A) would 
117 
 
be only another way of stating the trivial fact that, when some act would maximise happiness, this act 
would maximise happiness. 
Therefore, 
This form of naturalism is not true.198 
Mark Schroeder points out that in this form Parfit’s argument is invalid.199 (1) is true as long as 
(A) states or implies that when an act would maximise happiness it would have some different 
normative property. So, (1) could be true if (A) implies that acts which maximise happiness have 
the normative property good or the normative property what we have most reason to do. But, (2), if 
true, only rules out that (A) implies that when some act maximises happiness it could not have 
the normative property of being what we ought to. This premise is silent about whether (A) might 
imply that happiness-maximising acts has normative properties other than the property being what 
we ought to do. As a result, (1) and (2) could be true and the conclusion false. To fix this Parfit 
could simply tweak the second premise so that it said something like this: 
(2’) If, impossibly, (C) were true, (A) could not state such a fact. (A) could not be used to imply that when 
some act would maximise happiness, this act would have a different normative property since (C) claims that 
there is no such different property. 
With that tweak in place, Parfit’s argument is valid, but it only tells against one particular form of 
naturalist utilitarianism if it is sound. Parfit thinks, however, that his argument generalises. For 
any claim of the form, ‘If an act is M then it is N’, where ‘M’ is a natural predicate and ‘N’ is a 
normative predicate, that claim can only be positive and substantive if it says of an act that has a 
natural property that is also has a different normative property. However, according to the 
naturalist, some claim of the form, ‘If an act is M then it is N’, merely states the normatively 
trivial fact that actions with a particular natural property have that selfsame property. If 
 
198 Parfit (2011b), pp.343-44. I alter premise (2) slightly so that Parfit’s argument applies to analytic naturalists as well 
as synthetic naturalists.                                                                                    
199 Schroeder (2016) 
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normative claims of the form, ‘If an act is M then it is N’, are positive and substantive then for 
any ‘M’ and ‘N’ those terms cannot denote the same property. Therefore, no naturalist account 
could work. It does not matter whether or not on the naturalist account in question ‘M’ and ‘N’ 
have the same meaning, just that they are co-referring. Because his argument has this feature, 
Parfit thinks that it is not vulnerable to the same objections that the open question argument 
faces. 
§2 - Response 1 – Railton and Dowell & Sobel 
Parfit’s triviality argument has generated a lot of discussion but most responses to it have missed 
the mark. Parfit imposes on the naturalist two requirements: that they show that normative 
claims like (A) are substantive and that they show that they are positive. Most naturalist 
responses have focused on the first of these requirements, but, as we shall see, this is a mistake 
because Parfit is willing to grant that the naturalist can explain why normative claims are 
substantive, just not how they could be both substantive and positive. 
(A) is substantive as long as it is potentially informative and could be disagreed with. The second 
premise of Parfit’s arguments states that if naturalism were true then normative claims would just 
state the normatively trivial fact that actions with a natural property have that selfsame property. 
Most philosophers who have responded to Parfit have thought that he is here claiming that if 
normative claims like (A) merely stated the fact that actions with a natural property have that 
property then they could not inform us of something we did not already know, nor could they be 
sensibly disagreed with. 200 On this interpretation, Parfit’s argument is more or less just a 
variation of Moore’s open question argument, which I already covered in Chapters 1 and 2. It is 
natural to think that Parfit is here trying to argue along the same lines as Moore. Moore argued 
that if naturalism were true then a normative claim like ‘Pleasure is good’ would be equivalent in 
 
200 Copp (2017), Jackson (2016) and Lenman & Lutz (2018) also interpret Parfit’s point in this way. 
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meaning to a trivial claim like ‘Pleasure is pleasure’; that looks similar to the point that Parfit is 
trying to get at when he says that naturalists cannot explain why normative claims are non-trivial. 
If we understand Parfit’s argument this way then the challenge for the naturalist is to explain the 
difference in cognitive significance between accepting normative claims and accepting trivial 
natural claims like ‘Pleasure is pleasure’. 
To meet this challenge the naturalist can just take one of the many extent responses to Moore’s 
argument and apply it, mutatis mutandis, to Parfit’s argument. Different naturalists try to do this in 
different ways. One example comes in Peter Railton’s paper Two Sides of the Metaethical Mountain.201 
Railton takes Parfit to be challenging the naturalist to say what information a claim like 
(C) when some act would maximise happiness, this property of this act is the same as the property of being 
what we ought to do. 
provides over and above a trivial claim like  
(E) being an act that would maximise happiness is the same as being an act that would maximise happiness 
Railton’s response is to argue that (C), unlike (E), informs us that the property maximises happiness 
fulfils the job description associated with the normative concept <being what we ought to do>. He 
makes his case by using the analogy to the concepts <heat> and <molecular kinetic energy>, 
which are co-referring but associated with different information. The job description associated 
with the concept <heat> is something like that which melts solids, evaporates liquids, etc. If we are told 
that when something has the property of having a certain molecular kinetic energy then it 
necessarily has a certain heat, we are informed that things with a natural property also have the 
property of fulfilling a certain job description associated with the concept <heat>. This is 
information that could not be provided simply by telling saying to someone, “Something with a 
certain molecular kinetic energy has a certain molecular kinetic energy”, since the concept 
<molecular kinetic energy> is not associated with the same job description as the concept 
 
201 Railton (2016). 
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<heat>. The same goes for (C) and (E). If we learned that maximising happiness was the same as 
being what we ought to do we would have learned that maximising happiness is the property that fits the 
job description of <being what we ought to do>. Railton is circumspect when it comes to 
detailing what the job descriptions associated with normative concepts are, but he does suggest 
that normative concepts are associated with other normative concepts and that they are related 
to intention and action in ways that paradigmatically natural concepts are not. 
Whether or not Railton shows that normative claims, understood along naturalist lines, can be 
substantive, it does not fully address the argument that Parfit intends to make. Parfit accepts that 
claims like (E) could give us substantive information as Railton claims, but he argues that this 
information could not also be positive. To be positive, in Parfit’s sense, a normative claim must 
tell us that when some act has a natural property it has another different normative property. The 
claim (C) does not imply that when some act has a particular natural property, it therefore has a 
different normative property. The only information it gives us is negative; it tells us that when 
some act has a natural property, it does not have some other different property of being right, 
since naturalists do not believe there is any property of rightness distinct from that natural 
property.202 
The same pattern arises in Janice Dowell and David Sobel’s debate with Parfit.  Dowell and 
Sobel understand Parfit’s argument along the same lines that Railton does. They write:  
“Parfit’s Triviality Objection purports to show that [naturalists] are unable to do so much as state 
informative identities between the normative and the natural”.203  
They model their response to this challenge on Robert Stalnaker’s approach to explaining why 
identity claims involving co-referring proper names can be informative. It is not necessary to go 
far into the details, but the idea is that claims like (C) update the ‘conversational common 
 
202 Parfit (2016, pp.94-6) 
203 Dowell and Sobel (2017, p.153) 
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ground’ – roughly, the set of presuppositions and background beliefs underlying a conversation - 
in ways that (E) does not.204 Particularly, (C) rules out that we are speaking a language in which 
the expression ‘maximises utility’ denotes a property other than the property that is denoted by 
the expression ‘what we ought to do’. 
In his response, Parfit does not take issue with Dowell and Sobel’s contention that claims like 
(C), understood along naturalist lines, could be informative. His point of contention is that this 
information could not be positive. As a result, he quickly dismisses Dowell and Sobel’s argument 
as being based on a misunderstanding of his argument.205 Merely showing that normative claims 
are substantive is not an adequate response to Parfit’s challenge since it only fulfils one of the 
two requirements that Parfit imposes. 
§3 – Response 2 - Railton Again 
Railton’s first reply to Parfit, which we have just seen, is to challenge the idea that normative 
claims, understood along naturalist lines, cannot be informative. Railton also, however, offers a 
more irenic response.206  He explores whether a synthetic naturalist could accept that there are 
non-natural properties if those properties are also non-ontological, as Parfit believes normative 
properties to be.207 On this response, the naturalist, in effect, concedes that Parfit’s Triviality 
argument shows that claims like (C) could not be true, but then shows that the denial of claims 
like (C) is consistent with naturalism. 
Railton takes Parfit to be saying that distinct concepts must be tied to distinct properties. He 
discusses the concepts <heat> and <molecular kinetic energy>. Railton takes Parfit to be saying 
that because those concepts are distinct they must refer to distinct properties. A claim like  
 
204 Stalnaker (1981, 2014). 
205 Parfit (2017, pp.230-232). 
206 Railton (2016) 
207 Parfit (2016, pp.53-4) 
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 (G) heat is the same as molecular kinetic energy 
tells us that the property molecular kinetic energy has a different second-order property heat. Because 
the concept <heat> supplies different information to the concept <molecular kinetic energy>, 
the properties heat and molecular kinetic energy are different properties. Railton comments that this 
is an unusual way to understand talk of ‘properties’ - we do not usually think of properties as 
conveying information, rather, we think that only properties under descriptions convey information.208 
Still, if the naturalist goes along with Parfit’s understanding of ‘properties’ they can agree with 
much of what he says, or so suggests Railton. 
Normative concepts are distinct from natural concepts on both Railton and Parfit’s views. Since 
normative concepts carry different information to paradigmatically natural concepts, Railton 
thinks he can now agree that normative concepts pick out some kind of non-ontological, non-
natural property, in Parfit’s sense of the word ‘property’. Since these properties are non-ontological this 
does not conflict with his commitment to methodological naturalism – the principle that, in 
inquiry, we should see how far we can get on the assumption that all there are, are the kinds of 
entities that figure in the sciences. While non-natural irreducibly normative properties do not 
figure in the sciences, if they are non-ontological then naturalists need have no objection to 
including them. And since normative concepts like <wrong> do not play fundamental 
explanatory roles in the sciences it makes sense for the naturalist to say that properties like wrong 
are non-natural (as long as we are using ‘property’ in the sense that Railton takes Parfit to be 
doing).  
Since on Parfit’s view (as Railton understands it) to say that two properties are distinct is to say 
that the concepts they are associated with carry different information, we can accept that, in 
Parfit’s sense of ‘property’, things have non-natural properties without reifying the former in any way 
that would trouble a methodological naturalist. To say that, ‘Killing has the non-natural property 
 
208 Railton (2016, p.53) 
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wrong’, would be to say that the concept <wrong> applies to killing and that that concept 
<wrong> is not equivalent in meaning to any natural concept. The synthetic naturalist could 
agree with all this.   
When it comes to talk of irreducibly normative facts, Railton also sees reason to think that he 
and Parfit can agree. Parfit distinguishes between referential and informational senses of facts.209 On 
the former sense the claims, ‘Heat is heat’, and, ‘Heat is molecular kinetic energy’, state the same 
fact, on the latter sense one claim states a trivial fact and the other states an interesting fact. 
Parfit thinks that when we talk of ‘normative facts’, it is the informational sense of fact that is of 
interest to us. Railton argues that the synthetic naturalist can agree that ‘Killing is wrong’ and 
‘Killing does not maximise happiness’ (or whatever) state different facts in the informational sense of 
‘fact’, since they agree that those sentences carry different information. Since the concept 
<wrong> is one that does not fundamentally figure in the natural sciences, Railton is happy to 
say that, ‘Killing is wrong’, expresses a kind of non-natural fact, distinct from the fact expressed by 
the claim, ‘Killing does not maximise happiness’. 
Additionally, on Parfit’s view, only natural facts have normative importance.210 The claim,  
(J) Your wine is poisoned  
states a natural fact which gives you a reason not to drink the wine. The normative claim,  
(K) the fact stated by (J) gives you a reason not to drink the wine,  
states a normative fact. But, that fact is not normatively important; it does not provide you with any 
further reason not to drink the wine over and above the fact stated by (J), according to Parfit. 
Since, on Parfit’s view, non-natural normative facts do not have normative importance, Railton 
thinks that that is a reason to think that the naturalist can grant that talk of non-natural 
 
209 Parfit (2011b), ch.26, §94. 
210 Parfit (2011b), pp.279-80 
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normative facts is legitimate. Since non-natural normative facts do not need to figure in any, 
“fundamental metaphysical explanation of what really matters”, these facts can figure into a 
broadly methodologically naturalist program.211 So, Railton suggests, all in all there is very little 
that Parfit says about normative matters that the naturalist could not say also.  
Parfit is enthusiastic about Railton’s proposal.212 He writes that he and Railton now agree. Parfit 
thinks that if the naturalist is happy to allow that there are non-ontological non-natural 
normative properties and use those to explain the normativity of normative claims then synthetic 
naturalism is okay. 
I do not think that Parfit and Railton really agree. The reason is that Railton misunderstands 
Parfit’s view of properties, something which Parfit actually points out.213 Railton has it that on 
Parfit’s view where two terms carry different information they refer to different properties. Since 
on Railton’s view normative and natural terms carry different information, he thinks he can allow 
that in Parfit’s sense of the term ‘property’, normative and natural terms refer to different 
properties. Just as the properties being a certain heat and having a certain molecular kinetic energy might 
be said to be different because the expressions ‘being a certain heat’ and ‘having a certain 
molecular kinetic energy’ convey different information, so might the synthetic naturalist say that 
the properties maximising happiness and being what we ought to do are different properties. At the 
same time, the naturalist could maintain that in a causal-explanatory sense normative properties are 
natural properties, i.e. that normative properties are nothing over and above natural properties 
ontologically speaking. 
However, Parfit denies that this is his view of properties, though admittedly it is hard to identify 
exactly what he thinks properties are. On his view, heat and molecular kinetic energy are the same 
property even though the terms ‘heat’ and ‘molecular kinetic energy’ convey different 
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212 Parfit (2016, ch.42). 
213 Parfit (2016, pp.93-4) 
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information. In fact, earlier in On What Matters, in response to one of Frank Jackson’s arguments, 
Parfit writes that whenever two concepts necessarily have the same extension then if those concepts 
refer to natural properties, like <heat> and <molecular kinetic energy>, then plausibly they must 
both refer to the very same property.214 
Instead, Parfit argues that the claim  
(G) ‘Having a certain heat is the same as having a certain molecular kinetic energy’  
is more informative than  
(O) ‘Having a certain heat is the same as having a certain heat’ 
even though they state the same fact in the referential sense, because the former also tells us that the 
property having a certain molecular kinetic energy is related to certain other properties associated with 
the term ‘heat’ like causing certain sensations, being melted and being turned into a gas. (G) and (O) both 
state the same fact in the referential sense, but because they do so in different ways (G) conveys 
information that (O) does not. 
Since Parfit does not think, pace Railton, that two properties must be distinct if they (or terms 
that pick them out) carry different information it does not seem as clear that the naturalist can 
agree with Parfit after all. When Parfit says that to be substantive and positive claims like (A) 
must be relating one property to a different normative property he does not mean merely that 
claims like (A) should convey some information over and above the trivial claim that a natural 
property has a natural property, otherwise he would say that a claim like (G) was relating two 
different properties as well. When Parfit says that normative properties cannot be natural 
properties he seems to be using ‘properties’ in the same kind of sense that Railton would. Railton 
has to say that normative properties belong to the same ontological category as natural 
properties, even if normative terms are not equivalent to natural terms. Parfit says that normative 
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properties cannot possibly belong to the same ontological category as natural properties (because 
normative properties belong to no ontological category on his view). There is no chance of their 
views being reconciled. 
§4 
Parfit does admit that both Railton’s misunderstanding and Dowell and Sobel’s, may be partly 
his fault because of how he stated his view.215 I think that Parfit is right about this. In his 
responses to naturalists, Parfit is very quick to accept that naturalists can show that normative 
claims are at least substantive. Given that, one wonders why he made it one of the two 
explananda. Since he thinks it is relatively easy for naturalists to explain why normative claims are 
substantive but impossible to explain why they are positive, there seems no reason to challenge 
naturalists to explain how normative claims could be both substantive and positive, rather than 
just challenging them to show that normative claims like (A) can be positive. It is also strange 
that Parfit calls his argument the ‘triviality argument’, rather than something like the ‘positivity 
argument’, since the positivity requirement seems to be doing the work. These features of Parfit’s 
argument invite misunderstanding. 
I suspect however that the main reason that philosophers have not seemed to address the 
argument Parfit is intending to make is down to considerations of charity, for understood 
correctly Parfit’s argument is straightforwardly question-begging. In assuming that a normative 
claim like, ‘Maximising happiness is right’, must be positive, Parfit begs the question against the 
naturalist. The naturalist thinks that some natural property N is identical to rightness. Parfit’s 
assumption that all claims of the form like, ‘Actions which are N are right’, must be positive, 
requires that ‘N’ and ‘right’ denote distinct properties. It is not clear why Parfit should be entitled 
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to assume that normative claims are all positive since whether ‘N’ and ‘right’ denote the same 
natural property or not is exactly the point of contention between him and the naturalist.  
And that, I think, is all that really needs to said to refute Parfit’s triviality argument.  The first 
premise of Parfit’s argument is tantamount to declaring that naturalism is false and so is 
question-begging in the most obvious way. It is easy to sympathise with Mark Schroeder (who I 
think does gauge Parfit’s intentions correctly) when he says, “I have to confess that Parfit’s 
triviality objection is one of the most puzzling arguments I have ever encountered in 
philosophy.”216  
In his reply to Schroeder, Parfit claims that he does not beg the question since he provides 
arguments for his first premise, and since Schroeder does not address these auxiliary arguments 
the triviality argument is still to be defeated.217 Since the first premise of Parfit’s argument is 
tantamount to a denial of naturalism, any auxiliary arguments for that premise are going to be 
more interesting arguments against naturalism than the triviality argument itself. It is strange that 
the triviality argument has been billed as a new, devastating objection to naturalism given that the 
philosophical interest really lies in the justification for its first premise. 
In any case, when we come to look at On what Matters, it turns out to be difficult to identify any 
argument for the first premise of the triviality argument which applies generally to all forms of 
naturalism and which is not obviously question-begging. Seemingly, the normativity argument, or 
similar flat appeals to the intuition that naturalism seems wrong, is supposed to be doing some of 
the work, but as I argued in the last chapter that argument is not convincing. In what follows I 
try to draw out from the text some of the other arguments that Parfit might use to establish the 
first premise of his triviality argument and show that they do not provide a very strong case 
against naturalism. 
 
216 Schroeder (2016, p.223) 
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§5 
§5.1 – Hard and Soft Naturalism 
To deny the first premise of the triviality argument is, Parfit argues, to accept what he calls ‘hard 
naturalism’.218 Hard naturalists think that, at least in principle, normative facts could be stated in 
purely natural terms. Parfit gives Richard Brandt and Frank Jackson as examples of hard 
naturalists. Hard naturalists will say that normative claims like (A) are not positive. Since they 
think that a normative term like ‘is right’ can be restated as ‘maximises utility’, it is coherent for 
them to say that (A) does not say of actions with one property that they have another different 
normative property, rather, (A) says that actions with one natural property have that natural 
property. The problem with hard naturalism is that it is just very implausible that we could do 
without normative terms and concepts. Normative facts just could not be restated in purely 
natural terms without loss, or so thinks Parfit. I will say more about Parfit’s case against hard 
naturalism shortly. 
According to what Parfit calls ‘soft naturalism’ we must use normative terms and concepts, or 
that we at least have very good reason to, even though normative facts are natural facts.219 Parfit 
attributes this kind of position to philosophers like Stephen Darwall and Peter Railton.  Parfit 
thinks that soft naturalism is, prima facie, a much more plausible position than hard naturalism 
and he even goes as far to say that the central claims of soft naturalism sometimes strike him as 
true.220 All the same, he argues that soft naturalism ultimately founders. 
Soft naturalists cannot deny that normative claims are positive, argues Parfit. Soft naturalists 
have to say that normative claims like (A) are positive, for if (A) just said of actions that had a 
 
218 Parfit (2011b, p.344) 
219 On Parfit’s formulation naturalists also claim that all facts are natural facts. I prefer my way of phrasing it because 
it allows that people who believe in theological or supernatural facts, say, could still count as ethical naturalists. 
Some of the major neo-Aristotelians like G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Geach and Alastair McIntyre might fall into this 
category and I take it it would be preferable if their views counted as naturalist. 
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natural property that it had that natural property, we would not need or have good reason to 
have normative terms and concepts. If (A) just states the trivial fact that happiness-maximising 
actions are happiness-maximising, then we could state the same fact with the purely natural claim 
(E): 
(E) being an act that would maximise happiness is the same as being an act that would maximise happiness 
So, soft naturalists must say that normative claims like (A) state some fact other than the one 
stated by (E). The problem is that there is no obvious candidate for which fact this would be. In 
other words, soft naturalists must argue that normative claims like (A) tell us that acts which 
have some natural property have some other different normative property, but this leads them 
into what Parfit calls, The Lost Property Problem; the problem of being unable to say which 
normative property a claim like (A) attributes to an action.221 The most obvious candidate for the 
normative property that (A) attributes to happiness-maximising actions would be the property 
being what we ought to do. But, if this is the case then (A) would not state a positive, normative fact 
given the naturalist’s commitment to (C), which says that being what we ought to do is not a different 
property to maximising happiness. There are no other obvious candidates for the normative 
property that a claim like (A) could attribute other than being what we ought to do. That being so it 
seems likely that if (C) were true then (A) must state the normatively trivial fact that acts with a 
natural property have that natural property but provide no positive normative information in 
addition to this. 
Additionally, even if soft naturalists do identify a different normative property that is attributed 
to happiness-maximising actions by a claim like (A) (e.g. the normative property being what I have 
most reason to to) they will have to give a naturalistic account of that property, i.e. they will need to 
say which natural property it is identical to.  To then explain why claims which attribute that 
property to actions are positive they would have to find yet another normative property which 
 
221 ibid. p.345 
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those claims attribute to those actions. And then they would have to do the same thing for this 
other property, and so on for ever.  
Parfit goes further and argues that soft naturalism is not even a coherent position. If, on the one 
hand, soft naturalists were right that we needed normative terms and concepts then it would be 
false to say that normative facts were also natural, for if they were they could be stated using 
purely naturalistic vocabulary. If, on the other hand, soft naturalists say that normative facts 
could be stated in natural terms then soft naturalism simply fails in its own terms and collapses 
into hard naturalism. This is the Soft Naturalist’s Dilemma.222  
So, if naturalists argue that we do need normative terms and concepts then their position ceases 
to be coherent, but if they argue that we do not need normative terms and concepts then their 
position cannot explain why normative claims like (A) are positive. In what follows I argue first 
that soft naturalism is coherent and that soft naturalists need not say that normative claims are 
positive. After that, I argue that Parfit has failed to show that hard naturalism is implausible.  
§5.2 - Parfit’s Case against Soft Naturalism 
Parfit argues that soft naturalists cannot claim that we need, or have good reason to have, 
irreducibly normative terms and concepts if normative properties are natural properties. By 
‘irreducibly normative terms and concepts’ he must mean normative terms and concepts which 
are distinct in meaning from any natural terms and concepts which refer to the same properties, 
just as ‘H2O’ and ‘water’ are distinct in meaning but co-referring. If normative properties are 
natural properties then we could just as well pick out normative properties with natural terms as 
with normative terms. So, we do not need, or have good reason to have, those normative terms. 
The natural terms would do by themselves. This means that soft naturalism collapses into hard 
naturalism. 
 
222 ibid. p.366. 
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Parfit’s argument involves two questionable assumptions. The first is the assumption that if 
normative properties were natural properties then we must be able refer to those properties 
using some non-normative, natural terms. Nicholas Sturgeon denies this assumption.223 Sturgeon 
sees no reason to suppose that the natural sciences must have a term for every natural property. 
Just for the purposes of illustration, suppose a kind of particularism is correct, meaning that 
whether an action is, say, good depends on many particular features of a situation. On this view, 
what makes an action pro tanto good in one situation might make it pro tanto bad in other 
situations. For example, that going to the cinema causes pleasure might be pro tanto good but that 
sadistic cruelty causes pleasure might be pro tanto bad. If some such view were correct then there 
might be no simple natural predicate, like ‘pleasurable’, that we could use refer to all good 
actions. Nevertheless, we could think that an action’s goodness in any given situation were identical 
to those natural properties that (constitutively) make it good. Parfit says nothing that refutes 
Sturgeon’s view.224 
We might think, as Frank Jackson does, that there must be a way to refer to normative properties 
using purely natural terminology.225 I covered this argument in chapter 2, but here a brief sketch 
of it by way of reminder.226 For any possible right action we can give a complete description, wn 
of that action’s natural properties and the properties of the world in which it takes place. Because 
the normative supervenes on the natural we know that actions which are naturalistically identical 
to the action described by wn will also be right. If we put all these descriptions into a huge 
disjunction of the form w1, w2… wn then we will have a description, containing only natural terms, 
which can be applied to any right action. This huge disjunction then is a purely natural 
 
223 Sturgeon (1988. 2005, p.109). 
224 Parfit addresses Sturgeon directly but misunderstands his position. Parfit (2011b, p.365, p.368) quotes Sturgeon 
as saying that if some form of naturalism is true then we would ‘be able to say, in entirely non-moral terms, exactly 
which natural properties moral terms refer to’, and ‘moral explanations would be in principle dispensable’. But in the 
section Parfit is quoting from Sturgeon (1988, pp.242-243) is only talking about what would the case if reductive 
naturalism were true; a form of naturalism that he rejects. In fact in the very same passage Parfit quotes from, 
Sturgeon makes it clear that the position Parfit attributes to him is one he in fact rejects. 
225 Though Jackson would prefer to say ‘descriptive terminology’ for reasons I do not need to go into. 
226 See chapter 2 §6. 
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expressions with which we can denote right actions. This might seem to refute what Sturgeon 
says. If goodness is a natural property then even if there is no common natural term for it in our 
language, we can construct one in the above way. This might seem to show that Parfit is right to 
say that if normative properties are natural properties then they can be referred to using purely 
non-normative, natural terminology. 
However, if normative properties could only be picked out by extremely long disjunctions, or 
even infinitely long disjunctions, then we would have excellent reason to have normative terms 
in addition to natural terms. Very long disjunctive expressions are unwieldy and difficult to 
follow. Infinitely long disjunctions are impossible to state or fully understand. So if Jackson is 
right that we can in principle state all possible normative properties in natural terms, that would 
not show that Parfit was right that soft naturalism is incoherent. The soft naturalist can say that 
we have excellent reason to retain normative terms and concepts because we could not refer, in 
any practicable way, to normative properties without them. 
Following on from that, the second questionable assumption Parfit makes is that we cannot 
need, or have good reasons to have, two terms or concepts which are distinct in meaning if they 
are co-referring. This seems like an odd assumption, even if Sturgeon is wrong and normative 
terms like ‘good’ are coreferring with very simple natural terms like ‘causes pleasure’. No one 
believes that we do not need, or do not have good reason to have, the term ‘water’ since we also 
have the co-referring term ‘being composed of H2O molecules’. There are many possible reasons 
we might have to have two such terms. I will outline a few of these.227 
First, different coreferring terms might be associated with different conceptual or inferential 
roles.228 Take the case of ‘water’ and ‘composed of H2O molecules’. We can know that one term 
 
227 See also Copp (2012, 2017) who does something similar in response to Parfit. 
228 It need not be the case that an inferential/conceptual role semantics is correct for what I say to work. 
Terms/concepts may be associated with inferential/conceptual roles without the meaning of these terms and 
concepts being determined by those inferential/conceptual roles. Railton suggests something along these lines for 
normative concepts (2016). 
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applies to some liquid without knowing that the other does, even though these expressions are 
co-referring. Suppose for illustrative purposes that competence with the term ‘water’ requires an 
ability to infer that the liquids to which the term applies are potable and that competence with 
the expression ‘is composed of H2O molecules’ requires an ability to infer that the liquids to 
which the term applies contain hydrogen atoms. If someone knew that ‘is composed of H2O 
molecules’ applies to the liquid in the glass we can infer straightaway that there are some 
hydrogen atoms in the glass but we cannot necessarily infer that the liquid is potable. At the 
same time, someone else could be competent with the term ‘water’ and know that it applies to 
the liquid in the glass without thereby being able to infer that there are hydrogen atoms in the 
glass, but they would be able to infer that it is potable. This gives us a reason to have both ‘is 
composed of H2O molecules’ and ‘water’ in our vocabulary. By applying the latter term we imply 
something about the liquid in the glass which would not necessarily imply if we used the term 
‘water’ instead and vice versa.   
Similarly, normative and natural terms might be associated with different inferential or 
conceptual roles. A particularly clear example of this comes in Allan Gibbard’s Thinking How to 
Live.229 Gibbard argues that normative properties are natural properties but that normative 
concepts are ‘plan-laden’, meaning that they are used to rule out particular courses of action. On 
this picture, we can infer from someone’s using a normative term something about their 
intentions or motivations which we would not be able to infer if they used instead a coreferring 
natural term. 
A naturalist need not accept the kind of semantics that Gibbard carves out for normative terms 
in order to justify the usefulness of normative terms however. There are other options available. 
Supposing that rightness is identical to maximising happiness, it might be the case that we still need 
the concept <rightness> because it has inferential links to other concepts like <ought> and 
 
229 Gibbard (2003) 
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<wrong> which the concept <maximising happiness> does not.230 In other words, by telling you 
‘X is right’, you can infer that X is not wrong and that you ought to do X, but you cannot 
necessarily infer those things by my saying ‘X maximises happiness’. 
The second reason we might want to have distinct, co-referring expressions is that people can be 
unaware that co-referring terms are co-referring.231 It is useful to have the term ‘heat’ in addition 
to the term ‘molecular kinetic energy’ so that we can communicate heat/molecular kinetic energy 
related information to people who know what ‘heat’ refers to but don’t know what ‘molecular 
kinetic energy’ refers to. Similarly, if, as soft naturalists believe, we are not sure exactly which 
natural terms picks out normative properties, it is helpful to retain normative terms which do. 
Third, people can disagree about whether co-referring terms are co-referring. Suppose that I 
think that water is a primitive element whereas you know that it is composed of H2O molecules. 
Since ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are coreferring you could state, in a referential sense, your view that 
water is H2O even if our language did not have the term ‘water’; you could just say ‘H2O is H2O’. 
However, this would make it impossible for us to disagree. I will not object to your claim ‘H2O is 
H2O’. The term ‘water’, it is sometimes said, is associated with the job description, which is 
something like ‘that clear potable liquid that fills our lakes and rivers’. Having a term with that 
job description allows us to ground our disagreement since we disagree about the fundamental 
chemical composition of the liquid in our lakes and rivers. Similarly, some naturalists argue, 
normative terms are associated with a different job description to the natural terms that refer to 
the same properties. 
Fourth, non-equivalent but coreferring terms can also be associated with different implicature, 
presuppositions or other categories of information that are the result of the pragmatics of our 
language. According to one view of ‘thick’ normative terms, a term like ‘generous’ has the same 
 
230 Railton (2016). 
231 Sturgeon (1988). 
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semantic content as a purely descriptive term like ‘Disposed to give large amounts to others’, but 
it also has pragmatically expresses the speaker’s approval of that character trait. Some naturalists 
have argued that something similar happens with even ‘thin’ normative terms like ‘right’. These 
terms refer to the same property as some natural term but also express the speaker’s desires, pro-
attitudes, approval, etc. Having terms that work in this way serves an important social function since 
we can influence the each other’s behaviour and attitudes by expressing our own attitudes in this 
way. The soft naturalist can argue that this gives us good reason to have normative terms, whose 
meaning is not reducible to natural terms, even though normative terms refer to natural 
properties. 
I think we could probably add more reasons but those four will be sufficient. Given how 
plausible it is that we sometimes need, or have good reason to have, non-equivalent but 
coreferring terms I am inclined to think that Parfit must intend his argument against the soft 
naturalist to work a bit differently. I suspect he means to say that if, as the soft naturalist 
supposes, we need, or have good reason to have, irreducible normative terms and concepts in 
order to represent all the things that there are, then it cannot be the case that normative properties are 
natural properties. If we could just as well pick out normative properties with natural terms then, 
with regards to the goal of picking out all the properties that there are, we could use just natural terms 
instead.  
However, that, with regards to the goal of picking out all the properties that there are, we need only have 
natural terms is something I think that the naturalist can and should accept. If we have natural 
terms to pick out all natural properties, and if normative properties are natural properties, then 
we must have natural terms to pick out normative properties. If rightness is maximising utility then 
we can refer to rightness either with the terms ‘right’ or ‘maximises utility’. We might still have 
reasons for keeping these two separate terms, as I just argued, but we do not need both terms in 
order to represent all the things that there are. Having just one or the other term would do with regards 
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to the goal of referring to the properties that there are. As far as I can tell, no soft naturalist has 
any reason to deny this, so their position is not incoherent. Nor does Parfit give us any reason 
for thinking that it is costly for the naturalist to say that we could refer to normative properties 
with natural terms.  
§5.3 – Parfit’s Case against Hard Naturalism 
Suppose now that Parfit is right that naturalists must say that, at least in principle, we could do 
without normative terms and concepts. Would that show that naturalism is inadequate? In my 
view, Parfit does not do much to establish this. In his response to Schroeder, he speaks as if he 
had provided a damning refutation that applies to all hard naturalist theories, but when we come 
to look at the text his attack on hard naturalism is almost entirely focused on attacking Richard 
Brandt’s account.232 Particularly, Parfit attacks Brandt’s idea that we could understand calling 
someone’s desire ‘rational’ to just mean that that person would still have that desire after they 
have finished undergoing cognitive psychotherapy – a process that requires carefully deliberating 
on full information.233 Parfit argues that this is not our ordinary sense of ‘rational’ since, in the 
ordinary sense, it would not be rational for someone suffering from anorexia to starve 
themselves to death, even if they would desire to do so after cognitive psychotherapy.234 Brandt 
is aware of this but he believes that his definition of ‘rational’ is preferable to the ordinary one 
because the ordinary definition makes no sense unless we are willing to allow that there are non-
natural facts; a possibility that Brandt rules out.235 Parfit believes that Brandt’s definition is not 
superior to the ordinary one because, firstly, he thinks that it is plausible that there are non-
natural facts and, second, if we understood normative concepts in Brandt’s sense then we would 
 
232 Parfit (2011b, part 6). 
233 Brandt (1979). 
234 Parfit (2011b, §98). 
235 Or at least, this is what Parfit takes Brandt to be arguing. 
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have no way of asserting that in cases like that of the anorexia sufferer the rational desire is not 
the one that would survive cognitive psychotherapy. 
Whatever the merits of Parfit’s case against Brandt it is difficult to see why it should amount to a 
general attack against hard naturalism. If Parfit is right then Brandt’s definition of ‘rational’ is not 
extensionally adequate; it does not mark as ‘rational’ the things we are intuitively inclined to call 
rational. However, hard naturalists could assign to ‘rational’ a different extension to the one that 
Brandt assigns to ‘rational’, so Parfit’s case against Brandt will not generalise. 
In fact, we know that there is at least one possible hard naturalist position that Parfit cannot 
think extensionally inadequate. Parfit thinks that there is some natural property N which (non-
causally) makes desires rational. A natural result of this, is that that N will be necessarily 
coextensive with the normative property rational. Parfit has to concede that a hard naturalist who 
said that N just was identical to ‘rational’ would at the very least not be vulnerable to the 
objection he makes to Brandt. In other words, Parfit will not be able to find a case where some 
action is rational but it does not have the property N that the hard naturalist identifies with the 
normative property rational. So, his criticism of Brandt cannot generalise. 
Beyond his argument against Brandt, Parfit does not offer any argument explicitly designed to 
show that hard naturalism fails. In lieu of such an argument, we are forced to scramble around to 
try to identify another auxiliary argument for the first premise of Parfit’s triviality argument in 
part 6 of On What Matters. I run through three of these now. 
§5.4 - Naturalists must be Subjectivists? 
Parfit suggests at one point that naturalists will inevitably be subjectivists.236 If that is the case 
then it might be right to say that naturalism will be extensionally inadequate, since extensional 
 
236 This was much more explicit in the 2009 draft of On What Matters (pp.562-563), but see Parfit (2011b, p.339) 
where he suggests that defeating subjectivism is “enough” to defeat naturalism. 
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inadequacy is the main objection made against subjectivist accounts.237 If that objection is a good 
one and if naturalists must be subjectivists then Parfit will have a good objection against 
naturalists. 
However, it is not clear why Parfit thinks that naturalists must be subjectivists. Part of it seems 
to be that he thinks that subjectivism offers what appears, at first blush, to be a promising 
explanation of normativity in terms of motivation. On subjectivist accounts, what is rational is 
tied, in one way or another, to our desires. Subjectivists might try to use this fact to explain why 
normative facts, on their account, are normative. Of course, Parfit thinks that this is not in fact 
an adequate explanation of normativity, but he seems to believe that this will be the motivation 
for naturalists to be subjectivists. 
However, as we saw in the last chapter, there is no reason that naturalists need to explain 
normativity in terms of motivation. If to be normative is to be reason-involving, as Parfit thinks, 
then naturalists just need to give a natural reduction of the concept <reasons>, and show that 
other normative concepts are related to the concept of <reasons>. There is no reason why such 
a reduction must take the form of a subjectivist theory, so there is no reason that the naturalist 
must have an extensionally inadequate theory. 
§5.5 - The Nose Blowing Argument 
At one point, Parfit argues that we can see by analogy that a claim like  
(A) When some act would maximise happiness, this act is what we ought to do.  
could not state the same fact as  
(J) Maximising happiness is the same property as being what we ought to do. 
The analogy is with the claim 
 
237 See Parfit’s own case against subjectivism (2011a, ch.3). 
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 (V) Blowing your nose is what you ought to do. 
This claim could not plausibly state the same fact as: 
(W) The property of blowing your nose is the same as the property of being what you ought to do.238 
This does not strike me as a very strong argument. I grant that (V) is not naturally interpreted as 
stating the same fact as (W). The ‘is’ in (V) is presumably the ‘is’ of predication rather than the 
‘is’ of identity, since no one could realistically believe that something is what you ought to do iff 
it involves nose-blowing. Parfit is right that (V) is most plausibly interpreted as saying that 
actions with one property have some other distinct property, but the naturalist can agree with 
this. They do not have to say that every normative claim of the form ‘X is what you ought to do’ 
is equivalent to a claim like (W). Consider these claims 
(G) Making your mother proud is what you ought to do. 
(G’) When some act makes your mother proud, this act is what you ought to do. 
A utilitarian naturalist could accept (G) and (G’) without committing themselves to saying that 
the property makes your mother proud is identical to the property being what you ought to do. They 
might just think that acts which involve making your mother proud also maximise happiness, 
and so also think that acts which have the property making your mother proud also have the 
property maximises happiness/is what we ought to do. 
§5.6 - Advice Argument 
Another point Parfit makes is that if normative claims just expressed natural facts then they 
could not be used to give advice.239 This, I think, is a better argument. If a normative claim like 
(A) just states the same fact as a natural claim like 
(E) being an act that would maximise happiness is the same as being an act that would maximise happiness 
 
238 Parfit (2011b, p.350) 
239 Parfit (2011b, p.278-282) 
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then we might doubt that (A) could be used to give advice. (E) does not seem to be a piece of 
advice, it seems to be silent on normative matters. So, if (A) states the same fact as (E) then (A) 
cannot be advice either. But, intuitively (A) is advice, so the naturalist account of normative 
claims like (A) must be inadequate.  
To make this argument work we need to know what, according to Parfit, makes a claim a piece 
of advice. This is difficult to do very precisely. At one point in the text Parfit seem to 
characterise advice just as that which necessarily involves telling us what we should do, how we 
ought to act, what we have most reason to do, etc. But, if we take this approach then the naturalist 
can explain why (E) is not advice but (A) is very easily. (A) is advice, on the naturalist’s account, 
because (A) contains the normative predicate “ought to” whereas (E) contains no normative 
predicate. If advice just involves the application of normative predicates then naturalists have no 
difficulty with explaining why (A) is advice, they just have a different take on the nature of the 
referent of those normative predicates to the non-naturalist. 
At other times, Parfit suggests that in order to be advice a claim must tell us, or must imply, that 
something has an irreducibly normative property. To be advice a claim must tell us what we ought 
to do or have reason to do, where telling us what we ought to do is understood as referring to an 
irreducibly normative fact. But why should we accept this? Parfit thinks that it is just obvious, but 
as explored previously, the fact that some philosophers think that non-naturalism is obviously 
true does not tell against naturalism. Here we are just back to the question-begging assertions 
that normative predicates simply could not refer to natural properties. 
Another option might be to understand advice in terms of its cognitive significance. The thought 
might be that normative claims, understood along naturalist lines, could not constitute advice 
since we might advice someone that something was, say, what they had most reason to do, 
without also believing that it, say, maximised happiness, and we might believe that an action 
maximises happiness without also thinking that it is an advisable thing to do. But the advice 
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argument, understood in this way, comes out as a variation of Moore’s open question argument 
and so it could be dealt with using the strategies I defended in chapters 1 and 2. 
We might say that in order to be a piece of advice a claim must necessarily exerts a kind of 
pressure on the audience to behave in a certain way. In other words, advice necessarily has a kind 
of prescriptive or recommendatory illocutionary force. We might also claim, relatedly, that if I advise 
someone to do something then necessarily I will desire that they do that thing. These claims about 
advice might seem difficult to capture this on a naturalistic picture. According to naturalists, 
normative claims just attribute to actions particular natural properties. Seemingly, someone can 
tell someone that something has a natural property without prescribing or recommending any 
particular course of action. Also, someone could accept that some action has a particular natural 
property without thereby desiring anything in particular. This is more or less a version of the 
motivational internalist’s argument against naturalism. 
Motivational internalism is a problem for all cognitivists, including non-naturalists like Parfit. 
Since Parfit is not a motivational internalist I think we can safely assume that Parfit does not 
think that in order to be advice an expression must be a prescriptive speech act, nor that it must 
have a necessary link to the speaker’s desires. Parfit believes that people can make normative 
claims without necessarily desiring to influence the actions of others, meaning that on his view a 
prescriptive illocutionary force does not necessarily accompany sincere normative utterances. If 
the naturalist cannot explain why normative claims are advice, in this sense, then neither can Parfit, 
meaning that his advice argument would not have any dialectical purchase. I have more to say 
about motivational internalism in the next chapter. Since it is just as much a problem for Parfit 
as for the naturalist I put it aside for now. 
Even if we put motivational internalism to one side, we might think that the naturalist needs to 
say something about why normative utterances are at least often understood as attempts to influence 
the behaviour of others, even though they merely tell us that certain actions have certain natural 
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properties. It is worth mentioning that naturalists have several options for how to do this. 
Philosophers such as Allan Gibbard and David Copp argue that normative properties are natural 
properties but both, though in quite different ways, argue that crucial to the meaning of 
normative claims is the expression of a kind of desire that the audience act a particular way.240 
The expression of this attitude exerts a kind of conversational pressure on the audience to obey. 
Other philosophers also think that normative terms express desire-like attitudes but they argue 
that this is because of the pragmatics of normative language rather than down to the meaning of 
normative terms.241 I will just give the briefest sketch. We give people information for some 
particular purpose. If I tell someone that smoking shortens their life expectancy I am not 
understood as merely informing them of some medical fact, I am understood as advising them 
not to smoke. The naturalist can offer explanations of this fact. Given that people are assumed 
to speak for some purpose and given that most people desire to live a long and healthy life, I will 
also be understood as recommending that they do not smoke. Similarly, argue some naturalists, if 
I say that some action is rational I will be understood as attempting to influence behaviour even 
though their semantic content is just the proposition that some action has some natural property. 
It is assumed that in making a normative claim I speak for some reason, and it is assumed that I 
want people to act in ways that fulfil their goals and desires, so my utterance exerts a kind of 
conversational pressure on my audience to perform that action. 
These ways of explaining why normative utterances constitute advice may or may not stand up 
to scrutiny. All we need to note here is that since Parfit cannot offer any better explanation he 
cannot use this issue to establish that naturalism fails. 
Conclusion  
 
240 Gibbard (2003), Copp (2001) 
241 Finlay (2014). 
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Parfit’s triviality argument has attracted a lot of attention, but for the most part philosophers 
have misunderstood his intention. They have overlooked the requirement Parfit places on the 
naturalist to explain why normative claims are positive. Naturalists cannot meet that requirement, 
but this does not matter because Parfit has not established that normative claims are positive.  
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Chapter 5: The Argument from Motivational Internalism 
As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, motivational internalism (from hereon I will drop 
the word ‘motivational’) presents a potential problem for any cognitivist theory of normative 
judgement, including naturalist theories and provides support for non-cognitivist theories. 
Cognitivists usually answer this challenge by denying that internalism is true and that is just what 
I will do in this chapter. First, I tackle some preliminaries. Then I give a sketch of the existing 
debate around internalism, showing why it has reached an impasse. Since the debate has reached 
an impasse, there cannot be drawn from it a decisive argument against naturalism. I then try to 
break the deadlock by arguing against internalism in an oblique way.  
§1 
Internalism is the view that there exists a necessary connection between the normative 
judgements people make and the actions they are motivated to perform.242 For instance, 
according to one form of internalism, anyone who sincerely judges that some action is right is 
necessarily motivated to perform that action, and anyone who judges that some action is wrong 
is necessarily motivated to refrain from performing that action.  
According to cognitivist theories, normative judgements are just beliefs. Judging that some 
action is right, for instance, is, on cognitivist views, just to believe that that action has the 
normative property is right. It is difficult for cognitivist views to accommodate internalism. 
Beliefs, it is widely thought, cannot by themselves motivate us to act. It is often thought that 
beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, meaning that the aim of belief is to have its content 
match that of the world.243 To desire to do something is, meanwhile, to be motivated to do it.244 
Desires have a world-to-mind direction of fit; their aim is to be realised, or to make the world fit 
 
242 It is important to distinguish this view from Williams-style reasons internalism which I talked about in the last 
two chapters.  
243 Hume (1739), Anscombe (1957), Platts (1979, p.257), Smith (1987). 
244 Smith (1988), Dancy (2000, ch.2), Toppinen (2015). 
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the way that the desire would have it be. Both beliefs and desires are required to motivate us to 
act; without desires we have no aim for how the world is to be, and without beliefs we cannot 
know whether the world needs to change in order to match that aim. If this picture is right, then 
cognitivists cannot claim that normative judgements can by themselves motivate us to act.  
That does not quite show that cognitivists cannot accommodate internalism; there remains the 
possibility that anyone who believes that some action has the property is right necessarily also has 
a desire to perform that action. However, it is also widely thought that there are no necessary 
connections between distinct existences. If that is correct then the cognitivist cannot account for 
a necessary connection between rightness-judgements and motivation, since on their view the 
judgement that some action is right and a desire to perform that action are distinct mental states. 
If two entities are distinct then it should be possible for us to imagine one existing without the 
other. Therefore, if cognitivism is correct it should be possible to imagine someone who has the 
belief that some action has the property is right but does not have any desire to perform that 
action. However, such scenarios are, according to internalists, conceptually impossible. So, the 
truth of internalism would present a serious problem for any cognitivist view of normative 
judgement. It would also provide strong support for non-cognitivist views, which hold that 
normative judgements just are desires. Non-cognitivists can explain why normative judgements 
are necessarily accompanied by a motivation to act because on their view that normative 
judgements just are motivational states. 
Some philosophers have argued that cognitivism can be shown to be compatible with 
internalism. Ralph Wedgwood, for instance, has argued that it is part of the inferential role of 
normative concepts, that we must intend to perform a particular action if we are to count as 
judging that that action what we ought to do.245 Other philosophers have argued that the claim 
 
245 (2007) ch.4. Wedgwood is not a naturalist, but I do not see why naturalists could not adapt his view. Jackson 
(1998, pp.160-1) briefly makes a suggestion which is along these lines. Laskowski (2019) explores a view which is 
similar to this. 
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that someone is motivated to do something is entailed or conventionally implicated (in Grice’s 
sense246) by normative judgements.247 According to all these views, though normative judgements 
are just beliefs that some action or object has some natural property, in order to understand 
them specifically as normative judgements it must be the case that we are disposed to infer that the 
person who makes the judgement has a certain motivation. Interesting though these views are, I 
will not go into them here. 
Since I am defending naturalism and not cognitivism per se, I could argue that naturalism is 
compatible with internalism even if cognitivism is not. Internalism is a conceptual claim about 
normative judgements whereas naturalism, as I have understood it, is the metaphysical claim that 
normative properties are nothing over and above natural properties. That being so, the truth of 
internalism would not immediately discount naturalism. At the same time, it is very natural to 
think that naturalism and cognitivism go hand-in-hand. If some action’s being right consists in its 
having a particular natural property, it is hard to see how the judgement that some action is right 
could not simply be the belief that that action has that property. 
Philosophers have recently challenged this idea in a number of interesting ways. For instance, 
some have argued that while normative properties are natural properties, normative judgements 
consist of both a belief that something has a natural property and a desire to act in a particular 
way.248 Allan Gibbard has even argued that naturalism is compatible with the view that normative 
claims just express desires.249 There is a lot to say about these views but I will put them to one 
 
246 In Studies in the Way of Words, Grice stipulates that by ‘S implicates X’ he means that X is an implicature of S. 
247 Tresan (2006) is an example of entailment view while Copp (2001) is an example of the conventional implicature 
view. I do not mention conversational implicature views (e.g. Finlay 2005) because conversational implicature is cancellable 
and so difficult to square with there being a necessary connection between judgement and motivation. See also, 
Radcliffe (2006). 
248 e.g. Boisvert (2008), Hay (2014). Schroeder (2009) offers an excellent, critical survey of many of these views. So-
called ‘Besirest’ theories (e.g. McNaughton (1988), Wiggins (1991), Zangwill (2008)) would also fall under this 
heading since they think that the mental states that constitute normative judgements have a world-to-mind and a 
mind-to-world direction of fit. 
249 Gibbard (2003), pp.29-33. He prefers to say that normative judgements are plans rather than ‘desires’, but since I 
understand ‘desires’ in terms of their direction-of-fit, ‘plans’ would count as desires as I understand them.  
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side also and assume that naturalists are cognitivists. Instead, I will argue that internalism is false. 
First, I need to say a bit more about internalism. 
§2 - Internalism 
Saying that someone is motivated to perform an action is ambiguous. It could mean that that 
person would perform that action if the opportunity arose, or it could merely mean that they 
would feel some pull to perform the action but not necessarily enough motivation to actually 
perform it. According to, what David Brink, calls “strong internalism”, anyone who makes a 
normative judgement will necessarily act in accordance with that judgement (or at least try to).250 
For example, the strong internalist would think that someone who sincerely judges that visiting 
the dentist today would be the right thing to do will necessarily at least try to visit the dentist 
today.   
Strong internalism is an implausible theory and very few people now defend it. The idea that we 
sometimes fail to attempt to do that which we judge to be the right thing to do is not only 
coherent, but also familiar. For example, it is not uncommon for a student to believe that 
starting working on their essay immediately would be the right thing to do, only for them to do 
something fun instead. The strong internalist might argue that the fact that the student does not 
start work on their essay shows that really what they think the right thing to do is to have fun. 
However, this seems more like an ad hoc attempt to save strong internalism than it is a plausible 
claim about our psychology. It is hard to think of any justification for such a claim that does not 
assume the truth of strong internalism. According to strong internalism, it is impossible for us to 
fail to attempt to do what we think would be right for us to do due to lethargy, selfishness, 
cowardice, etc. Since the theory rules out the possibility of such commonplace, widely recognised 
 
250 Brink (1988, ch.3) 
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phenomena, we would need some very strong reasons to accept it.  No such reasons have been 
found, so in what follows I ignore the possibility that strong internalism might be true. 
Nowadays, internalists almost all opt for weak forms of internalism. According to weak 
internalism, anyone who makes a sincere normative judgement will necessarily have at least some 
motivation to act as that judgement requires. For instance, a weak internalist might claim that 
anyone who judges that some action would be the right thing for them to do will necessarily be 
motivated, at least to some degree, to perform that action. The motivation to do what they judge 
to be right could be outweighed by a motivation to perform a different action. It is consistent 
with weak internalism that I might fail to give £10 to Oxfam, even though I judge that it would 
be right to give £10 to Oxfam, if my motivation not to give £10 to Oxfam is stronger. Weak 
internalism merely requires that in that scenario I would have at least a tiny amount of 
motivation to give £10 to Oxfam. From here on when I use the label, ‘internalism’, I will usually 
be talking about weak forms of internalism unless otherwise stated. 
Internalist theories can also be grouped into unconditional and conditional varieties.251 So far I have 
been talking as if all internalist theories were unconditional. According to unconditional 
internalism anyone, without exception, who makes a normative judgement must have a 
corresponding motivation. Not all forms of internalism are like this. Conditional internalists 
argue that someone who makes a normative judgement will necessarily have a corresponding 
motivation as long as they meet condition C. Meeting C usually requires that the person making the 
normative judgement is free from the kinds of quirks or defects which are thought to prevent 
people from doing what they judge to be right. For example, meeting C might require that the 
speaker is not a psychopath.  
 
251 See the introduction to Björnsson, Strandberg, Olinder, Eriksson, & Björklund (2014). 
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Since, according to conditional views, there is still a necessary connection between judgement 
and motivation, the cognitivist has as much trouble accommodating these forms of internalism 
as they do unconditional internalism. On the cognitivist view normative judgements and the 
mental states which motivate us to act on those judgements are distinct so, regardless of which 
conditions the person making the normative judgement meets, it should be possible to imagine 
that person having one mental state without having the other. 
The main exceptions to this are conditional forms of internalism which require that the person 
meets certain normative conditions. For example, some philosophers argue that anyone who 
makes a normative judgement necessarily has a corresponding motivation as long as they are fully 
rational.252 The cognitivist can accommodate this form of internalism because they can plausibly 
argue that the normative property is fully rational is had only by people who would be motivated 
to act on their normative judgements. This would not be an ad hoc move; that someone is fully 
rational only if they are motivated to act on their normative judgements is an independently 
plausible claim. It does seem to plausibly be a defect of rationality not to be motivated to do 
what you judge to be right. That being so, when the naturalist comes to identify which natural 
property is identical to is fully rational, they could restrict their search only to natural properties 
had by agents who are motivated to do what they judge is right and in so doing capture this kind 
of internalism. It has often been said, rightly in my view, that introducing the requirement that 
the person making the normative judgement be fully rational has the effect of making internalism 
trivial since most metaethical views are able to accommodate it. The same is true, mutatis 
mutandis, for conditional forms of internalism which require that the person making the 
normative judgements is fully virtuous or maximally good. Since these conditional forms of 
internalism are not much threat to cognitivism I do not say any more about them.  
 
252 e.g. Smith (1994), Korsgaard (1996), Wedgwood (2007). 
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I give some reasons for thinking that we should reject the forms of conditional internalism that 
are incompatible with cognitivism later in this chapter. First, however I briefly discuss the debate 
around unconditional internalism. I argue that the main arguments that have been given for or 
against unconditional internalism are not decisive, but I then go on to provide what I think is a 
better argument against it. To set up these argument we need to know a bit more about the main 
alternative theory of normative motivation. 
§3 – Externalism 
Cognitivists are very often externalists. They believe that our motivation to do what our normative 
judgements require is supplied externally to the judgements themselves. On externalist views we 
might be motivated by a motivational state such as a desire (either de dicto or de re) to do the right 
thing, rather than by the normative judgement itself.253 Unconditional internalists feel that if, for 
example, someone says that they believe that it would be right for them to do something but 
they have no motivation whatsoever to do it, then they do not really believe that that is the right 
thing to do. Externalists can accept that this is usually the case. Failing to be motivated to do 
what you say you think is right might be a reliable indicator that the speaker is being insincere. 
There are a few ways that the externalist can try to explain this fact.  
First, they might argue that normative properties are natural properties which usually motivate us 
to perform actions that we believe exemplify them.254 A utilitarian could, for instance, argue that 
the reason we are usually motivated to perform actions we judge to be right is that we are usually 
motivated to perform actions which would maximise happiness.  
Second, they might argue that the content of normative claims makes essential reference to facts 
about our motivation and desires. For instance, according to one view judging that something is 
right involves judging that we would desire to desire that it were done if we thought about the 
 
253 See e.g. Svavardóttier (1999) 
254 ibid. 
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issue as fully as we could.255 This view is not quite compatible with internalism, since it is 
conceivable that someone might not desire to do what they believe they would desire to desire to 
do if they considered the matter fully. But this view could explain why we usually are motivated to 
do what we judge to be right.  
Third, there are views which try to explain why normative judgements are usually accompanied 
by a particular motivation by drawing on the pragmatics of normative language.256 According to 
these views normative judgements presupposes or implicates a connection between that 
judgement and the speaker’s motivation. If, for instance, we are happy to accept that people tend 
to speak in a way that fulfils the function of the conversation, and if we assume that normative 
conversation function to settle questions of how we are to act, then it will not be surprising if we 
can usually correctly infer from a speaker’s normative utterances that they have particular 
motivations.  
Externalists explain why normative judgements are usually accompanied by a motivation in these 
kinds of ways. Internalists think that this is insufficient for having a satisfactory account of 
normative motivation. They believe that it is necessarily the case that anyone who makes a 
normative judgement has a corresponding motivation. Externalists demur. They think that it is at 
the very least conceivable that someone might not be motivated to do what they judge to be 
right. I now move on to give a brief overview of how the debate between them has gone. 
§4 – The Internalist-Externalist Stalemate 
§4.1 – The Externalist Case against Internalism 
The debate between internalists and externalists has largely been focused on the possibility of 
amoralists – people who have no motivation to do what they judge to be right. Externalists think 
 
255 Lewis (1989) 
256 Finlay (2005, 2014). 
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that there are clearly are some amoralists and that this shows that the connection between 
normative judgements and motivation is not a necessary connection. 257 
Psychopaths are very often cited as examples of amoralists. Psychopaths are people with 
sociopathic personality disorders who are prone to violence and who seemingly feel unmoved by 
moral considerations. Nevertheless, it has been found that, when questioned, psychopaths will 
say that they agree that violent and harmful behaviours are morally wrong; they just do not care 
that these behaviours are morally wrong. Some externalists consider this to be good evidence 
that people can make normative judgements while having no motivation to act on them. 
Internalists have some good replies to this objection. One reply is to question whether 
psychopaths really make moral judgements, or if they just use terms like ‘right’ in what R.M. 
Hare called a “conventional sense”.258 The idea is that when psychopaths say that something is 
‘right’, they mean merely that society generally deems it to be right. These kinds of judgements are 
not moral judgements in any interesting sense so the fact that they do not entail that the speaker 
has any particular motivation is not an objection to internalism. This seems to be a plausible 
account of what psychopaths mean when they make moral judgements. Studies have shown that 
psychopaths do not generally see as much of a distinction between what is conventional and 
what is moral as regular adults.259 Psychopaths will, for instance, usually judge that moral norms 
are contingent on their society’s conventions. Furthermore, they view moral transgressions and 
transgressions of conventions as being very close in terms of seriousness. A good explanation of 
these data is that psychopaths simply mean to describe what is conventional when they use moral 
terms. With a viable alternative account on the table, internalism is at no disadvantage as regards 
explaining the lack of moral motivation in psychopaths. 
 
257 Stocker (1979), Brink (1989), Mele (1996). 
258 (1952, pp.125-6). Internalists usually talk instead about the ‘inverted commas sense’ when referencing Hare but 
for Hare the ‘conventional sense’ and the ‘inverted commas sense’ of a word are different and the ‘conventional 
sense’ fits better with what internalists want to say about psychopaths.   
259 e.g. Blair, (1995, 2008). 
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People suffering from depression are another case that externalists sometimes use as an example 
of amoralists. These externalists claim that depression can totally sap our motivation to do what 
we judge to be morally right. In such cases it seems intuitive that the depressed person still 
counts as making a moral judgement, and not just in a ‘conventional sense’. Depressed people 
often feel extreme frustration at their own inability to get motivated to do what they judge that 
they ought to do. If their moral judgements were merely conventional then it would be unclear 
why they should feel this frustration. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that, unlike 
psychopaths, people with depression are unable to clearly distinguish the conventional from the 
moral.  
The best response to the case of depressed people (though this could be applied to psychopaths 
too) is to question whether they really have no motivation whatsoever. That depressed people feel so 
much frustration that their listlessness prevents them from doing what they think they ought to 
do suggests to me that they experience some pull to do what they judge they ought to. Jamie 
Dreier has a helpful way of framing what the externalist requires for their argument,  
“[The externalist asks us to] imagine a man who would not lift a finger, as it were, to achieve what he 
believes to be good - for if he would make even some minimal effort, then the relevant motivation is 
exposed.” 
It seems reasonable to suppose that depressed people (and maybe psychopaths also, insofar as 
they can make sincere moral judgements) might be motivated to at least lift a finger to bring 
about what they judge to be right. That is enough to show that there is at least some motivation, 
which is enough for internalists.260 It is also worth mentioning that the empirical research 
suggests that depressed people do feel some motivation to do what they believe is morally 
right.261 
 
260 Eggers (2015). 
261 Roberts, ‘Mental Illness, Motivation, and Commitment,’. O’Conner et al. ‘Empathy and Depression.’ L.E. 
O’Connor, J.W. Berry, J. Weiss, and P. Gilbert, ‘Guilt, Fear, Submission, and Empathy in Depression,’. All cited in 
Cholbi (2011). 
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A third class of cases that externalists consider concerns what Brink calls amoralist sceptics.262 
These are people who claim to recognise that certain actions are morally right but are sceptical 
about whether this gives them any reason to do those actions. Some philosophers fall under this 
category. In Ethics without Morals, Joel Marks argues that we have excellent reason not to guide 
our action by moral concerns.263 Morality, he argues, can lead to terrible consequences, it makes 
us feel bad, it leads us to living poorly, etc. In sum Marks thinks that we should reject moral 
concerns because we would better maximise the fulfilment of our desires.  
I think that there are two ways for internalists to account for these kinds of claims. The first is to 
point out that these philosophers are plausibly talking about morality in the ‘conventional sense’. 
These philosophers are moral error theorists so they are not really making moral judgements 
when they say things are right or wrong; they do not believe that anything is, strictly speaking, right 
or wrong.  
The second reply is to question whether these philosophers are really rejecting morality tout court 
or whether they are just offering an alternative morality. In Marks’ case, we might think he is 
offering a moral account according to which what we ought to do is that which maximises the 
fulfilment of our desires.264 Marks would reject this, for him, morality, by its very nature is 
composed of short, absolute, objective rules which apply to all people at all times and which 
override any other considerations. What he calls, “ethics”, on the other hand, is a far superior 
way to regulate behaviour in that its rules could apply contingently on the addressee’s desires. 
But at this point the internalist could stipulate that they are using ‘morality’ in a broad sense such 
that it is coextensive with what Marks calls ‘ethics’. (This seems a legitimate move to me; there is 
no real difference between ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ to my ear). If Marks wants to insist on his 
 
262 Brink (1989, ch.3) 
263 Marks (2012). 
264 A proper examination of Marks’ view would probably give a more complicated picture than this, but it will serve 
well enough as an example. 
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distinction, internalists can just redefine their position in terms of ‘ethical judgements’ rather 
than ‘moral judgements’ without any real loss. 
The externalist might argue at this point that facts about what sceptics, psychopaths and people 
with depression are usually like are not crucial for showing that internalism is false. As long as we 
can imagine people who have no motivation whatsoever to do what they judge to be right then 
unconditional internalism fails, since it is a claim about what is conceptually possible rather than 
what is in fact the case.265  
However, I do not see why internalists should accept that amoralists are imaginable either. Brink 
cites as examples of possible amoralists, Thrasymachus in The Republic, Hume’s knave and Mike 
the conman from David Mamet’s House of Games.266 He argues that we can imagine that these 
characters are real. However, while it is true that we can imagine these characters, the internalist 
can argue that what we imagine is someone who would at least raise a finger to do what is right. 
Alternatively, for each of these cases it is also plausible that we might adopt a ‘conventional’ 
reading of their use of moral terms.  
Matthew Kramer argues that this response would not work for cases of fictional immoralists.267 He 
uses the examples of Aaron from Titus Andronicus and Iago from Othello. These characters have 
no motivation to do what he judges to be right, quite the opposite; they are motivated to do 
what is wrong because it is wrong. Aaron declares shortly before his execution, “If one good deed in 
all my life I did I do repent it from my very soul”. We have no difficulty in believing in these 
characters and they do not seem in any way impossible. So, argues Kramer, it cannot be a 
conceptual truth that we are always motivated to do what we judge to be right. 
 
265 Nichols (2004) 
266 Brink (1989) 
267 Kramer (2009) 
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Pace Kramer, I think intuitively the ‘conventional sense’ reply is available in these cases. What we 
are imagining, an internalist could argue, are deeply anti-social and contrarian characters. When 
Aaron for example claims that he repents any good actions he may have performed, he could be 
just evincing his rejection of conventionally accepted values. Kramer argues that this kind of 
response will not work for Iago at least. He writes,  
“Iago is not seeking to reproduce the moral judgements of ordinary people when in his soliloquies he 
utters his verdicts on the monstrousness of his own actions. When he declares to himself that his 
contrivances are diabolical, he is delightedly expressing his own view rather than anyone else’s view. For 
his purposes, he needs to grasp what is morally right and obligatory. Only be apprehending what is actually 
right and obligatory can he fulfil his objective of acting in defiance of what is right and obligatory.”268 
However, I am not sure that this is a fatal case for internalists either. It might be true that when 
Iago describes something as ‘bad’ he is not talking about what is deemed bad by some person in 
particular but that does not mean that he must be using terms like ‘bad’ in a genuinely normative 
way. It seems open to the internalist to argue that Iago is a moral nihilist who delights in 
betraying others and causing them harm but without really believing that those things have moral 
significance. Iago might use ‘bad’ to refer to actions which cause harm, not because he thinks 
that these actions really are bad, but because he thinks that they are the kinds of actions that 
would be deemed bad at the end of inquiry, or which are deemed bad by God, or something along 
those lines. In other words, while it might be true that Iago is not just referencing the moral 
judgements of those around him and it might be true that he uses words like ‘bad’ to try to pick 
out those things that cause harm and that violate people’s rights, it is not obvious that he really 
views these things as morally bad. It is not unreasonable for the internalist to say that someone 
who believes that moral facts have no normative authority whatsoever (and are motivated 
accordingly) does not really believe that there are moral facts at all.269  
 
268 ibid. pp.278-9 
269 See Smith (1994 pp.68-70) 
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So, for all the examples I have looked at so far the internalist has a plausible enough story to 
offer. I do not claim that the internalist story is always as plausible as the externalist alternative, 
just these cases are, at most, only slightly damaging to the internalist. In other words, if they cost 
the internalist any ‘plausibility points’ at all, the do not cost very many.270  
A way we might try to break this deadlock is to ask ordinary language users. If it can be shown 
that ordinary language users overwhelming regard amoralists as conceptually possible then that 
might tip the scale in the externalists favour. Shaun Nichols and Caj Strandberg & Frederik 
Björklund conducted studies on students which suggest that, by and large, these students 
thought that amoralists were possible.271 Nichols argues that facts about actual people are not 
crucial, since were competent users of normative concepts to regard amoralist psychopaths as 
possible that would also undermine internalism. Since ordinary concept users do think that 
people can make normative judgements without having a particular motivation, internalism 
cannot be a conceptual truth, or so Nichols argues.  
However, things are not so clear cut. First of all, Strandberg & Björklund’s tests delivered the 
opposite results for psychopaths (though they did get externalist-seeming results for cases of 
depressed people, apathetic people and even normally functioning people). Secondly, Gunnar 
Björnsson et al. and Jesse Prinz have found that we can get results which seem to support 
internalism simply by asking the same kinds of questions in a different way.272 Third, there are 
methodological worries one could have with all of these studies. 273 For instance, it is not clear 
that the subjects of these studies were made sufficiently aware of the distinction between 
genuinely moral judgements and conventional judgements. Nichols did ask his subjects whether 
they thought that psychopaths could judge things to be “really” right and wrong in an attempt to 
 
270 The ‘plausibility points’ metaphor comes from Enoch (2011). 
271 Nichols (2002), Strandberg & Björklund (2013). 
272 Björnsson, Strandberg, Olinder, Eriksson & Björklund (2015), Prinz (2007, p.99) 
273 Björnsson, Strandberg, Olinder, Eriksson & Björklund’s (ibid) interesting discussion of empirical testing of folk 
intuitions on internalism also throws up several ways that results from these studies could be misleading. 
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make the subjects focus only on genuinely moral judgements, but this may have not been 
enough. Using the qualification, “really”, might merely have prompted them to judge what the 
psychopath thinks people are “really” committed to as oppose to what the psychopath thinks 
that people might say.274  
So far, we have not seen a decisive reason to reject internalism. I think it is viable in the face of 
these examples for the internalist to, as it were, dig in their heels. I move on now to look at the 
main internalist arguments against externalism. 
§4.2 – The Internalist Case against Externalism 
Internalists have put forward their own examples designed to show that externalism is false. 
First, they argue that if internalism were not true then it would be possible for there to be whole 
communities, or even whole worlds, in which people make moral judgements but are never 
motivated to act upon them. They judge that, first instance, it is wrong to cheat or to lie but this 
gives them no motivation whatsoever to refrain from cheating and lying. Internalists think that 
intuitively such a world is not possible. 275 
Second, internalists argue that there could be whole worlds in which people make moral 
judgements but are reliably disposed to act contrary to them. For example, people might sincerely 
judge that causing pain has the property is wrong and be motivated to cause pain because it is 
wrong.276 Such people, internalists argue, could not count as making sincere moral judgements, 
contra externalism. 
Third, internalists argue that if there were no necessary connection between normative 
judgements and motivation then there could be amoral saints; people who judge that all kinds of 
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275 Lenman (1999), Ridge (2014). 
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terrible things are permissible, or even obligatory, but who nevertheless behave impeccably 
because they do not care to act in accordance with their horrible moral judgements.277 
Such examples do not settle the debate. First of all, it is not clear that it follows from the falsity 
of internalism that these examples would be possible. Some cognitivist theories have it that the 
content of normative judgements is, in some way or other, tied to the desires, attitudes or plans 
of normative agents or their communities. For instance, on David Copp’s view judging that we 
have a reason to do something is, very roughly, to judge that some rule or norm which would 
promote certain desires and interests of our community would permit or prescribe it.278 This 
view is compatible with there being one person who does not have motivation to do what they 
judge that they have most reason to do. It does not, however, follow that if Copp’s view were 
correct then a whole community could make such judgements without ever having any 
motivation to act in accordance with them. Since the content of normative judgements is, on this 
kind of view, a function of the community’s desires and interests it is not surprising if we cannot 
imagine a whole community of people who are never motivated to act in accordance with them, 
or who are reliably motivated to act contrary to them. The same might be said of lots of other 
cognitivist theories.279 So, we should not assume that if internalism is false then there could be no 
tie between the motivations of a whole community worth of people and their normative 
judgements. 
Second, the cognitivist can insist that such examples are conceivable. They could try to explain 
away some of our resistance to the examples on the grounds that a community who had no 
motivation to act in accordance with what they judged to be right, would have no real reason to 
bother making moral judgements in the first place. At the same time, the cognitivist can maintain 
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279 e.g. Indexical relativist accounts like that of Jamie Dreier, Aristotelian contextualist accounts like that of Judith 
Jarvis Thomson or Phillipa Foot, end-relational theories like those defended by Stephen Finlay and Daan Evers, and 
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that the examples are not logically impossible. It is hard to come up with a reason, or at least one 
that does not just assume some form of internalism, why this would be mistaken. We seem 
perfectly capable of conceiving of worlds of amoralists in fantasy and science fiction novels. The 
internalist will reply that what we actually imagine is a world of people who make moral 
judgements only in a ‘conventional sense’, but the externalist is not forced to accept this. The 
externalist reading seems as viable as the internalist’s alternative. 
Third, cognitivists might even argue that some examples of amoralist communities support 
externalism more than internalism.280 In a very interesting paper, Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar 
Francén Olinder get us to imagine that psychological egoism turns out to be true. According to 
this cynical hypothesis we only ever act for self-interested reasons and never for moral reasons.281 
Though we delude ourselves that we are sometimes altruistic, in fact we really just look to 
maximise our self-interest. The delusion that we are altruistic and moral is, according to this 
hypothesis, a convenient psychological device for promoting our own self-interest because 
people who consciously act in only self-interested ways do not tend to prosper over the long 
term. The fact that we often behave in accordance with moral rules is not, according to this view, 
because we are concerned to do what is right (either de dicto or de re), rather, it is because we want 
to be seen as being morally upstanding to reap various certain social benefits. Though we might 
be generally motivated to do what we judge to be right, on this picture, we are not motivated to 
do what we judge to be right because we judge it to be right; deep down we are really just looking out 
for number one.  
This cynical hypothesis is, Björnsson and Oliner acknowledge, not likely to be true. The chance 
that it is true is, however, greater than zero. If internalism were true then discovering that the 
cynical hypothesis were true should lead us to judge that we had never made any genuine moral 
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judgments. If anyone who makes a genuine moral judgement necessarily has at least some 
motivation to act on that judgement then we could not have made genuine moral judgements if 
the cynical hypothesis were true, since, according to that hypothesis, we never have moral 
motivations, only self-interested ones. Björnsson and Oliner contend that this is counterintuitive. 
It seems much more reasonable to suppose that, if we discovered the cynical hypothesis was true 
then we would judge that we do make moral judgements but that these just do not have the 
kinds of links to motivation that the internalist supposes. In other words, discovering the cynical 
hypothesis were true might lead us to reconsider many of our beliefs about the nature of moral 
judgements, but it would not lead us to conclude that we had never made moral judgements. 
This suggests that it is not conceptually necessary that anyone who applies the moral concept 
<right> to some action is necessarily motivated to perform that action, since it is conceivable that 
we might find out that this is not true of us. 
There is more that could be said in response to these examples, but we have seen that 
externalists seem to have viable rebuttals to the internalist’s arguments.  
§4.3 
There are many more examples put forward by internalists and externalists in the literature. 
Often, these are introduced as examples which are finally going to break the deadlock, but this 
invariably proves not to be the case. Whether or not we think that examples of amoralists are 
possible typically depends on whether we already have internalist or externalist sympathies. Since 
the debate largely boils down to this clash of intuitions, it has reached an impasse. That being so, 
cognitivism’s failure to accommodate internalism cannot be seen as a reason to discount it at this 
stage. So, the naturalist is safe from the argument from motivational internalism. 
Leaving matters there would, however, be unsatisfying, so in what follows I argue against 
internalism in an indirect way. I accept, at least for the sake of argument, that internalism’s truth 
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would count heavily against cognitivism and heavily in favour of non-cognitivism.282 Since there 
are no necessary connections between distinct existences, if it is the case that there is a necessary 
link between normative judgements and desires, it must be the case that normative judgements 
are (at least partly) constituted by desires. 283 Non-cognitivists think that the normative judgement 
that some action is right necessarily provide us with some motivation to perform that action by 
itself simply because that normative judgement consists in a motivation to perform that action. If 
non-cognitivism is correct then the strength of that motivation ought to covary with the strength of 
the normative judgement that that desire constitutes.284 However, the strength of our normative 
motivation does not seem to covary with the strength of our normative judgements, so 
normative judgements cannot be motivational states, or so I shall argue. This provides us with a 
premise in the following modus tollens: 
(1) If internalism were true then normative judgements would be motivational states.  
(2) Normative judgements are not motivational states. 
(3) Therefore, it is not the case that internalism is true. 
My auxiliary argument for the second premise has a lot in common with an argument that has 
been made by Nick Zangwill.285 However, unlike my argument, non-cognitivists have the 
resources to respond to Zangwill’s argument and to a similar argument that Zangwill could have 
made. It will be helpful for setting up my argument if I first show why this is the case. 
§5 
§5.1 – Zangwill’s Argument 
According to non-cognitivists, normative judgements are desires. Desires vary in degrees of 
strength. We desire some things more than others and we desire those things to different degrees 
 
282 I do not actually think that cognitivism is necessarily ruled out by internalism since there remains the possibility 
that a theory like Tresan’s or Copp’s might be shown to work. That is fine from my point of view since these 
theories are broadly naturalistic. 
283 Brink (1989, chapter 3) also argues that the fates of non-cognitivism and unconditional internalism are joined. 
284 I will explain what it means for normative judgements to be weak or strong shortly. 
285 Zangwill (2008, 2009). 
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at different times. Normative judgements must also vary in degrees of strength if non-
cognitivism is true. One way that normative judgements seem to vary in strength is in terms of 
the degree of certainty we have that those normative judgements are correct.286 I might judge both 
that giving money to Oxfam is right and that giving money to the Labour party is right, but be 
much more confident in the former judgement than I am in the latter. Nick Zangwill argues that 
the non-cognitivist must explain this in terms of the strength of the desires that constitute those 
normative judgements, the idea being that we are more confident that some action is right the 
stronger the desire to do it is. Recall now that for non-cognitivists the desires that constitute 
moral judgements are also what explain the normative motivation to perform those actions.287 If 
non-cognitivism is true then, desire strength is doing double duty; it explains a normative 
judgement’s motivational efficacy and it explains the certainty with which we hold that 
judgement. This means that the non-cognitivist would be committed to saying that the certainty 
of normative judgements necessarily covaries with the normative motivation the agent has to 
perform that action. The level of normative motivation to perform an action could not change 
while the certainty remained the same because the level of moral motivation and the level of 
certainty are both explained by desire strength. Let us call this claim the Proportionate Certitude 
Determination Thesis (PCDT).288  
There are plausibly counterexamples to PCDT: 
Example 1: John judges that it is right to pick his kids up from school and he is fairly certain that his 
judgement is correct. On Monday, John is not looking forward to picking up his kids because he hates 
driving but he also thinks that it is the right thing to do. John recognises that his kids will be stranded at 
school if he does not pick them up and he believes that he has a duty to pick them up having previously 
agreed to. Since John is a decent person he feels a fairly high level of motivation overall to pick up his kids. 
On Tuesday, however, John is in a depressed state. He realises that picking up his kids is the right thing to 
 
286 Zangwill (2008, p.95) 
287 I say ‘normative motivation’ because we can of course have other motivations to perform those actions that we 
judge to be right. For example, I might judge that it is right to give to Oxfam but be motivated to give to Oxfam 
largely by some other mental state which is distinct from that normative judgement, such as a desire to be well 
thought of by others. 
288 I am using, with slight tweaks, Zangwill’s (2008) terminology here. 
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do but his judgement that it is the right thing to do moves him much less than it did on Monday. 
Intuitively, John need not be any less certain on Tuesday than he was on Monday that picking up his kids is 
the right thing to do, but he has less normative motivation to pick them up.  
The point of this example is not that on one day John is motivated enough to act as he judges he 
ought to and the other he is not, nor is the point that on one day John’s normative motivation is 
outweighed by other motivations. The point is that John is motivated less by his normative 
judgement on one day than the other, regardless of other motivations, despite his confidence in 
the truth of those judgements staying the same. Such examples seem conceptually possible at the 
very least. So, we have a counterexample to PCDT. Since, Zangwill argues, non-cognitivism 
entails PCDT, non-cognitivism must also be false. Because non-cognitivists try to explain both 
the certitude of our normative judgements and their motivational efficacy in terms of desire 
strength, they have no resources to explain how the certitude of our normative judgements and 
the motivational efficacy of normative judgements can come apart. 
Cognitivists meanwhile do not face this problem. They can explain why John is just as certain on 
Monday as he is on Tuesday that picking up his kids is right by saying that he gives equal 
credence to his belief that picking up his kids has a certain property on both days. The fact that 
John is less motivated to pick up his kids on one day than on the other does not conflict with 
that explanation. John’s level of normative motivation is explained, on this account, by the 
strength of John’s desires (de re or de dicto) to do what he judges to be right. Since John’s 
normative judgements and the desires that explain John’s normative motivation are separate 
mental states, on this account, they need not have the same strength. 
§5.2 – An Argument Zangwill Could Have Made 
Another way that moral judgements vary in strength is the degree to which we a moral property 
is instantiated in an action. For example, we typically think that lying and killing are both wrong, 
but we think that killing is wrong to a greater extent. Michael Smith calls this feature 
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‘importance’.289 If a judgement that some action is wrong has high ‘importance’ then that action 
is judged to be wrong to a high degree. From now on when I speak about a judgement’s 
‘importance’ or of a judgement being ‘important’ I will always be using these terms in this sense. 
If the importance of a judgement is also to be determined by the strength of the desire that 
constitutes the normative judgement, then the agent’s normative motivation must also covary 
with the importance of the judgement. Let us call this claim the Proportionate Importance 
Determination Thesis (PIDT).  
Zangwill does not consider PIDT a problem for non-cognitivists, he says that this claim is 
“relatively uncontroversial”, but I think that a commitment to PIDT would be just as troubling 
as a commitment to PCDT. It is often the case that when one action is right to a greater degree 
than some other action, we will be proportionally more motivated to perform the first action 
than the second. If the judgement that the right thing to do is to help my neighbour move house 
has less importance for me than the judgement that the right thing to do is to help my mum 
move house, then I will usually be more motivated to help my mum than to help my neighbour. 
Additionally, the degree to which I am motivated to help my mum move and the degree to 
which I am motivated to help my neighbour move will usually be proportional to the degree to 
which I think those acts are right. However, this will not always be the case as the following 
example illustrates: 
Example 2: John judges that it is right to pick his kids up from school, he judges that picking up his kids is 
morally right to a high degree and he judges that nothing else he could be doing that day is as normatively 
pressing as his duty to pick up his kids. John’s normative judgement has high importance. On Monday, the 
fact that he judges that it is the right thing to do supplies John with a significant amount of motivation to 
pick up his kids, but on Tuesday John is barely motivated at all by the judgement that picking up his kids is 
right because he is in a depressed state. Nevertheless, on both Monday and Tuesday, John judges that 
picking up his kids is right to the same degree.  
 
289 Smith (2002) 
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If this example is conceptually possible, and it seems that it is, then we have a counterexample to 
PIDT. The degree to which we judge something to be normatively important does not 
necessarily covary with our motivation to do the right thing. We can become more or less 
motivated to perform some action because it is right without also changing our mind at all 
concerning the degree to which that action is right. The non-cognitivist would be committed to 
denying that this is possible if they are also committed to PIDT. 
So, the cognitivist has two potentially powerful arguments against non-cognitivism: 
Argument from PCDT 
1. If non-cognitivism is true then PCDT is true 
2. Someone could remain as certain that an action is right but become more or less normatively motivated 
to do it. 
3. Therefore, PDCT is false. 
4. Therefore, non-cognitivism is false. 
Argument from PIDT 
1. If non-cognitivism is true then PIDT is true 
2. The importance of a person’s judgement that an action is right could stay the same but they could 
become more or less normatively motivated to do it. 
3. Therefore, PIDT is false 
4. Therefore, non-cognitivism is false. 
The problem for the non-cognitivist is that in identifying normative judgements with the same 
states of mind that motivate us to act on those judgements, they make the link between 
judgement and motivation too close. The strength of normative judgements is generally less 
variable than our normative motivation. I will now suggest that both of these arguments fail, but 
then go on to argue that a similar argument is telling. 
§6 
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I think that non-cognitivists can refute both Zangwill’s argument and the one that I have 
constructed. Quite aside from issues regarding normative motivation, a commitment to both 
PCDT and PIDT would be a problem for non-cognitivists. This point becomes clear if we 
consider Michael Smith’s paper Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation and the discussion that has 
followed from it.290  
Smith argues that normative judgements cannot be desires because normative judgements vary 
along more dimensions than desires do. While desires only vary in strength, normative 
judgements can vary in terms of certitude and importance. Desire strength alone cannot be used 
to explain all the different ways that normative judgements can vary in strength. If the strength 
of the desire that constitutes a normative judgement explains both its certitude and importance, 
then non-cognitivists cannot explain why normative judgements can change in certitude without 
changing in importance, and vice versa. We can come to be less sure that some action is wrong 
without also coming to think that the action in question is less wrong than we previously did, 
and we can come to think that some action is not as wrong as we used to without being any less 
sure that it is wrong. Non-cognitivists need to accommodate these facts if they are to have a 
satisfactory account of normative judgement. 
In response, non-cognitivists have argued that neither certitude nor importance were to be 
explained in terms of the strength of the desire that constitutes the normative judgement.291 If 
this is right then it undercuts both arguments considered in the last section, since the first 
premises of those arguments would be false. 
 
290 Smith (2002) 
291 Lenman (2003a), Ridge (2003). 
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Non-cognitivists have argued that being very certain that some action is right is, in effect, to be 
very certain that we would judge that action to be right if we had a perfect normative character. 
292 A classic statement of this idea comes from Simon Blackburn: 
The problem comes with thinking of myself (or of us or our tradition) that I may be mistaken. How can I 
make sense of fears of my own fallibility? Well, there are a number of things I admire: for instance, 
information, sensitivity, maturity, imagination, coherence. I know that other people show defects in these 
respects, and that these defects lead to bad opinions. But can I exempt myself from the same possibility? 
Of course not (that would be unpardonably smug). So I can think that perhaps some of my opinions are 
due to defects of information, sensitivity, maturity, imagination and coherence.293 
There are certain traits that we think make people better at making normative judgements. An 
ideal normative agent would have these traits to an ideal extent and so could not be bettered when it 
comes to making normative decisions. Judging that it is very certain that some action is right is, 
on this view, to judge that an ideal normative agent would judge it to be right. Because this is a 
non-cognitivist account, judging that an ideal normative agent would judge some action to be 
right is understood as judging that the ideal normative agent would desire that that action was 
performed. So, for example, if I think that it is right to give £10 to Oxfam then I judge that an 
ideal normative agent would desire that I give £10 to Oxfam. 
The judgement that some hypothetical agent counts as normatively ideal is also normative 
judgement. This judgement must then be a desire if non-cognitivism is true, since non-
cognitivists think that all normative judgements are desires. What they say is that judging that a 
hypothetical agent is an ideal normative agent is to desire to act as that hypothetical agent would 
desire that we do. For example, to judge that Martin Luther King is an ideal normative agent, is, 
on the picture, to desire to act as Martin Luther King would desire me to. 
For Blackburn, an ideal normative agent is one who is well-informed, sensitive, mature, 
imaginative and coherent but other people might think that ideal normative agents have 
 
292 Blackburn (1998), Lenman (2003a), Ridge (2003), Gibbard (2011). 
293 Blackburn (1998), p. 318 
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completely different traits. Some people might, for instance, judge that maturity has a corrupting 
influence and that only those with a childlike naïveté could be ideal normative agents. We can 
also differ in our views about the extent to which ideal normative agents have particular traits. 
For instance, someone might think that an ideal normative agent must be sensitive, but think 
that they would be sensitive to a lesser degree than Blackburn does. The fact that different 
people judge different hypothetical agents to be ideal is understood, on this view, as reflecting 
the fact that different people desire to act as different agents would desire them to. 
On this account then, the judgement that some action is right consists of both a belief that some 
hypothetical agent would desire that I perform that action and a desire to do as that hypothetical 
agent would desire me to.  We can be more or less certain that hypothetical agents would have 
certain desires. Suppose I think that a normatively ideal agent is just one who is fully-informed 
on all non-normative matters, i.e. I desire to do the things a fully-informed agent would desire 
that I do. When I judge that it is right for me to give £10 to Oxfam I judge that a fully-informed 
agent would desire that I give £10 to Oxfam. I could be more or less certain about that 
judgement. For all I know, a fully-informed agent might desire that I give money to a different 
charity since they would know which charities most effectively use money that is donated to 
them. A fully-informed agent might even desire that I keep the money for myself. So, the 
certainty of normative judgements is understood on this view in terms of the certainty of our 
belief regarding what a particular hypothetical agent would desire them to do.  
The importance of a normative judgement, meanwhile, is most naturally explained in terms of 
the strength of the desire that I believe that an ideal normative agent would have towards the 
action in question. Suppose again that I think that ideal agents are just fully-informed agents. In 
that case for me to think that it is better to give £10 to Oxfam than to Shelter is, on this view, to 
judge that a fully-informed agent would desire that I give £10 to Oxfam more than they would 
desire me to give £10 to Shelter.  
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We can apply this picture to the example of John I gave earlier. Let us suppose that, according to 
John, an ideal normative agent is just one who is fully-informed. John’s normative judgement 
that it is right to a very high degree to pick up his kids could be said to be made up of three 
component judgements: 
1. John’s judgement that a fully-informed agent is normatively ideal. 
2. John’s judgement that a fully-informed agent would judge that it is right for him to pick up his kids. 
3. John’s judgement that a fully-informed agent would judge that it is right to a high degree for him to pick 
up his kids. 
The first of these is a normative judgement so it must be understood by the non-cognitivist as a 
desire. The other two judgements are not normative judgements, they are just judgements 
concerning what a particular hypothetical agent would think, so the non-cognitivist can 
understand these judgments as being ordinary beliefs about a hypothetical agent’s judgements. 
The resulting picture looks a bit like this: 
1. John’s judgement that a fully-informed agent is normatively ideal ≈ John’s desire to act as a fully-
informed agent would desire that he does. 
2. John’s judgement that a fully-informed agent would judge that it is right for him to pick up his kids ≈ 
John’s belief that a fully-informed agent would desire that he picks up his kids. 
3. John’s judgement that a fully-informed agent would judge that it is right to a high degree for him to pick 
up his kids ≈ John’s belief that a fully-informed agent would strongly desire that he picks up his kids. 
The certitude and importance of John’s normative judgement that it is right that he picks up his 
kids is explained by credence he gives to the second and third component judgments 
respectively. We can explain why John is less motivated by his judgement that picking up his kids 
is right on Tuesday than he is on Monday by the fact that the strength of his desire to do as a 
fully-informed agent would desire that he does has gone down due to his depressed state. This 
need not affect the certainty that John has on Monday or on Tuesday that picking up his kids is 
right. The certainty of his judgement is explained by how certain he is that a fully-informed agent 
would desire that he picks up his kids. Since the credence that he gives to that belief has not 
changed, neither has the certainty he has that it is right to pick up his kids.  
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John could also think that picking up his kids is right to do the same degree on Tuesday as it is 
on Monday because his depressed state need not change the credence he gives to his belief 
concerning the strength that a fully-informed agent’s desire that he pick up his kids would have. 
So, the non-cognitivist can explain Example 2 as well. 
The second and third component judgements are just beliefs. Since beliefs are motivationally 
inert, they do not also explain the motivational efficacy of John’s normative judgement that it is 
right that he picks up his kids. So, the motivational efficacy of John’s judgement can become 
stronger or weaker without the importance or certitude of his judgement also becoming stronger 
or weaker. This shows that non-cognitivists are not committed to PCDT or PIDT after all. 
Therefore, the arguments considered in the last section both fail. Those arguments presuppose 
that non-cognitivism must take the very simple form that normative judgements are just desires, 
when actually non-cognitivists are entitled to say that normative judgements are more complex 
than that. The non-cognitivist can explain importance and certitude in terms of the belief-
components of normative judgements so neither certitude nor importance need co-vary in 
strength to the motivational component of normative judgements. However, I think that we can 
tweak these arguments so that they apply to this more complex non-cognitivist picture.  
§7 
There are plenty of potential problems with this non-cognitivist account but I want to focus on 
just one.294 The desire that we have to do as some particular agent does is an important 
component of the normative judgement that some action is right on the non-cognitivist picture 
we are considering. That desire constitutes the component judgement that a particular agent is 
normatively ideal but it also explains why we necessarily feel some motivation to perform the 
action we are judging to be right (since it is the only motivational component of that judgement). 
 
294 See especially Egan (2005), but also Olson and Bykvist (2009), Scanlon (2009), Parfit (2011). 
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That being so, the strength of the component judgement that a particular agent is ideal should be 
proportional to the level of normative motivation we feel to perform the action we judge that to 
be right (or in other words the action that we believe that the hypothetical agent would desire 
that we do). The problem for the non-cognitivist is that we can run the same arguments we just 
considered against this claim. 
Since desires come in degrees of strength, the judgement that a particular agent is ideal should 
also admit of degrees of strength. Our certainty that a particular agent is normatively ideal seems 
to come in degrees. I am much more certain that a fully-informed agent is normatively ideal than 
I am that a fully-misinformed agent is normatively ideal, and I am much more certain that an 
empathetic agent is normatively ideal than a sadistic one, to take just two examples. The only 
resource that the non-cognitivist has to explain this kind of certainty is in terms of the strength 
of the desire that constitutes our judgement that a particular agent is normatively ideal. The fact 
that I am more certain that a fully-informed agent is normatively ideal than I am that a fully-
misinformed agent is normatively ideal could then be explained by the fact that I desire much 
more strongly to do as a fully-informed agent would desire that I do than as a fully-misinformed 
agent would desire that I do. If my desire to do as a particular agent would desire that I do 
explains both my judgement that that agent is normatively ideal and the level of motivation I feel 
to do what I judge to be right, then the level of certainty I feel that a particular agent is ideal 
should covary with the level of motivation we feel to perform the action we judge to be right. 
Let us call this claim the Proportionate Certitude Determination Thesis 2 (PCDT2). PCDT2 is 
vulnerable to the kinds of examples we have previously looked at. Consider the following 
scenario: 
Example 3: John thinks that the ideal normative agent is just a fully-informed agent. He also thinks that a 
fully-informed agent would desire that he picks up his kids from school. As a result, John judges that the 
right thing to do is to pick up his kids. On Monday, he is very motivated to pick up kids because it is the 
right thing to do, but on Tuesday, due to his being in a depressed state, he is barely moved by the fact that 
173 
 
picking up his kids is the right thing to do. John is no less convinced on Tuesday than on Monday that 
fully-informed agents are normatively ideal. 
Example 3 looks like a coherent possibility but it should not be if the non-cognitivist is right. If 
John’s judgement that full-informed agents are normatively ideal is a desire to do as a fully-
informed agent would desire him to do, and if that judgement is a component of John’s 
judgement that picking up his kids is the right thing to do, then his normative motivation to pick 
up his kids should covary in strength with his judgement that fully-informed agents are 
normatively ideal. This seems not to be the case. Our level of normative motivation seems to be 
less stable than our judgements concerning which kinds of agents are normatively ideal.  
The non-cognitivist might reply at this point that the certainty we have that a particular 
normative agent is ideal is not to be explained in terms of the strength of the desire that 
constitutes that judgement. The problem is that if non-cognitivists want to hold that the 
normative judgement that a particular agent is ideal is constituted by a desire then they need to 
explain how that judgement admits of degrees of certitude. They cannot respond as they did to 
Michael Smith’s challenge, i.e. they cannot bring in the desires of hypothetical agents to explain 
how certain we are that a particular agent is normatively ideal. They could not say that our level 
of certainty that a hypothetical agent is ideal is explained by the credence we assign to the belief 
that that hypothetical agent would judge themselves to be ideal. Being certain that some agent is 
ideal cannot be understood as being very sure that they would desire that we desire to act as they 
would want us to. I might be very sure that a particular hypothetical agent would want me to act 
as they would desire me to, while being very unsure whether that agent is ideal. A maximally self-
regarding agent would presumably want me to act as they desire me to, but I am very confident 
that they are not ideal normative agents.  
Alternatively, the non-cognitivist might try to say that our certainty that a particular hypothetical 
agent is ideal can be explained by the credence of our belief that a different hypothetical agent would 
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judge the first agent to be ideal. This could not work either. The first agent is, ex hypothesi, one 
that we judge to be normatively ideal.  We could not explain our confidence that that agent is 
ideal in terms of what some other, non-ideal agent desires; that agent’s desires are irrelevant to 
us, normatively speaking. I might be quite unsure whether agent X is normatively ideal while 
being very sure that that agent Y would desire that I act as agent X would desire that I do.   
Additionally, even if we did say that judging that some agent is normatively ideal is to judge that 
some other agent would desire that we desire as the first agent does, we would then have to 
explain our level of certainty in the judgment that the second agent is an appropriate judge of the 
first agent. If we did that in terms of the strength of our desire to desire as the second agent 
does, then the same problem would re-emerge. And, if we tried to explain it in terms of the 
desires of some third hypothetical agent, we would be walking into an infinite regress in which 
we invoke more and more hypothetical agents in order to explain our certitude that any one of 
them is normatively ideal. 
So, while I think that the non-cognitivist can get round Zangwill’s argument by drawing on the 
belief-components of normative judgements, the same basic argument can then be reapplied to 
the desire-components of normative judgements. It does not seem that desires could explain 
both the level of motivation we necessary feel to act and be the component judgement that a 
particular agent is ideal, since the two can vary in strength. The non-cognitivist ties normative 
judgement too closely to motivation, such that they end up with a very implausible picture of 
how our normative motivation works. If, as we have assumed for the sake of argument, the truth 
of internalism requires that normative judgements are (at least partly) constituted by a 
motivational state, then the cognitivist can reject internalism too. 
The cognitivist thinks that normative judgements and the states of mind that motivate to act on 
those judgements are distinct states of mind. This allows them to explain why features of 
normative judgements can change while motivation remains the same, and vice versa. But since 
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there are no necessary connections between distinct existences, it does require them to reject 
internalism. This is acceptable since accepting internalism requires that we also accept a flawed 
picture of normative motivation. 
§8 – Conditional Internalism Again 
Not all non-cognitivists accept unconditional internalism. Some non-cognitivists say instead that 
when we judge that something is morally right we will necessarily be motivated to do it as long as 
we meet condition C, where C stipulates that we are suitably normal in some way.295 For example, C 
may require that the speaker is free from depression. If the non-cognitivist wants instead to 
defend a conditional internalism then they may be able to avoid counterexamples like the 
example of John I gave since his depression is what explains the variability of his motivation. 
There are good reasons to doubt that non-cognitivists can avoid a commitment to an 
unconditional form of internalism.296 If normative judgements are desires, and desires are 
motivational states, then everyone, including people who meet condition C, who makes a 
normative judgement must surely be in a motivational state. Maybe the non-cognitivist can 
elaborate on the kind of desire they have in mind. Perhaps normative judgements are kinds of 
conative mental states that only motivate if you are not depressed. On this picture, desires are 
not necessarily motivating, they only motivate some of the agents who have them; those agents 
that are ‘normal’ in some stipulated sense. But without any motivation being present it is difficult 
to see what the content of ‘abnormal’ agent’s normative judgements would be on this picture. In 
other words, if it is not motivation, then there is nothing for the desires that constitute 
‘abnormal’ agents normative judgements to consist in. This problem seems to extend to any 
other form of conditional internalism. If (‘abnormal’) agents who fail to meet condition C can 
make sincere normative judgements without having any motivation to act in accordance with 
 
295 e.g. Gibbard (1993), Blackburn (1995). 
296 Standberg (2012) 
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them it becomes very difficult to see in what way those judgements could be said to consist in a 
motivational states of mind. 
I think we can put that issue to one side however, because I think that the problem I considered 
for unconditional internalism, applies just as much to conditional internalism. In other words, it 
seems likely that even the most ‘normal’ normative agents will be agents whose motivation to do 
what they judge to be right will not covary with the certitude of their judgement that a particular 
agent is ideal. Depressed people like John seem like a particularly clear example but I think that 
for any of us the level of our motivation to do what we judge to be right does not covary with 
certitude we have that a particular agent ideal. Our views about which kinds of agents are 
normatively ideal are, I submit, fairly stable. Sometimes we might re-examine our commitments 
and wonder whether we should be acting as a more spontaneous or a more thoughtful or a more 
mature agent would desire for us to but for the most part these judgements are not in flux. Our 
motivation to do what we judge to be right meanwhile is rather less stable.  
Studies have shown that we seem to be less motivated to help others if the environment we are 
in is noisy than if they are quiet.297 But on reflection we don’t tend to think that the level of noise 
is a relevant factor, i.e. we do not tend to think that a normatively ideal agent would desire to a 
greater degree that we help if surroundings are quiet than if they are noisy.298 This seems like a 
case where the amount we are moved by judging that something is right does not match the 
strength of our judgement that a particular agent is normatively ideal. For other examples, we 
might point to the fact that fluctuations in mood can affect how much our normative 
judgements motivate us without changing how sure we are that certain kinds of hypothetical 
agents are normatively ideal. Since the strength of even normal agents’ motivation to do what we 
judge to be right because it is right does not covary with the strength of their judgement that a 
 
297 Mathews, K. E., & Canon, L. K. (1975). “Environmental noise level as a determinant of helping 
behaviour”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(4) 
298 Though there may some cases where we think this is so. Failing to help an old lady cross the street in deafeningly 
loud conditions is less wrong than failing to help her in peaceful and safe auditory conditions. 
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particular kind of normative agent is ideal, our normative judgements cannot be motivational 
states. Since normative judgements cannot be motivational states, and since we are assuming that 
the only way that there could be necessary connections between normative judgment and 
motivation would be if normative judgements were motivational states, we can reject that there 
are necessary connections between the normative judgements of even the most ‘normal’ people 
and their motivation. 
§9 – More Problems Relating to Normative Motivation 
§9.1 – Which Motivational State? 
The arguments considered so far tell against the claim that normative judgements are constituted 
by motivational states. I now want to consider some other, admittedly less decisive, problems for 
the non-cognitivist explanation of normative motivation in order to bolster my case.  
When it comes to many normative judgements there is an obvious suggestion for what 
motivation the agent must have if internalism is true. If normative judgements are desires, and if 
we understand desires in terms of their having a mind-to-world direction of fit, then a normative 
judgement of the form ‘X is right’ will be constituted by a disposition to change the world so as 
to match the content of the desire. For example, when John judges, ‘Picking up my kids now 
would be the right thing to do’, the internalist might say that John would necessarily be 
motivated to pick up his kids. To put it another way, in making the normative judgement he does 
John will necessarily be disposed to change the world so that it becomes the case that he picks 
up his kids.  
In other cases, however, this account looks implausible. Suppose Dan judges it would be morally 
right for John to pick up his kids. It is not plausible that Dan necessarily is motivated to pick up 
John’s kids. So what action must Dan be motivated to perform if internalism is true? We do not 
make normative judgements just about actions that we ourselves could perform; we judge the 
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actions of others, actions of our past selves, the actions of fictional characters, etc. Non-
cognitivists need to find some action that an agent will plausibly necessarily feel some motivation 
to perform for each of these judgement types.  
Simon Blackburn offers one potential answer in his reply to an objection from Sigrun 
Svavarsdóttir, which is along the same lines as the one I am making.299 Blackburn suggests that in 
these kinds of cases what we are necessarily motivated to do is to encourage the action in 
question.300 This suggestion preserves a link between judgement and motivation but I worry that 
the move is ad hoc; why should some moral judgements require motivation to perform the action 
that is the object of the judgement, while others motivate us to adopt certain attitudes towards 
people who perform those actions?  
A more serious problem is this: the normative judgements, ‘The right thing for John to do is to 
pick up his kids’, and, ‘Encouraging John to pick up his kids is the right for me to do’, are 
obviously different judgements. However, if normative judgements are constituted by a desire 
and if that desire is what motivates the corresponding action, then these judgements come out as 
being identical since both judgements would consist in a desire to encourage John to pick up his 
kids. ‘Encouraging John to pick up his kids is the right for me to do’, is a first-personal 
normative judgement, so on the story we are considering, the desire-state that it consists in is a 
desire to encourage John to pick up his kids. “The right thing for John to do is to pick up his 
kids”, meanwhile, is not a first-personal moral judgement, so it must consist in a desire to 
encourage John to pick up his kids too. It would be a problem for non-cognitivism if these 
judgements come out as being the same judgement since they clearly are not. 
Problems multiply; consider the following argument: 
 
299 Svavarsdóttir (2002), Blackburn (2002) 
300 His answer is a little more complex than this, but not in a way that affects the point that I am making. 
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1. It was right for me to pick up my kids. 
2. It was right for John to pick up his kids. 
3. Therefore, we both did something that was right. 
The first premise, on this picture, expresses a desire for me to do something, whereas the second 
premise expresses a desire to encourage John to do something. What kind of desire does the use 
of ‘right’ in the conclusion then express? Since ‘right’ is predicated of both one of my actions and 
one of yours it does not seem that ‘right’ can express either a desire for me to do something or a 
desire to encourage you to do something. ‘Right’ in the conclusion however needs to have the 
same meaning (which means that it must express the same kind of attitude in non-cognitivist 
semantics) that it does in the premises, otherwise the argument will not be valid, which it clearly 
is. 
To get round these issues we might then suggest that all judgements concerning rightness, 
including first-personal judgements, are necessarily linked to a motivation to encourage the 
action in question. On this view, the judgement, ‘Encouraging John to pick up his kids would be 
the right thing for me to do’, would consist in a desire to encourage myself to encourage John to 
pick up his kids. This is a different attitude to the desire to encourage John to pick up his kids, so 
this suggestion avoids the problems just raised.  
However, now the link between judgement and motivation is becoming quite remote. If that is 
supposed to be the link between judgement and motivation, then it seems of little to no cost for 
externalists to deny that there is any such link. Or to bring this back to the issue of naturalism, if 
the sense in which normative judgements are normative is that anyone who makes them 
necessarily desires to encourage the subject to follow them, then it does not seem to be much of a 
cost to the naturalist to deny that normative judgements are normative in this sense. 
More to the point, this account of the link between judgement and motivation seems to be 
vulnerable to counterexamples. Here is one: suppose an evil demon causes everyone lots of pain 
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if anyone encourages you to visit your mother but does nothing if you visit your mother. A strict 
utilitarian could judge that it is right for you to visit your mother without seemingly having any 
motivation to encourage you to do it. In that case, the judgement, ‘The right thing for you to do 
is to visit your mother’, cannot be constituted by a desire to encourage you to visit your mother. 
If that example seems too fantastical, we can bring up examples that are more realistic. I might 
judge that it would be right for John to donate money to charity, while not having any 
motivation to encourage John to donate; I might want John to donate entirely at his own behest 
or I might think that by giving John a social incentive I will taint the moral worth of his actions. 
It is not difficult to come up with examples of actions we judge to be right that we are not 
motivated to encourage. Since this non-cognitivist picture identifies our rightness-judgements 
with motivations to encourage certain actions this is a problem for that picture.301 
§9.2 – Frege-Geach 
Sometimes Blackburn and other non-cognitivists are a bit more circumspect when it comes to 
identifying what the link between normative judgements and motivation is. In The Flight from 
Reality, Blackburn compares normative judgements with the attitude of loving someone.302 We do 
not expect, for every individual and for all times, that if someone counts as loving someone else 
then they will have any particular level of motivation to perform any particular actions. The 
picture is more complicated and nuanced. Love can drive someone on one day to deeds of 
heroism but on another day drive them to deeds of cruelty, and on other days have little effect at 
all on their will.  
A problem with this approach is that the non-cognitivist needs to be precise about which 
attitudes constitute which normative judgements if they are to have a satisfactory semantic 
account. Normative judgements stand in the same kinds of semantic and logical relations to one 
 
301 Toppinen (2015) provides a compelling and more detailed case against this kind of view. 
302 Blackburn (1995). 
181 
 
another as do non-normative judgements. Cognitivists think that the contents of both normative 
and non-normative judgements are just propositions. They can explain why normative judgements 
stand in the semantic and logical relations that they do fairly easily, since propositions stand in 
the same kinds of logical relations to one another that judgements do. Non-cognitivists 
meanwhile defend non-propositional semantic theories. They think that the semantic contents of 
normative claims are desires, not propositions.303 That being so, it needs to be the case that those 
desires enter into the same semantic and logical relations that normative judgements do if non-
cognitivism is to succeed. For instance, it needs to be the case that the desires that are expressed 
by the normative judgement, ‘Giving to charity is right and volunteering is right’, entail the desire 
that is expressed by, ‘Giving to charity is right’. Non-cognitivists need to show why the logical 
rules, such as conjunction elimination, apply to normative claims, even though they just express 
desires. This is known as the Frege-Geach Problem.304  
Non-cognitivists typically try to solve this problem by arguing that desires to perform certain 
actions commit the speaker to desiring to perform other actions. For example, they would argue 
that ‘Giving to charity is right and volunteering is right’ entails ‘Giving to charity is right’ because 
the first claim expresses a desire to give to charity and to volunteer. Having this desire commits 
the agent to having the desire to give to charity, it is argued, and this is just the attitude that is 
expressed by ‘Giving to charity is right’.  
This kind of explanation is also used to account for the validity of modus ponens. ‘Giving to charity 
is right’ and ‘If giving to charity is right then volunteering is right’ entails ‘Volunteering is right’ 
because accepting the first judgment involves having a desire to give to charity, and accepting the 
second judgement involves having a conditional desire to volunteer if one desires to give to 
 
303 Blackburn (1988), Gibbard (2003), Schroeder (2008a) 
304 The literature on this problem is vast but some sources worth mentioning are Geach (1960, 1965), Blackburn 
(1984, 1993, chapter 10), Hale (1993), Gibbard (2003), Schroeder (2008a, 2010). 
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charity. Together these desires would commit the agent to desiring to volunteer; the attitude that 
is the semantic content of the judgement, ‘Volunteering is right’. 
Whether or not this story is ultimately plausible is not our concern here. What is important is 
that this account requires that the motivational states that constitute normative judgments are 
related to one another in very particular, systematic ways. However, if Blackburn is right that 
judging that something is ‘right’ can, for different people and at different times, consists in 
motivations to perform any number of different actions then this would not be the case. If, at 
some times, ‘Volunteering is right’, does not consist in a motivation to volunteer, but instead 
consists in, say, a motivation to encourage volunteering then it will be difficult to explain why, 
‘Volunteering is right’, is logically entailed by, ‘Giving to charity is right’, and, ‘If giving to charity 
is right then volunteering is right’. If the premises of this modus ponens express, say, a desire to 
give to charity and a desire to volunteer conditional on desiring to give to charity, but the 
conclusion expresses a desire merely to encourage volunteering then argument is not valid, since 
desiring to do something does not commit me to also desiring to encourage doing it.  
Solving the Frege-Geach problem also requires showing that if I say that something is right and 
you say that the same thing is right then we agree with each other. However, if Blackburn is right 
that one and the same normative judgement can motivate different actions then it becomes 
difficult to see how this could be. If it could be the case that my judgement that giving to charity 
is right is constituted by a motivation to perform a particular action whereas your judgement that 
giving to charity is right is constituted by a motivation to perform some other action, it is hard to 
see in virtue of what we would count as agreeing that giving to charity is right. The semantic 
content of our judgements would not in any way match. We know that Blackburn thinks that the 
conative attitudes that constitute moral judgements are fundamentally to be understood in terms 
of their mind-to-world direction of fit.305 This means that normative judgements have the same 
 
305 e.g. Blackburn (1993, p.185) 
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content only if they both consist in a disposition to change the world in the same particular 
way.306 In other words, two agents who make the same normative judgement must have the 
motivation to perform the same kind of action if they are to count as agreeing with one another 
on a non-cognitivist semantics. 
All of this is a way of saying that since non-cognitivists identify the semantic contents of our 
normative judgements with motivational states, they cannot afford to be vague or evasive when 
it comes to identifying which actions agents are motivated to perform when they make 
normative judgments. Motivational states need to stand in very particular, systematic relations to 
one another if non-cognitivist semantics are to get off the ground, but if this is the case then the 
actions I am necessarily motivated to perform if I make a normative judgement should not be 
able to vary day to day in the way that Blackburn imagines.307 
§9.3 
A different way to think about this issue is along the lines that Allan Gibbard suggests in Thinking 
How to Live.308 His idea is that when we judge other people’s actions, we judge what we should do 
if we were in their place. More precisely, he says that when we judge that “the thing to do” for 
some person is to perform a particular action then we plan to perform that action for the 
contingency of being that person in their circumstances. Similar claims will be true, mutatis 
mutandis, for other normative terms too. When Dan judges that it would be right for John to pick 
up his kids, he plans to pick up John’s kids for the contingency of being John. Having a plan is a 
motivational state on this view because it is a kind of intention. Gibbard says that thinking that 
something is the thing to do is to decide to do that thing. 
 
306 This is a potentially important disanalogy between conative and affective attitudes like love, since affective 
attitudes, we might think, cannot be understood simply in terms of the actions that they dispose us to perform. 
Scarantino and De Sousa (2018) provide a good overview of these issues. 
307 I think that Gibbard (1990) plausibly suffers from a similar problem. 
308 Gibbard (2003) 
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I think that Gibbard offers a more plausible and general account than Blackburn of what actions 
the person making a moral judgement will be motivated to perform if internalism is true, but it 
faces problems of its own. Particularly, it seems to bring the connection between normative 
judgements and action too close. Gibbard’s position borders on the kinds of strong internalism 
which I wrote off at the start of this chapter. He argues that when I plan to do something then, 
unless I change my mind, I will do that thing when the time comes. Gibbard writes: 
"For a crucial sense of 'ought' , I say, the following holds: if you do accept, in every relevant 
aspect of your mind, that you ought right now to defy the bully, then, you will do it if you can."309 
Since Gibbard thinks that normative judgements are plans, he is committed to saying that if I 
judge that I ought, all things considered, to do something then I will do it. However, it seems 
perfectly possible for someone to believe that they ought to defy the bully and not defy the bully. 
Gibbard argues that in these cases people are necessarily of two minds as to what we ought to 
do. However, this seems false. I could be wholly decided that I ought to defy the bully and not 
do it. Gibbard could say that the fact I do not defy the bully suggests that I believe that there are 
some pro tanto reasons not to do it, e.g. it might lead to me being hurt. However, this is not the 
same thing as being in two minds concerning whether, all things considered, I ought to do it. I can 
be wholly certain that some action is what I ought, all things considered, to do while also 
acknowledging that there are some weighty pro-tanto reasons not to do it.310 
A second problem is that it just does not seem plausible that all normative judgements involve 
forming plans to act in some way. We can judge that some action is wrong even if we are 
absolutely certain that we will never be faced with that situation. If I judge that it was wrong for 
Brutus to betray Caesar then, according to Gibbard, I plan to refrain from betraying Caesar for 
the contingency of being Brutus. This seems a bit farfetched. I have no reason to plan for the 
contingency of being Brutus, I know that I will never be a Roman politician existing more than 
 
309 Gibbard (2003, p.153) 
310 Scanlon (2006). 
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two millennia ago. The range of circumstances I could possibly be in is an extremely small sliver 
of the total range of possible scenarios that I can make normative judgements concerning. 
Gibbard argues that in many cases, we make plans in order to “practice” for similar situations we 
might face. While I might know that I will never be in Brutus’ position, I could well end up in 
position which shares some of its characteristics, e.g. I might be in a position to betray my 
tyrannical boss. Gibbard thinks that I will plan for being in Brutus’ position so that I can then 
apply that plan, mutatis mutandis, to similar situations I come across. 
This explanation has a ring of plausibility but it is not fully satisfying. First, the range of 
situations of which I can make normative judgements is very wide indeed, including situations 
that are so dissimilar to situations I will face that it begins to look strained to suggest that I am 
engaging with these scenarios because it is instrumentally useful for my future self. Jerry Fodor’s 
sardonic response to Steven Pinker seems appropriate here: 
“What if it turns out that, having just used the ring that I got by kidnapping a dwarf to pay off the giants 
who built me my new castle, I should discover that it is the very ring that I need in order to continue to be 
immortal and rule the world? It’s important to think out the options betimes, because a thing like that 
could happen to anyone and you can never have too much insurance.”311 
Second, there are potential situations for which we have no need of normative ‘practice’ but 
about which we can nonetheless make normative judgements. If asked whether the Holocaust 
was wrong I will of course judge that it was. There might not seem much point in my planning 
for the contingency of being a Nazi in Germany circa WW2 because, aside from anything else, 
time travel to the past is impossible. Gibbard will presumably answer that here I am getting in 
‘practice’ for situations in which I might commit genocide. The thing is, I do not need any 
‘practice’ when it comes to planning whether to commit genocide. I was already fully against 
committing genocide before I was asked whether the Holocaust was wrong. When asked 
whether the Holocaust was wrong it does not seem plausible to me that I am planning, for the 
 
311 Fodor (1998b) 
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contingency of being a Nazi in Germany circa WW2, so as to apply any lessons I may have 
learned to future situations.  
Non-cognitivists are in something of a bind. They need to argue that the motivational states that 
(they say) constitute our normative judgements are related to each other in precise and systematic 
ways in order to have a plausible semantic account, but succeeding in this enterprise commits 
them to an implausible and contrived picture of the necessary relationship between our 
normative judgements and our motivation. As we have seen the non-cognitivist has no easy way 
of explaining which motivational states we are necessarily in when we make normative 
judgements. If even the non-cognitivist cannot explain this then that should lead us to doubt that 
normative judgements are accompanied necessarily by motivational states. At the very least, if 
capturing internalism requires saying that the link between normative judgement and motivation 
is as the non-cognitivists are committed to saying that it is, then it does not seem very costly to 
the naturalist to deny internalism. 
§10 - Conclusion 
In this chapter I have circumvented the traditional internalist-externalist debate – which has 
reached an impasse – and argued against internalism in a roundabout way. I accepted that, since 
there are no necessary links between distinct existences, if internalism is true then normative 
judgements must be (at least partially) constituted by a motivational state. I then argued that 
internalism could not be true because normative judgements cannot be constituted by 
motivational states. The strength of normative judgements can change while the strength of the 
normative motivation to act on those judgement does not change, so normative judgements 
cannot be constituted by the normative motivation we have to act on them.  
Additionally, there is not a plausible account of which motivational state we are necessarily in 
when we make normative judgements that covers all the kinds of normative judgements we can 
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make. Or, at least, the necessary link that must exist between normative judgements and 
motivation if internalism is true, turns out to be so strange and contrived that it is not at all 
costly to naturalists if they cannot accommodate it. 
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Chapter 6: The Moral Twin Earth Argument 
It has been argued that naturalists struggle to accommodate certain kinds of normative 
disagreement. The most influential of these arguments come from Terry Horgan and Mark 
Timmons.312 They argue that their Moral Twin Earth thought experiments show that naturalists 
cannot explain why we morally disagree with members of certain hypothetical extra-terrestrial 
communities. In this chapter, I argue that Moral Twin Earth scenarios present problems for 
most metaethical views. That makes more palatable the responses to the Moral Twin Earth 
arguments that I go on to develop. First, I suggest that we could widen our understanding of 
‘disagreement’ in such a way that naturalists could claim that there is disagreement going on in 
Moral Twin Earth scenarios. Second, I argue that we can debunk the intuitions that Moral Twin 
Earth scenarios are supposed to pump. I start by setting up the Moral Twin Earth arguments. 
§1 
Take a form of naturalism which says that the moral property right is identical to the natural 
property maximises pleasure. Now suppose two people disagree about whether voting for the 
Labour party is good. These two people might have conflicting beliefs about whether voting for 
the Labour party maximises pleasure, in which case their moral disagreement is easily explicable. 
Equally though, they might both think that voting for the Labour party maximises pleasure but 
still disagree about whether or not it is right. How is such a form of naturalism to accommodate 
this? 
In chapter 1, I argued that a normative term could refer to a natural property even if it was not 
obvious to competent language users that that term refers to that property. If that argument was 
sound, then the problem of explaining why, if right is identical to maximises pleasure, two people 
can have a moral disagreement, against a background of broad agreement concerning the natural 
 
312 Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996, 2000, 2009, 2015), Timmons (1998). 
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facts, becomes tractable. If competence with ‘right’ does not require that I know that right is 
maximises pleasure, then competent moralisers can disagree about whether voting Labour is right 
while having the same views, or no views, about whether voting Labour maximises pleasure. Just 
as two people could seemingly disagree about whether some liquid is water without disagreeing 
about whether it is H2O, so two people could disagree about whether something is right without 
disagreeing about whether it maximises pleasure.  
One way to flesh out this kind of move is with a causal semantics. According to what Terry 
Horgan and Mark Timmons call “Boyd/Brink view” - a position which combines elements of 
Richard Boyd’s semantic theory with David Brink’s - terms refer to the particular properties that 
they do because our use of those terms is causally regulated by those natural properties. 313 On this 
kind of account, ‘water’ refers to H2O, because water’s being composed of H2O molecules 
causally regulates the sorts of things we say and do using the term ‘water’. A property can 
causally regulate our use of a term without our being aware that it does. H2O, for instance, 
guided our use of ‘water’ before the discovery that water is composed of H2O molecules. 
Because of this, ‘water’ can refer to H2O even though competent speakers could doubt or 
disagree with claims like, ‘water is H2O’. 
Similar considerations apply in the moral case, argue Boyd and Brink. Suppose that the use of a 
term like ‘right’ is, by and large, causally regulated by the natural property maximises pleasure. In 
that case, ‘right’ refers to the property maximises pleasure. Competent language users need not 
know which properties causally regulate our use of ‘right’, which explains why it is possible to 
disagree with claims like, ‘Maximising pleasure is right’, even if right is identical to maximises 
pleasure. 
 
313 Especially, Boyd (1988) and Brink (1989). 
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Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons cast doubt on this suggestion with their Moral Twin Earth 
thought experiment.314 In Hilary Putnam’s original Twin Earth thought experiment, we are asked 
to imagine a hypothetical planet Twin Earth which is just like Earth except that the water-like 
liquid that fills the lakes and rivers on Twin Earth is not composed of H2O, but is instead 
composed of some other chemical compound called ‘XYZ’. Other than that fact, Twin Earth is 
as close to Earth as possible; all the plants, animals, hills, oceans, buildings, etc. on Earth have 
exact duplicates on Twin Earth. The inhabitants of this planet, the Moral Twin Earthlings, have 
a language which is very like English, Twin English, containing a term ‘water*’ which they use 
when talking about the liquid that fills their lakes and rivers. If they were to say something like 
‘Water* is XYZ’ and we were to say ‘Water is not XYZ’ then, despite surface appearances, we 
would not really be disagreeing. ‘Water*’ denotes XYZ, whereas ‘Water’ denotes H2O, so we 
would really just talking past one another.315 
The same does not apply in the moral case, argue Horgan and Timmons. We can imagine Moral 
Twin Earth which, again, is just like Earth in almost all respects. On this planet the humanoid 
inhabitants have terms like ‘right*’ and ‘good*’, which have the same kind of  ‘practical roles’ that 
the English terms ‘right’ and ‘good’ respectively have. For instance, Moral Twin Earthlings 
typically apply ‘right*’ to actions in order to convince others to perform those actions. Generally, 
they feel some shame, guilt or regret if  they fail to perform actions they judge to be ‘right*’. 
They also censure and punish those who do not do what is deemed ‘right*’. Most of  the 
philosophers in the community might believe that if  some potential action can be accurately 
called ‘right*’ then it must be possible to perform that action. In other words, they are largely 
disposed to use ‘right*’ in the kinds of  ways and for the same reasons that we use our term 
‘right’. When I talk about the ‘practical role’ of  a normative term in what follows I will be 
referring to these kinds of  features of  a normative term’s usage.  
 
314 Particularly in Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b) 
315 Putnam (1973, 1975) 
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The key difference between English and Twin-English is that the Twin-English  term ‘right*’ is 
causally regulated by a different natural property to the property that causally regulates of  our 
use of  ‘right’. ‘Right’, Horgan and Timmons assume for the sake of  argument, is causally 
regulated by maximises pleasure, whereas ‘right*’ is causally regulated by the property had by those 
actions that Kantians on Earth would describe as ‘right’. Following Horgan and Timmons, let us 
call the property that causally regulate the use of  ‘right*’, the Kantian property. 
 
Next, Horgan and Timmons ask whether our moral terms, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’ have the 
same meaning as the Twin English terms ‘good*’, ‘bad*’, ‘right*’, ‘wrong*’, and they submit that 
it is intuitively very plausible that they do. Suppose that we and the Moral Twin Earthlings agree 
that an act of  sacrificing one to save five has the property that causally regulates our use of  
‘good’, but that it does not have the property that causally regulates the use of  the Twin English 
term ‘good*’. Now imagine that we said to a Twin Earthling, ‘Sacrificing one to save five is right’, 
and they say, ‘Sacrificing one to save five is not *right’. Intuitively, Horgan and Timmons claim, 
in making these claims we would count as disagreeing with one another, which shows that ‘right’ 
and ‘right*’ must have the same meaning.   
 
According to the Boyd/Brink view, however, the English term ‘right’ picks out a different 
property, and so has a different meaning, to the Twin English term ‘right*’. In that case, the 
Boyd/Brink view is committed to saying, falsely, that we are merely talking past the twin-
earthlings. Additionally, if the Boyd/Brink view were correct then it should seem clear to both 
parties that what the other has said is true. But intuitively we would not be inclined to think that 
what the other had said was true. So, the Boyd/Brink view must be wrong about the meaning of 
moral terms. 
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This is not just a problem for the Boyd/Brink view, it is argued. Horgan and Timmons, as well as 
several other philosophers think that this problem, or a problem very much along the same lines, 
applies to all naturalist positions.316 For instance, according to Frank Jackson’s view a term like 
‘right’ refers to the descriptive property that, were it the referent of  ‘right’, would make as many 
mature folk platitudes surrounding the use of  the word ‘right’ come out as true as possible.317 
Another way to put this is to say that, ‘right’ refers to whichever property fills the ‘rightness-role’. 
Mature folk platitudes are the claims that we would regard as platitudinous in certain ideal 
conditions. Suppose that there is a mature folk platitude that says that attacking a passer-by with 
a sword in order to test its sharpness is not right.318 If  ‘right’ referred to maximises pleasure then 
that platitude would come out as true. If  more of  these kinds of  mature folk platitudes 
surrounding ‘right’ come out as true on the supposition that ‘right’ refers to maximises pleasure 
than on the supposition that ‘right’ refers to some other property, then ‘right’ refers to maximises 
pleasure on this theory. 
 
A crucial detail for this theory is how a naturalist can spell out what makes mature folk morality 
‘ideal’. Jackson is a bit quiet on this issue but there has been plenty of  discussion of  it in the 
literature; possessing full non-moral information, having undergone a full course of  cognitive 
psychotherapy, having full imagine acquaintance, being fully coherent and being behind a ‘veil of  
ignorance’ are just some of  the criteria that have been suggested.319 But however the naturalist 
understands ‘ideal conditions’, we can imagine that the property that would make true the Moral 
Twin Earthling’s mature folk platitudes surrounding the use of  their term ‘right*’, is different to 
the natural property that makes true our mature folk platitudes surrounding ‘right’, or, put 
another way, the property that plays the rightness*-role is different to the property that plays the 
 
316 Horgan and Timmons (2000, p.149). Ridge (2014), Streumer (2017) and Enoch (2011) are three philosophers 
who think that MTE arguments present serious problems for naturalists. 
317 Jackson (1997). Horgan and Timmons’ talk about Frank Jackson’s view specifically in their (2009). 
318 The example is adapted from Midgley (1981) 
319 Firth (1952), Lewis (1989), Brink (1989), Merli (2003), Rawls (1971). 
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rightness-role. Suppose that maximises pleasure plays the rightness-role while the Kantian property 
plays the rightness* role. If  that were the case then Jackson’s theory would have it that we would 
be merely talking past the Moral Twin Earthlings if  we were to say something like, ‘Killing one 
to save five is right’, and they were to say, ‘Killing one to save five is not right*’. Intuitively, 
however, we would be disagreeing with one another, or so it is alleged. So, Jackson’s semantics is 
also found wanting. 
 
Horgan and Timmons think that this kind of  problem generalises.320 For any naturalist account, 
we can imagine a community of  Moral Twin Earthlings of  whom it is the case that (i) they have 
terms with a similar ‘practical role’ to our moral terms; (ii) intuitively, they can enter into moral 
disagreements with us using claims in their language containing those terms, and (iii) according 
to the naturalist position under examination the referents of  those terms would be different to 
the referents our moral terms. Given (iii), the naturalist cannot account for (ii), so naturalist 
accounts of  moral terms must be incorrect.321 
 
The problem is a particularly acute one for naturalists, it is argued, because other metaethical 
accounts can easily explain why we seem to disagree with the Moral Twin Earthlings. In the next 
part of  this chapter, I show that this claim can be challenged; all major metaethical theories have 
problems providing a satisfactory explanation of  why there appears to be a disagreement going 
on in these kinds of  cases. After that, I survey two ways we might solve the problem. First, we 
might argue that we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings even though the semantic content of  
 
320 Horgan and Timmons (2000). 
321 This is a reconstruction of, what Laurence, Margolis and Dawson (1999) call, Horgan and Timmons’ “direct 
argument” against naturalism. Horgan and Timmons also use the Moral Twin-Earth thought experiment to try to 
resurrect the open question argument Moore (1993), Horgan and Timmons (1992a)) and John Mackie’s queerness 
argument (Mackie 1977, Horgan and Timmons (1992b)). Though these arguments are in many ways similar to each 
other it is nevertheless important to treat them separately since what refutes one argument will not necessary refute 
all three. For instance, I addressed Horgan and Timmons’ revival of the open question argumnent in Ch.1, but what 
I said there would not defeat their ‘direct argument’ also, so I feel the need to address it in this chapter. I do not 
have anything to say about their revival of Mackie’s argument that has not already been said by Laurence, Margolis 
and Dawson (1999), so I pass over it. 
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what we say is consistent with the semantic content of  what they say. Second, we could argue 
that there is nothing to explain; appearances are deceptive and in fact there is no disagreement 
taking place. 
 
§2 - Why Explaining Moral Disagreement is a Shared Problem 1 
I argued in chapter 1 that the open question argument was a problem for most metaethical 
theories. The open question argument affects all analyses of normative concepts, and most 
metaethical theories involve the analysis of some normative concepts. While non-naturalists, 
error theorists and non-cognitivists might not analyse normative concepts in natural terms, they 
do tend to analyse some normative concepts in terms of other normative concepts. For example, 
according to Parfit’s theory when we call something good we mean, roughly, that something 
about it gives us a reason to respond in a certain positive way to it such as wanting it, preserving 
it, choosing it, etc.322 Since it is possible to doubt claims like, ‘Something is good iff something 
about it gives us a reason to respond to it positively’, the open question argument also applies to 
these views. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of the Moral Twin Earth argument. 
Suppose that in ideal circumstances we would be disposed towards accepting a kind of  value 
fundamentalism, like the one defended by G.E. Moore. Particularly, we would apply ‘right’ to 
actions only if  we believe that they would produce the greatest amount of  good in the universe. 
Now suppose that on Moral Twin Earth they have terms ‘right*’ and ‘good*’ which play very 
similar respective practical roles to our terms ‘right’ and ‘good’. We can even imagine they are 
disposed to apply ‘good*’ in exactly the same circumstances that we would use ‘good’. Let us 
suppose that both ‘good’ and ‘good*’ would be used to refer, in ideal circumstances, to things 
that cause pleasure. However, Moral Twin Earthlings, in ideal conditions, would apply their term 
‘right*’ to some actions which they would not also be disposed to apply their expression 
 
322 Parfit (2011a, p.34) 
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‘produces the greatest amount of  good* in the universe’ to. For instance, they could think that if  
an action involves killing someone then it cannot be ‘right*’ even if  it produces the greatest 
amount of  ‘good*’ in the universe. We, however, would say that whenever an action counts as 
‘right’ it must be the case that ‘produce the greatest amount of  good’ can also be applied to it. 
 
Do we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings about what is right in this case or are we merely 
talking past each other? I maintain that, intuitively, it just as plausible that we genuinely disagree 
here as it is in Horgan and Timmons’ original Moral Twin Earth example. This is a problem for 
these views. ‘Right’, in the present example, refers to the property produces the greatest amount of  
good, whereas ‘right*’ cannot plausibly be said to. We should be merely talking past Moral Twin 
Earthlings, but (assuming the intuitions pumped by Moral Twin Earth examples are what 
Horgan and Timmons claim) intuitively this is not the case. 
 
We can apply the same line of  argument to those views that reduce evaluative concepts to reason 
concepts. According to T.M. Scanlon, to say that something is ‘good’ is to say that it has the 
property of  having other properties which provide reasons to choose, prefer or recommend it.323 
Suppose that Scanlon is correct about what ‘good’ means. Now suppose that on Moral Twin 
Earth they have terms like ‘good*’ and ‘reason*’ which work much like ‘good’ and ‘reason’. A 
difference however is that, even in ideal conditions, they would not think that something is 
‘good*’ only if  it has the property of  having other properties which provide ‘reasons*’ to choose, 
prefer or recommend it. They would be swayed by arguments made by Twin-Roger Crisp and 
other Twin-philosophers, who say that we can sometimes have a ‘reason*’ to choose, prefer or 
recommend something that is not ‘good*’, and that we can sometimes lack a ‘reason*’ to choose, 
prefer or recommend something that is ‘good*’.324 Now suppose we were to say, ‘If  something is 
 
323 Scanlon (2000, pp. 96-97. 2014, p.2). 
324 Crisp (2000, 2005, 2008). D’Arms and Jacobson (2000a, 2000b). Rabinowicz and Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). 
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good then we must have a reason to choose, prefer or recommend it’, and they were to say, ‘It is 
not the case that if  something is good* then we must have a reason to choose prefer or 
recommend it’. Intuitively it is about as plausible that there is a disagreement going on here as it 
is in the original Moral Twin-Earth case. But the Moral Twin earthlings could not be using 
‘good*’ to pick out the property has properties which provide reasons to choose, prefer or recommend it. So, 
we cannot explain why there seems to be disagreement in terms of  our and their claims having 
inconsistent semantic contents. 
 
We could apply the same line of  argument, mutatis mutandis, to other views which hold that we 
can analyse normative concepts in terms of  other normative concepts or reduce normative 
concepts to other normative concepts. For most mainstream views we consider of  the relation 
between concepts of, say, reasons and obligation, value and desirability, wrongness and 
blameworthiness, etc. we will be able to imagine a Moral Twin Earth scenario on which it 
appears to be the case that they accept some other conflicting view. This means that, if  Horgan 
and Timmons’ argument is sound, then it would rule out most views of  normative concepts. 
This fact should make us suspicious that the argument is a telling one. 
 
§3 - Why Explaining Moral Disagreement is a Shared Problem 2 
§3.1 
I just showed that any views which analyse normative concepts (be they normative or non-
normative analyses) will be potentially weak to Moral Twin Earth arguments. Most non-
naturalist, error theorist and non-cognitivist theories involve at least some analyses of normative 
concepts, so naturalists are not uniquely vulnerable to these worries. However, it is possible for 
non-naturalists, error theorists and non-cognitivists to deny that there are any analytic or 
conceptually necessary links between normative concepts. To bolster my line of argument then I 
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show that non-naturalists, error theorists and non-cognitivists are vulnerable to Moral Twin 
Earth scenarios in other ways. 
§3.2 Non-Naturalism (and Error Theory) 
Non-naturalists and error theorists appear, at first blush, to have an easy time explaining why we 
seem to disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings. Non-naturalists and error theorists will say that 
both ‘right’ and ‘right*’ attempt to refer to the non-natural, sui generis property right.325 Error 
theorists will think that neither term succeeds in referring to right, since they think that there is 
no such property, while non-naturalists think that ‘right’ or ‘right*’ could successfully refer to 
right. In either case, ‘X is right’, and, ‘X is not right*’, will express inconsistent propositions. In 
what follows I will focus on just the non-naturalist, but what I say for them goes for the error 
theorist too. 
The non-naturalist is not entitled to simply help themselves to the claim that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ 
refer to the same property, they must provide an explanation of it. It clearly would not be 
acceptable for the naturalist to refuse to give any theory of reference-determination, and simply 
insist that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ refer to the same natural property, in order to rebut Horgan and 
Timmons’ challenge. Likewise, the non-naturalist cannot just insist that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ must 
refer to the same non-natural property. In the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment, in ideal 
circumstances, Earthlings apply ‘right’ to actions which maximise pleasure, whereas in the same 
ideal conditions Twin Earthlings apply ‘right*’ to actions which have the Kantian property. The 
non-naturalist needs to tell us what makes it the case that ‘right*’ denotes the same thing that 
‘right’ does, and not some other property, like, for instance, the Kantian property. 
 
325 Non-naturalists and error theorists may say instead that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ denotes some other normative 
property that rightness reduces to such as the property is what we have most reason to do. In that case, we could then 
reapply the same argument to whatever they take to be the most fundamental normative properties that normative 
terms refer to. 
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This will be difficult to do because the hypothesis that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ denote the same 
property is very uncharitable. If in ideal circumstances we and Moral Twin earthlings denote right 
with ‘right’ and ‘right*’, but we apply those terms to different actions, then either we make a lot 
of false claims containing ‘right’ or they make a lot of false claims containing ‘right*’. Assuming 
that we are reasonably confident in the truth of our own moral judgements, if they denote is right 
with ‘right*’ then many of their claims containing ‘right*’ would come out as false. This 
contravenes a commonly accepted principle of interpretation, which roughly has it that we 
ought, ceteris paribus, to translate terms such that sentences in which those terms are embedded 
come out true.326 The hypothesis that Moral Twin Earthlings use ‘right*’ to denote the Kantian 
property conforms perfectly with this principle, unlike the hypothesis that ‘right*’ denotes the 
same non-natural property that ‘right’ does. Since the non-naturalist’s translation of the term 
‘right*’ contravenes a basic principle of interpretation they need to provide us with a strong 
countervailing reason to accept it. 
Non-naturalists could argue that the similarities in ‘practical role’ show that we and Moral Twin 
Earthlings are trying to denote the same property. In the thought experiment both Moral Twin 
Earthlings are disposed to use ‘right*’ in the same kinds of ways that we use ‘right’, e.g. they are 
motivated to do what they judge to be ‘right*’, they reliably feel guilty for failing to do what they 
think is ‘right*’, they shame others if they do not do what is deemed ‘right*’, etc.  
However, I think that this explanation fits uncomfortably with other parts of the non-naturalist 
account. Non-naturalists typically believe that all that is required to judge that some action is, say, 
right is to have the belief that that action has a particular sui generis property. So, on the non-
naturalist account, someone can believe that some action is right without necessarily being 
motivated to do it, without feeling any guilt for failing to do it and without satisfying the other 
criteria that non-cognitivists take to be necessary for judging that something is right. In fact, it is 
 
326 The loci classici for discussions of this principle are Quine (1960) and Davidson (1973). 
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consistent with the non-naturalist story that I might believe that something is right while being 
reliably motivated to refrain from doing it, if I am (substantively) irrational enough. I might even 
believe that something is right and consistently praise people for refraining from doing it if I am 
an immoralist. 327 All that being so, the fact that the Moral Twin Earthling term ‘right*’ has a 
particular ‘practical role’ tells us nothing about its denotation if the rest of the non-naturalist 
story is correct. For all the non-naturalist tells us, Moral Twin Earthlings could be immoralists who 
use their term ‘right*’ to denote the sui generis property is wrong and ‘wrong*’ to denote the 
property is right. On this hypothesis, Moral Twin Earthlings shame people for failing to do what 
they believe is wrong, and they are usually motivated to do what they believe is forbidden 
because it is wrong. The non-naturalist lacks grounds for saying that Moral Twin Earthlings use 
‘right*’ to denote is right rather than is wrong, or any other property, based on the ‘practical role’ 
that ‘right*’ has. 
A caveat to that is that non-naturalists can adopt some kinds of motivational internalism. For 
example, they can say that anyone who judges that something is right is necessarily motivated to 
do it if they are fully (substantively) rational.328 However, that does not affect the point I am making. 
We have no guarantee that the Moral Twin Earthlings are fully substantively rational, so the fact 
that they are typically motivated to do whatever they describe as ‘right*’, would not show us that 
it must have the same meaning as ‘right’, even if the kinds of internalism that are compatible 
with non-naturalism were true.329 
Non-naturalists might point out that in many paradigmatic cases ‘right’ and ‘right*’ will be 
applied to the same actions in order to ground the claim that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ must refer to the 
same property.330 Arguably, utilitarians and Kantians will largely see eye-to-eye when it comes to 
 
327 Dreier (1990), Lenman (2003b). 
328 I discussed this in the last chapter also. 
329 Because of this, I do not think that non-naturalists can use a Ralph Wedgwood-style conceptual role semantics to 
explain why ‘right*’ and ‘right’ denote the same property. 
330 Thank you to James Lenman for this suggestion. 
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paradigmatic moral cases. They will both think, for instance, that killing is usually not right and 
that helping someone in need usually is. Since the Moral Twin Earthlings describe as ‘right*’ 
those actions which a Kantian would describe as ‘right’, ‘right’ and ‘right*’ will arguably both be 
applied to many of the same actions. The non-naturalist might try to use this fact to argue that 
‘right’ and ‘right*’ must have the same referent. 
However, I think that there are three problems with this move. Firstly, it is not clear to me that 
utilitarians and Kantians do in fact agree all that much. For example, utilitarians think that every 
single action that someone could perform other than the ones that maximises utility are morally 
wrong. Presumably, that will mean that, even in paradigm cases, for many of the possible actions 
that utilitarians will call ‘wrong’, the Kantian will call them ‘permissible’. And, for many of the 
actions that a utilitarian regards as ‘obligatory’, the Kantian is going to call it either ‘wrong’ or 
‘superogatory’. If the Twin Earthling use of ‘right*’ mirrors the Kantians use of ‘right’ then, we 
should not assume that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ will be applied in the same way even in paradigm 
cases.  
Second, it is arguably not crucial that Moral Twin Earthlings do apply ‘right*’ to the same actions 
we apply ‘right’ to, in order to generate the intuition that we disagree with them. Years before 
Horgan and Timmons introduced Moral Twin Earth, R.M. Hare pumped more or less the same 
intuitions with his Missionary and the Cannibals example. Hare imagines that we encounter a 
community of cannibals who have a word ‘good*’ which they use to refer to the taking of 
scalps.331 Naturalist theories, Hare argued, would have it that we would not really disagree with 
the cannibals if we were to say, ‘Scalp hunting is not good’, and they were to say, ‘Scalp hunting 
is good*’, rather, each of us would be saying something true in our own language. But, intuitively 
we seem to disagree with the cannibals about what is good, or so it is claimed. 
 
331 Hare, (1952, ch.5). Horgan and Timmons (1996) and Timmons (1998) acknowledge the similarity between their 
argument and Hare’s, but they deny that they were influenced by it. 
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If those intuitions count against the naturalist then, the non-naturalist also has a problem. Even 
if utilitarians and Kantians will agree about the moral status of many actions (e.g. Killing, 
torturing and theft are usually wrong), the same cannot be said of us and the cannibals. Since 
‘good’ and ‘good*’ will be applied to such different kinds of actions, the non-naturalists will have 
a hard time convincing us that both terms must refer to the sui generis property good. 
Finally, as we just saw, for all the non-naturalist says, Moral Twin Earthlings could be immoralists 
who use ‘right*’ to denote is wrong. If for every action that we judge to be right, they judge it to 
be wrong, and vice versa, then they could apply ‘right*’ to exactly the same actions that we apply 
‘right’ to, without ‘right’ and ‘right*’ having the same referent. That being so, the non-naturalist 
needs some reason other than the fact that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ have the same application in 
paradigm cases to justify their claim that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ both refer to the non-natural 
property right.  
I cannot rule out that the non-naturalist and error theorist could come up with some other 
explanation of why ‘right’ and ‘right*’, or ‘good’ and ‘good*’ must refer to the same sui generis 
moral property, but it is hard to see what it could be. Until they provide one, the non-naturalist  
has no better explanation of why we intuitively seem to disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings 
than the naturalist does.  
§3.3 Non-Cognitivism 
At first blush, non-cognitivists seem to fare better than non-naturalists. Since non-cognitivists 
think that the semantic contents of normative terms are, in a sense, determined by the ‘practical 
role’ of those terms, they can give a more plausible-seeming explanation of why ‘right’ and 
‘right*’ must have the same semantic content.332 If it is the practical role of normative terms to 
express desires, and if the content of normative terms is determined by their practical role, then 
 
332 Gibbard (1992) gives a particularly good discussion of this. 
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since ‘right’ and ‘right*’ have the same kind of practical roles they will have the same semantic 
content. If the similarity in the practical roles of the terms ‘right’ and ‘right*’ suffices for their 
having the same semantic content then we and the Moral Twin Earthlings would disagree if we 
were to say, ‘Sacrificing one to save five is right’, and they were to say, ‘Sacrificing one to save 
five is not right*’. This is Horgan and Timmons’ position. 
However, this explanation has implausible consequences. Consider the following example: 
Moral Twin Earth 2 
Moral Twin Earth 2 is in most respects just like Earth and Twin-Earth. On Moral Twin Earth 2, however, 
the humanoid inhabitants have a term ‘right**’ which they apply to actions only if those actions result in 
hedgehogs being looked at in the light of the moon.333 They do not call actions which result in hedgehogs 
being looked at in the light of the moon ‘right**’ because they believe that looking at hedgehogs in the 
light of the moon has certain effects, e.g. they don’t call actions ‘right**’ because they think that hedgehog-
watching is fun or that it improves health. They say that actions which result in hedgehogs being looked at 
in the light of the moon can be described as ‘right**’, simply because it is ‘right**’ in and of itself for 
hedgehogs to be looked at in the light of the moon and that no further explanation can be given. At the 
same time, ‘right**’ has the same kind of ‘practical role’ in the lives of the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 
2 that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ has in the lives of Earthlings and Moral Twin earthlings respectively. For instance, 
they are typically motivated to do what they deem ‘right**’ and they shame others who fail to do actions 
that they deem ‘right**’. 
I submit that when we say, ‘Giving to charity is right’, and the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 2 
say, ‘Giving to charity is not right**’, we are not intuitively disagreeing about what is morally 
right.334 The inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 2 are too different and too strange to really count 
as engaging in substantive moral discussion with us or being within the same moral community 
as us. In other words, the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 2 simply do not seem to count as 
having any interest in what is morally right at all and they really are talking past us. However, 
according to the non-cognitivists account we have considered so far we disagree with the 
inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 2 because both ‘right’ and ‘right**’ have the same practical role. 
Since sameness of practical role does not mean that we and the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 
 
333 This example is taken from Foot (1979, p.102). 
334 Rubin (2014). 
203 
 
2 disagree, it cannot explain why we disagree with the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth either. 
So, the simple non-cognitivist explanation of why we seem to disagree with Moral Twin 
Earthlings does not work either.  
One way to get around the problem would be for the non-cognitivists to say that the semantic 
content of normative terms is determined by more than simply ‘practical role’. They could, for 
instance, agree with Philippa Foot that a term can only be a moral term if that term is governed 
by standards that regulate harms and benefits.335 On this view, when we say that some action is 
‘right’ we primarily express a desire to perform that action, but we also express a background 
belief that that action is appropriately related to the prevention of harms or the promotion of 
benefits.  This kind of strategy could be used to get round cases like Moral Twin Earth 2. Since 
the use of ‘right**’ is not governed by standards that regulate harms and benefits it does not 
count as a moral term, so this non-cognitivist account is not forced to say that ‘right’ and 
‘right**’ have the same content, nor that we and inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 2 count as 
being in a moral disagreement.  
At the same time, the descriptive constraints that are placed on moral terms are relaxed enough 
that non-cognitivists can still explain why we and the inhabitants of the Moral Twin Earth 
disagree with another in the original thought experiment. Both ‘right’ and ‘right*’ are plausibly 
constrained by standards that regulate harms and benefits. The actions these terms are used to 
describe may promote different benefits or promote the same benefits to different degrees but 
the constraints on what counts as a moral term are minimal enough that these differences are not 
sufficient to show that they are not both moral terms. That being so, the non=cognitivist can say 
that, given the sameness of their ‘practical role’, and given that they are both meet the same 
 
335 This is the strategy that Rubin (2014) pursues. See also Hare (1952) and Gibbard (1992). 
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minimal descriptive constraints, ‘right’ and ‘right*’ have the same meaning, and so they can 
explain why we and the original Moral Twin Earthlings disagree. 
However, I think that this more nuanced non-cognitivist account is vulnerable to further 
examples like the following: 
 Moral Twin Earth 3 
Moral Twin Earth 3 is in most respects just like Earth, Moral Twin Earth and Moral Twin Earth 2. 
However, the humanoid inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 3 have a term ‘right***’ which has the same kind 
of ‘practical role’ as ‘right’, but whose use is governed by some natural property other than the one that 
governs our use of ‘right’. One important difference is that ‘right***’ is not governed by standards that 
regulate harms and benefits, instead it is governed merely by standards that regulate harms. Inhabitants of 
Moral Twin Earth 3 do not care about benefits, except insofar as they are privations of harm. They really 
want to minimise harm, but are indifferent to benefiting others beyond the point of their being free from 
harm. 
Suppose that we were to say, ‘Giving birthday cards to friends is right’, and inhabitants of Moral 
Twin Earth 3 say, ‘It is not the case that Giving birthday cards to friends is right***’. In my view, 
it is about as plausible that there is a disagreement going on about what is right as it was in the 
original Moral Twin Earth case. This is a problem for the more nuanced kind of non-cognitivism 
I am considering because ‘right***’ should not come out as a genuine moral term, since its use is 
not governed by standards that regulate harms and benefits, only harms. By adding even minimal 
descriptive content to their account of normative judgement to get round examples like Moral 
Twin Earth 2, non-cognitivists end up being vulnerable to the same kinds of worries that affect 
ordinary descriptivist accounts. 
That might seem to merely suggest that the kinds of descriptive constraints that Foot suggested 
for moral terms are too demanding. A non-cognitivist might argue that the semantic constraints 
should be much lesser than this, such that inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 3 do count as using 
moral terminology but inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth 2 still do not. To settle the matter we 
would need to hear in more detail what the descriptive constraints are on moral terms, but I 
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suspect that similar problems will arise for any constraints we suggest. Whatever the constraints 
on moral terms like ‘right’, we will be able to imagine another community who have a term 
‘right****’ which has the same practical role as ‘right’ but slightly different descriptive constraints, 
and with whom we can intuitively disagree about what is right. Since ‘right****’ will not meet the 
descriptive constraints necessary for counting as a moral term, it should not have the same 
meaning as ‘right’, so we will be at loss for how to explain why we intuitively disagree when we 
say ‘X is right’ and they say ‘X is not right****’.  
So, while I think that non-cognitivists can get round problems arising from scenarios like Moral 
Twin Earth 2 by adding descriptive content to their account of normative terms, they are then 
unable to explain why we intuitively disagree with some hypothetical speakers who have terms 
with the same practical role as our normative terms but slightly different descriptive content, as 
in Moral Twin Earth 3.  
The best way to explain cases like Moral Twin Earth 2 then, may be for the non-cognitivist to 
simply bite the bullet. This seems costly to me (though admittedly not fatal). Intuitively, the 
inhabitants of that world do not have anything that could be considered a moral concept. It 
seems odd to think that they are trying to find out what is right and good and they have 
spectacularly missed the mark, rather than thinking that they are interested in other things.  
Having established that there are some potential costs for any account arising from Moral Twin 
Earth-style scenarios I move on to sketch two ways that the naturalist might solve the 
problem.336 
 
336 It might be objected that my partners in guilt style argument is incomplete because I have not talked about, what 
Max Kölbel (2004) calls, ‘genuine relativism’; a position motivated largely by its supposed ability to handle 
disagreement. I have not talked about this position in the main text because I do not think that relativist explanation 
of moral disagreement even gets off the ground. I will say why briefly now. 
  
Genuine relativists argue that moral claims express propositions which are never absolutely true but only ever true 
relative to a circumstance of evaluation. According to one form of genuine relativism, when we, who are utilitarians, say, 
‘An action is right iff it maximises pleasure’, we express the proposition - An action is right iff it maximises pleasure – 
which is not simply true or false, but is true relative to their own normative outlook and false relative to, the Twin 
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§4 – Non-Content Based Disagreement 
Naturalism entails that the semantic contents of our moral claims like, ‘An action is right iff it 
maximises happiness’, are not inconsistent with the semantic contents of Moral Twin Earthling 
claims like, ‘It is not the case that an action is right* iff it maximises happiness’. This makes it 
difficult to explain why we intuitively seem to be disagreeing with Moral Twin Earthlings. One 
way to solve the problem would be to argue that we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings despite 
the fact that the semantic contents of our respective claims are not inconsistent. Let us call cases 
where we disagree, despite the fact that the semantic contents of our utterances could both be 
true, non-content based disagreements.  
There are plausibly many examples of non-content based disagreement. Some of the most discussed 
cases of potential non-content based disagreement concern taste. Many people think that two 
people can disagree about what is, say, tasty or funny without either of those people necessarily 
saying something that is false.337 If I say that aubergines are tasty and you say that they are not 
then we seem to disagree, but, so goes the thought, neither of us necessarily say something that 
has false semantic content.  
 
Earthlings’ outlook. Relativists think that they can explain easily why we disagree in these cases since we have 
inconsistent beliefs about the proposition - An action is right iff it maximises pleasure; we think that it is true and Moral 
Twin Earthlings think that it is false.  
 
However, I do not think that this account really explains why we and Twin-Earthlings disagree, rather, it just 
presents the superficial appearance of explaining disagreement. Either, we and they disagree about whether one and 
the same proposition is absolutely true, or we and they disagree about whether that proposition is true relative to a 
particular circumstance of evaluation. The first option is incompatible with relativism since they think that moral 
propositions are never absolutely true or false. The second option does not explain the disagreement between us and 
Twin-Earthlings, since we might agree entirely about which circumstances of evaluation the proposition - an action is 
right iff it maximises pleasure – is true relative to, while still disagreeing. We and they might agree that it is true relative to a 
utilitarian outlook but false relative to a Kantian outlook that an action is right iff it maximises pleasure, but disagree 
about whether an action is right iff it maximises pleasure, so whence the disagreement? (James Dreier makes the 
same kind of point well in his (2009)). 
 
To his credit, John MacFarlane, a genuine relativist, recognises that the simple relativist account of disagreement 
does not work (MacFarlane, 2007). The account of disagreement he offers instead is along the quasi-expressivist 
lines that I look at shortly. Since that kind of explanation is open to naturalists I do not need to talk about genuine 
relativism any more. 
 
337 The literature on this topic is large; see the references in Zeman (forthcoming). 
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We do not, however, need to commit ourselves to any position on these controversial topics in 
order to show that there are non-content based disagreements. Uncontroversial examples of this 
kinds of disagreement are the following:  
A: John has one leg. 
B: I disagree. John has both his legs. 
A: John said that Jane was from London. 
B: I disagree. Jane is from Leeds. 
What A says in the first example has true semantic content iff John has one leg. That is not 
logically inconsistent with B’s claim that John has two legs; in fact B’s claim entails A’s claim. 
However, B will assume based on what A has said, that A believes that John has only one leg. The 
reason, according to Paul Grice’s classic account, is that it is assumed that when we converse 
with someone we try to communicate a sufficient amount of information given the context of 
the conversation.338 It is more informative to say that John has two legs than to say that John has 
one leg, since John having two legs entails that John has one leg but not vice versa. Since B 
assumes that A wants to provide sufficient information with their utterance, B will assume that A 
does not believe that John has two legs, for if they did then they would have said so. Since B 
disagrees with the belief that John does not have two legs, B disagree with A, even though they 
believe that what A has said is strictly speaking true. The disagreement here is a result of the 
pragmatics – the practical purpose for which the speakers make their utterances – rather than the 
semantics – the literal meaning, or truth-value of the utterance – of what has been said.  
The second example works in a similar way. An indirect speech report can function not just to 
convey the information that someone said something, but also to imply or suggest that the 
content of what that person said is correct. In a context where it will be taken for granted that a 
speaker will be reporting what someone else has said faithfully, expressions of disagreement can 
be understood as contesting the content of the utterance that is being reported. This is what we 
 
338 Grice (1989) 
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see in the second example. Here B disagrees with the content of what John is reporting to have 
said and not the claim that John said it. 
Similarly, some naturalists argue, we can disagree with someone’s normative claim where we 
disagree with some information or content that that claim communicates, which is distinct from 
the semantic content of that claim. This presents us with an opportunity to explain why we 
disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings when we say, ‘X is right’, and they say, ‘X is not right*’. 
There are several different suggestions for what the disagreement in these cases concerns. I will 
briefly sketch three suggestions, without stopping to assess their relative merits. 
According to one view, moral disagreements are often metalinguistic disagreements concerning what 
certain terms mean or how they are, or should be, applied.339 The classic example of 
metalinguistic disagreement is the following: 
A: Secretariat is the greatest athlete of the 20th Century. 
B: I disagree, Secretariat is not an athlete. 
The disagreement here is not about the Secretariat’s achievements or physical prowess, rather, it 
concerns whether ‘athlete’ is the kind of term that can correctly be applied to horses as well as 
humans. Some naturalists want to say that moral disagreements are often just metalinguistic 
disagreements concerning the meaning of moral terms. Applied to Moral Twin-Earth, the 
thought would be that we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings when we say, ‘X is right’ and they 
say ‘X is not right*’ because our claim expresses the judgement that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ are, or 
should be, used in such a way that they can both be applied to X.  
According to another view, two people can count as disagreeing if their normative claims 
attempt to update the conversational common ground in inconsistent ways.340 The conversational 
common ground is, roughly, the set of things which are taken for granted by participants to a 
 
339 Plunkett & Sundell (2013) and Silk (2016).  
340 Khoo and Knobe (2018). This is a common strategy when accounting for disagreements concerning epistemic 
modals, see e.g. Stalnaker (2014). 
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conversation. Joshua Khoo and Justin Knobe suggest that norms, as well as propositions or 
beliefs, are part of the conversational common ground. In other words, they think that 
participants to a conversation tacitly acknowledge certain rules concerning how they should or 
should not behave. When we make a normative claim like, ‘Stealing is wrong’, we try to update 
the conversational common ground so that it contains a norm like Don’t steal. On this view, we 
would disagree with someone who says, ‘Stealing is not wrong’, because, by making that 
utterance, they are trying to update the common ground so that it contains a conflicting norm. 
We can apply this view to Moral Twin Earth too. Because ‘right’ and ‘right*’ have the same kind 
of practical roles, utterances containing them might be said to attempt to update the norms of 
the conversational common ground. If we were to talk with them and we were to say that 
something is ‘right’ and they were to say that the same thing is ‘not right*’, we will disagree with 
each other because we would be trying to update the norms of the conversational common 
ground in inconsistent ways. 
Finally, we have the quasi-expressivist view.341 This is an attempt by naturalists to co-opt the non-
cognitivists account of moral disagreement. Very roughly, the idea is that someone who says, ‘X 
is right’ disagrees with someone who says, ‘X is not right’ because their claims express inconsistent 
attitudes. According to non-cognitivists, ‘X is right’ expresses a kind of desire, which is 
inconsistent with the desire expressed by ‘X is not right’. While naturalists disagree with non-
cognitivists that the semantic contents of moral claims are desires, naturalists can say that moral 
claims express desires due to the pragmatics of moral discourse. There are multiple ways to spell 
this out, but one thought goes that part of the function of moral discourse is to influence people’s 
behaviour and attitudes. For instance, if someone says, ‘Stealing is wrong’, then part of their 
reason for speaking is to convince others not to steal. Because of this, someone who makes a 
moral claim will be understood as expressing a desire that people act in such-and-such a way and 
 
341 Merli (2004), Björnsson and Finlay (2010), Björnsson and Almér (2009, 2011), Evers (2011), Finlay (2014, 2017).  
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if this desire is inconsistent with the desires of others, they will be in disagreement with them. 
Since we know that Moral Twin Earthling terms like ‘right*’ have the same ‘practical roles’ as 
terms like ‘right’ they will also express desires. Since Moral Twin Earthlings would, under ideal 
conditions, apply ‘right*’ differently to how we apply ‘right’, they will express desires which are 
inconsistent with our desires, so we will disagree with them. 
Naturalists then have several options for how to explain why we can be in a moral disagreement 
with the inhabitants of Moral Twin Earth, even though the semantic contents of what we say is 
not inconsistent with the semantic content of what they say. I do not go into which is the best 
theory because they all share one very serious problem which I will talk about now.342   
§4.1 – Disagreement and Truth-Assessments. 
Since these naturalist accounts locate the source of our disagreement in the pragmatics and not the 
semantics of moral claims, they are all vulnerable to a powerful objection. They cannot explain 
why, when we morally disagree with someone, we will also be inclined to say that what they have 
said is false.343 If, according to naturalist semantics, the Twin English term ‘right*’ picks out the 
Kantian-property then we should be disposed to say that Moral Twin Earthlings speak truly 
when they say things like, ‘It is not the case that an action is right* iff it maximises utility’. But, 
assuming again that we are utilitarians, we would not do this. We would say that they have 
spoken falsely. It is not enough for the naturalist to locate any old source of conflict and use that 
to explain why we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings, they need to also explain why we regard 
moral claims we disagree with as false.344  
 
342 I also do not need to discuss which is the best strategy because Finlay (2017) has already convincingly shown that 
the rivals to the quasi-expressivist theory are either clearly inferior to it or that they collapse into a form of it. 
343 Ridge (2014), MacFarlane (2007), Richard (2011). This objection would also apply to other naturalist accounts 
which have it that normative disagreements are non-content based. 
344 This problem, arguably, does not affect the ordinary non-cognitivist since they think that to say that a moral 
claim is true only ever to amounts expressing the same attitude that is the semantic content of that claim. See Dreier 
(1996) for why this tactic is difficult for the non-cognitivist to pull off. 
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Some naturalists have challenged this.345 They point out that we can sometimes attribute falsity to 
someone’s utterance even where the literal semantic content of what they have said is a true 
proposition346, such as in the following cases: 
A: John has one leg. 
B: That’s false, John two legs. 
A: John said that Jane was from London 
B: That’s false, Jane is from Leeds. 
The thought goes that our truth or falsity attributions can sometimes be used, not to assess the 
truth-value of the literal semantic content of what is said, but to signal a disagreement with 
something that is pragmatically expressed by the utterance. Where the pragmatic content, rather 
than the semantic content, is more salient in certain conversational contexts, phrases like ‘That’s 
false’, will be understood as targeting that pragmatic content. The point of moral discourse is 
primarily about influencing action and aligning our attitudes, so our truth and falsity attributions 
to moral claims can be understood not as assessments of the literal truth or falsity of the 
proposition semantically expressed, but, rather, as a means of expressing pragmatically expressed 
content which conflicts with the pragmatically expressed content of the other party’s utterance.347  
Michael Ridge objects that even if this were the case, we should still be able to assess the literal 
truth of the semantic content of an utterance by using phrases like ‘literally true’ and ‘strictly 
speaking false’ or by simply clarifying what we mean.348 Consider this example: 
A: John said that Jane was from London. 
B: What you said is literally true; that is indeed what John said. However, John was lying, Jane is not from 
London.  
 
345 Björnsson and Finlay (2010), Björnsson and Almér (2011), Evers (2011). 
346 Björnsson and Finlay (2010) p.19 
347 Björsson and Almér (2011), Evers (2011). 
348 Ridge (2014, ch.3) 
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If the naturalist semantics were correct then we should be able to do something similar in the 
moral case. We should be able to have discussions like the following: 
Moral Twin earthling: It is not the case that an action is right* iff it maximises utility. 
Earthling: What you have said is literally true. Though to be clear I disagree with you; I desire to perform 
actions only if they maximise utility. 
But intuitively such claims are very strange. This suggests that naturalist semantics are incorrect, 
since we do not regard the Moral Twin Earthlings claims as being even ‘literally’ or ‘strictly 
speaking’ true, but according to naturalists we should. 
Addressing this issue, Gunnar Björnsson and Alexander Almér suggest that in the moral case, 
unlike the indirect speech case, ordinary speakers just do not ever concern themselves with the 
literal semantic content of what is said; that is primarily of interest only to philosophers and 
linguists.349 Because the role of moral talk is to coordinate action and align attitudes, assessments 
of the truth or falsity of moral claims only ever target the conative attitude expressed, even if 
qualified by expressions like ‘really’ or ‘strictly speaking’. This means that, there is no context in 
which we will say that the Moral Twin Earthlings moral utterances are true, since saying that 
would express a desire not to maximise utility at all times; a desire which, assuming we are 
utilitarians, we do not have. 
This reply seems to me to be a bit of a stretch. The semantic content of moral claims now 
appears to be doing almost no work in explaining how and why we use moral language in the 
way that we do. If the literal semantic content of moral claims cannot be assessed by ordinary 
speakers with claims like, ‘That’s true’, then it seems hard to see in virtue of what that content 
constitutes the meaning of the claim in question. If agreeing with a moral claim or believing that 
claim to be true only ever amounts, in the everyday contexts that ordinary speakers make moral 
claims, to expressing a particular conative attitude, then we begin to lose our grip on why this 
 
349 (2009, 2011). 
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account is naturalist and not just non-cognitivist. In other words, then the naturalist’s semantic 
account seems to have fallen away altogether.350 
That worry might seem a bit nebulous so allow me to sharpen the point. A good reason not to 
take Almér and Björnsson’s approach is that by doing so we will incur the problems that beset 
non-cognitivists. I will mention just one problem. Take the following modus ponens: 
Giving to charity is right. 
If giving to charity is right then volunteering is right. 
Therefore, volunteering is right. 
If I agree with the premises then I am committed to agreeing with the conclusion also. Standard 
naturalist accounts can explain this easily; since the truth of the propositional content of the 
premises entails the truth of the propositional content of the conclusion on those accounts, 
anyone who believes the premises to be true must also think that the conclusion is true. 
According to Almer and Björnsson’s story however, in ordinary contexts, agreeing with moral 
claims or believing them to be true only ever amounts to having the same conative attitude as the 
attitude expressed by those claims. In that case, they need to give a different story of why 
someone who agrees with the premises is committed to agreeing with the conclusion. They need 
to tell us why someone who desires to give to charity, and desires to volunteer if they desire to 
give to charity, is rationally bound to desire to volunteer. In other words, they need to solve a 
version of the Frege-Geach problem that plagues non-cognitivists; a problem I mentioned in the 
last chapter. More specifically, they need to solve a version of the Frege-Geach problem put 
forward by Mark Schroeder, which challenges the non-cognitivist to explain why moral claims 
have the inference-licensing property.351 This is the challenge of explaining why, if accepting or 
believing moral claims to be true just amounts to having a particular desire, accepting certain 
moral claims rationally binds us to accepting other moral claims, such as when we accept the 
 
350 See Ridge (2014, p.97) 
351 Schroeder (2009) 
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premises of a moral modus ponens. Despite many years of trying, arguably, no solution to the 
Frege-Geach problem has been found. That would be a serious problem for Almér and 
Björnsson to take on board, and if this problem were solved then one of the main dialectical 
advantages that naturalists have over non-cognitivists would have been lost.  
So, it might be unwise for naturalists to argue that agreeing or disagreeing with moral claims, and 
believing moral claims to be true or false, only ever amounts to expressing a particular conative 
attitude. To have a fully satisfactory account of disagreement they would have to show that there 
could be a logic of attitudes, which has for decades proved a vexing problem for non-
cognitivists.352  
There is another option. While philosophers often assume that ordinary speakers are tacitly 
moral realists, anyone who has taught undergraduates or done some public engagement knows 
that this is often not the case. Ordinary speakers very often seem much more sympathetic 
towards some kind of moral anti-realism than they are towards realism. Studies have backed this 
up. One that is particularly relevant for our purposes was undertaken by Khoo and Knobe.353 
They found that ordinary speakers tend to think that in hypothetical scenarios in which we 
appear to have moral disagreements with extra-terrestrials, both of us might speak truly. This 
means that, the content of what we say need not be inconsistent with the content of what the 
extra-terrestrials say if we are to make sense of why we can disagree with them.  
Moreover, these findings, Khoo and Knobe argue, turn the normal dialectic on its head. 
Previously, it was thought that anyone who is committed to saying that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ have 
different content cannot explain why Earthlings and extra-terrestrials (like Moral Twin 
Earthlings) intuitively disagree. Now we see that it is those who think that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ 
 
352 I think that many of the other problems that face non-cognitivist semantics would also apply (see the objections 
presented by van Roojen (1996), Jackson and Pettit (1998) Dorr (2002), Egan (2007) Schroeder (2008a, 2008b 
2010)). 
353 Khoo and Knobe (2016) 
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must have the same content who fail to respect ordinary speakers’ linguistic intuitions. Other 
experimental findings have also supported this claim.354 In order to respect these data, our 
account of disagreement must accommodate cases in which both parties to a disagreement speak 
truly. 
These findings also provide the naturalist with a potential response to Ridge. While Ridge 
assumes that where I disagree with someone I will also believe what they have said to be false, 
the experimental data challenge this. Ordinary speakers seem to think that two people can 
disagree even where neither party has said something false or has the belief that the other has 
said something false. The naturalist can simply reply to Ridge that there is nothing to explain, 
and that in fact, naturalist accounts which have it that the disagreement between us and Moral 
Twin Earthlings is non-content based, actually come out better than rival accounts which explain 
the disagreement in terms of inconsistent sematic contents. These rival accounts are committed 
to saying that whenever we disagree with someone, we will say that they have spoken falsely, but 
the experimental findings show that this is not the case.  
However, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter, I am unsure whether the kinds 
of surveys that Khoo and Knobe rely on are very useful for semantic theorising.355 That being so, 
I prefer to canvas another approach. 
§5 – Debunking the disagreement intuition 
Another strategy that the naturalist could adopt is simply to deny that there is really a 
disagreement going on in cases like Moral Twin Earth. As discussed in a previous chapter, 
people have mistaken intuitions about all manner of things, so we could potentially debunk these 
intuitions pumped by Moral Twin Earth. Since every major metaethical theory has difficulty 
 
354 Bolinger (ms), Ross and Schroeder (2013), Sarkissian et. al. (2011). These findings are discussed briefly in Finlay 
(2017). 
355 Knobe and Nichols (2017, §3) provide a nice, concise overview of the potential issues associated with the use of 
surveys in philosophy. 
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explaining how we could disagree with hypothetical speakers in some Moral Twin Earth-style 
scenarios, that might suggest to us that it would be best to just accept that we do not really 
disagree. However, ordinary speaker’s linguistic intuitions are the raw data with which we do 
semantics, so we cannot disregard them lightly. We need a principled reason to debunk our 
intuitions in this case. 
I think, however, that we can make a very good case for that denying that, strictly speaking, we do 
disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings. First, the intuition that we do disagree with them is not 
universally held. Nor is it, I think, that strongly held by many of those that do have the intuition. 
Something does seem off about these cases, they do not seem like other more paradigmatic 
disagreements. Having considered that Moral Twin Earth-style scenarios are problems for 
everyone, we might well accept that we do not really disagree with Twin earthlings, nor regard 
them as having made some kind of error, so much as are just want and value different things to 
them. If we would apply ‘right’ to different actions than those that Twin Earthlings apply ‘right*’ 
to, even when we were both fully-informed on non-normative matters, made no logical errors, 
had fully-reflected, had undergone a full course of cognitive psychotherapy, were maximally 
coherent, made our judgements behind a veil of ignorance, etc., then it does not seem 
unreasonable to think that we simply do not disagree when we say, ‘X is right’, and they say, ‘X is 
not right*’. If, in these kinds of ideal conditions, Moral Twin Earthlings use ‘right*’ to refer to 
actions only if they believe has the Kantian property, then it seems to me to be plausible, 
regardless of its ‘practical role’, that ‘right*’ might denote the Kantian property, and not whatever is 
denoted by our term ‘right’ (if it denotes anything at all). 
Second, the way that Moral Twin-Earth scenarios get presented to us are often very misleading 
which should make us wary of trusting the intuitions that have been pumped by them. Above I 
set out the thought experiment in a fair way by omitting the many misleading features that it 
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typically comes with. Here are a few of the ways that Horgan and Timmons mislead their 
audience356: 
1. They tell us that the Moral Twin Earthling terms ‘good*’, ‘bad*’, ‘right*, ‘wrong*’ etc. are moral 
terms357 and they tell us that Moral Twin Earthlings make moral claims. 358 Since we know that 
moral terms denote moral properties, this will instantly lead us to believe that they must be using 
terms like ‘good*’ to talk about goodness. If the naturalist is right then, ‘good*’ actually denotes 
some natural property other than goodness, so Horgan and Timmons unfairly influence the reader 
against naturalism. Precisely what is at stake in the debate is whether or not ‘good*’ and the like, 
are really moral terms or whether (given the difference in referent) they have merely similar 
practical roles to moral terms. Similarly, by telling us that in their thought experiment members 
of both communities are making moral claims, Horgan and Timmons prejudice the reader into 
thinking that there is a shared subject matter. If we are told that their claim, ‘X is good*’ is a 
moral claim, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that our moral claim ‘X is not good’ must be 
inconsistent with it. 
2. We are also told, that Moral Twin Earthlings have ‘folk morality’359, ‘moral sensibilities’360, 
‘moral educations’,361 etc. By telling us, at the outset, that Moral Twin Earthlings are moralisers in 
these ways, Horgan and Timmons lead us to judge that they morally disagree with us.  
3. Relatedly, we are told that terms like ‘good*’ and ‘right*’ are used to evaluate actions. That 
presumably makes them evaluative terms, which are a subset of normative terms. If ‘good*’ and 
 
356 Laurence, Margolis and Dawson (1999), Copp (2000), Merli (2002) and Dowell (2016) mention more ways that 
Horgan and Timmons mislead us which I do not cover. 
357 e.g. Horgan and Timmons (1991a, p.460) 
358 e.g. Horgan and Timmons (1996) and (2015, p.358). 
359 Horgan and Timmons, (2009,p.9). 
360 ibid. p.20, fn.5 
361 ibid. 
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‘right*’ are normative terms then they presumably share a subject matter with our terms like 
‘good’ and ‘right’.362 
4. They repeatedly stipulate that explorers from Earth who visited Twin-Earth would translate 
‘good*’ as ‘good’. 363 If they would translate the terms this way then presumably those terms must 
have the same meaning. This stipulation prejudices the reader against the view that these terms 
have different meanings. 
5. They tell us that were we to say that ‘good’ and ‘good*’ denote different properties then a kind 
of moral relativism would be true, according to which each of us make moral claims which are 
only ever true relative to our community.364 But in fact, if relativism were true, then the claims ‘X is 
good’ and ‘X is good*’ would have the same semantic content or meaning (though those contents 
would be true or false only relative to a communities normative outlook). By telling us that if their view 
is not correct, then relativism must be correct, Horgan and Timmons present us with two views 
both of which have it that ‘good’ and ‘good*’ have the same meaning. But this is a false 
dichotomy. If ‘good’ and ‘good*’ denote different natural properties then we and the Moral Twin 
Earthlings would each say something (absolutely) true in our own language, if naturalism is true. 
By inaccurately restricting the field of possible views to only those where ‘good’ and ‘good*’ have 
the same meaning, Horgan and Timmons mislead the audience. Additionally, since many readers 
are hostile to moral relativism, being told, incorrectly, that it is the only alternative view, unfairly 
pushes the reader towards Horgan and Timmons’ preferred theory.  
6. Unlike me, Horgan and Timmons do not use a ‘*’ to distinguish our moral terms from the 
relevant Moral Twin Earthling terms. They say things like this: “Moral Twin Earthlings … use 
the terms “good” and “bad,” “right” and “wrong””.365 The most natural way to understand a 
 
362 e.g. Horgan and Timmons (1991a, p.459) 
363 ibid.  
364 e.g. Horgan and Timmons (1996). 
365 Horgan and Timmons (1991) 
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phrase like ‘Moral Twin Earthlings use “good”’, is as asserting that Moral Twin Earthlings use 
the English term ‘good’.366 If Moral Twin Earthlings used the English term ‘good’ then they 
would obviously disagree with us if we say, ‘X is good’, and they say, ‘X is not good’. 
Given that the thought experiments are usually set out in these misleading we should be wary of 
the intuitions that have been drawn from them. 
Third, we have other potential explanations of why our intuitions could be mistaken. As was 
pointed out in the last subsection, in these cases there is a kind of tension or conflict resulting 
from the mutually unsatifiable desires that moral claims plausibly express even on a naturalist 
account. If that does not amount to a disagreement proper (as we are currently supposing), it 
could at least be mistaken for one by ordinary speakers. These cases have many of the hallmarks 
of disagreement, and, since ordinary speakers do not have very considered views about what 
disagreement consists in, they can potentially mistake them for genuine disagreements. 
Finally, as Janice Dowell argues in a brilliant paper, for the intuitions pumped by Twin-Earth 
scenarios to have probative value it would need to be the case that competence with a term like 
‘right’ requires knowing just which similarities in the use of ‘right’ and the term ‘right*’, from any 
other hypothetical language, are sufficient for ‘right’ and ‘right*’ to have the same meaning.367 
This is much more than we usually assume is the case when constructing semantic theories from 
people’s linguistic intuitions.368 Ordinarily, we construct semantic theories based on how 
competent speakers are disposed to deploy expressions from their own language. Whether those 
speakers can also accurately tell how to translate those terms into any hypothetical language is a 
different matter. In this regard, the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment requires of competent 
speakers more than Putnam’s original Twin Earth experiment. Putnam asks us whether we, who 
know that water is H2O, would apply our term ‘water’ to XYZ were we to visit Twin Earth. He 
 
366 A point raised by Dowell (2016) 
367 ibid. 
368 ibid. pp.12-14. 
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thinks that we would not, suggesting that XYZ does not fall under the extension of ‘water’. 
Putnam did not ask whether competent speakers would translate ‘water’ as ‘water*’ – a Twin 
English term used to denote XYZ. If he had, it is not obvious that the answer to this question 
would have told us much about the semantics of ‘water’.  
If the assumption that ordinary speakers can translate terms they know into any hypothetical 
language is not true, then there would be no reason for us to think that ordinary speakers’ 
intuitions about which hypothetical alien-language speakers we do or do not disagree with, tell us 
anything decisive about the meaning of terms in our language.  
And it seems quite implausible that all competent speakers have this knowledge. I am competent 
with a term like ‘hammer’, for example, but I do not think I know which similarities in use 
between ‘hammer’ and a term from any hypothetical language make those terms have the same 
meaning. If a hypothetical community uses a term from their language, ‘hammer*’, when 
pointing at a tool they use to drive nails into wood with, is that enough of a similarity in use for 
‘hammer*’ to have the same meaning as ‘hammer’? Perhaps it is. But suppose that what they call 
‘hammers*’ are naturally occurring objects on their planet. Suppose also that ‘hammers*’ are 
typically different in shape from hammers and that they are typically made from rock. Do those 
differences in usage mean that it is better to say that they use some other tool, and not hammers, 
to drive nails into wood? Does ‘hammer*’ translate better as ‘bludgeon’ or ‘rock’ than it does 
‘hammer’? Or is it more accurate to say that they have hammers which have different shapes and 
manufacturing origins to our hammers? Whatever the answers to these questions, ordinary 
speakers do not necessarily have to know what they are in order to count as competent with the 
term ‘hammer’. 
Similarly, ordinary speakers need not know just which similarities in usage between ‘right’ and 
‘right*’ are sufficient for them to have the same meaning, so their intuitions about whether the 
person who says ‘X is right’ and the hypothetical speaker who says ‘X is not right*’ disagree 
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would not show us that ‘right’ and ‘right*’ do, or do not, have the same meaning. Competent 
users of moral vocabulary (who can seemingly be very young369), do not, as Dowell points out, 
plausibly all possess “the skills of a field linguist engaged in radical translation”.370 So, even if 
ordinary speakers do have the intuition that we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings, we are safe 
to question those intuitions without undermining the foundations on which we build semantic 
theories. 
All in all then, it seems reasonably safe to reject the claim that we and Moral Twin earthlings 
disagree. ‘Good’ and ‘good*’ might be orthographically very similar and they might serve similar 
practical roles, but that is not reason enough to think that they must have the same meaning. It is 
not intuitively obvious that we do disagree with the Moral Twin Earthlings and, even if it were, 
those intuitions would not be decisive. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I looked at Horgan and Timmons’ ‘direct’ Moral Twin Earth argument. I argued, 
first, that it is difficult, on anyone’s account, to explain why we intuitively disagree with the 
hypothetical speakers in these kinds of  scenarios. I then sketched two solutions. One solution 
involved widening our understanding of  disagreement so that it including non-content based 
disagreements. This solution, I argued, faces some serious issues when it comes to explaining 
why expressions of  disagreements seem to go hand-in-hand with truth and falsity attributions. 
The alternative solution was to reject the claim that we disagree with Moral Twin Earthlings. The 
intuitions guiding this claim are dubious in multiple ways, so I think that this is a perfectly 
defensible route for a naturalist to take. 
  
 
369 See Kagan (2007). 
370 Dowell (2016), p.21 
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Conclusion 
Derek Parfit claims that it is “amazing” that we still need to defend the claim that normative 
properties are not natural properties.371 There is nothing amazing about it. Naturalism provides a 
vindicatory account of our ordinary normative claims with appeal to nothing more than garden-
variety natural properties. Unlike non-cognitivist positions, naturalism can do all this while 
remaining compatible with orthodox theories of semantics and truth. Naturalism is also well 
positioned to explain why normative properties supervene on natural properties.372 
The anti-naturalist argument that normative properties could not be natural properties because 
we can doubt any naturalistic analysis is not convincing. As I showed in chapters 1, we are able 
to doubt analyses that are correct and, even if we were not, normative terms need not necessarily 
be analysable in terms of natural terms if normative properties are natural properties. I showed in 
chapter 2 that there are no metaphysical laws either requiring or forbidding normative properties 
from exemplifying themselves which do not also apply to natural properties. 
Parfit contends that, regardless of how debates concerning meaning and analysis turn out, we 
can know that normative properties are not natural properties. Parfit thinks that this is just 
intuitively obvious to anyone who considers the matter. In chapter 3, I showed that there is no 
convincing argument against naturalism from such intuitions. I also showed that naturalists can 
explain why normative properties are normative in the reason-involving sense and that nothing 
Parfit says shows that natural properties could not both be normative properties and non-
causally make actions have those properties. 
Parfit also argues that if normative properties were natural properties then normative claims 
could not be substantive and positive, which they are. This is considered Parfit’s master 
argument against naturalism, but I showed in chapter 4 that it is both unconvincing and 
 
371 Parfit, (2001), p.39 
372 See Dreier (2015).  
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uninteresting since the key premise of that argument just amount to a flat denial of naturalism. 
More interesting are Parfit’s auxiliary arguments for that premise, but they ultimately also fail. 
Naturalists can also respond to arguments from motivational internalism. There do not appear to 
be any decisive arguments for motivational internalism, so naturalists, as well as other 
descriptivists are safe from arguments that require it. There are also some good reasons to think 
that internalism is not true. If there are no necessary connections between distinct existences 
then internalism requires that normative judgements and motivational states are not distinct 
mental states. This is very implausible because the strength of normative judgements does not 
covary with the strength of the motivational states we have to act on those judgements. What is 
more, there is no very convincing story to tell about just which motivational states we must be in 
when we make normative judgements. Unlike some rival accounts, naturalists can say that the 
connection between normative judgements and motivation is as strong as it intuitively is, but are 
not committed to also saying that it is stronger.  
The possibility of fundamental normative disagreements might be thought to be one last spanner 
that can be thrown in the naturalist works. Seemingly, we can disagree with speakers from 
hypothetical communities who use terms which would refer to different natural properties to our 
moral terms if naturalism were correct. I showed in chapter 6 that scenarios involving seeming 
disagreements with communities of hypothetical speakers provide a difficult explanatory burden 
for us all. One way to solve these problems is by appealing to theories of non-content based 
disagreement; theories which are available to the naturalist to adopt. Another, less costly way, to 
address these problems is just to deny that we really disagree with the hypothetical speakers in 
these scenarios. 
Given the advantages of naturalism, and given that we can remove the roadblocks to naturalism 
that philosophers have thought are impassable, naturalism should appear a promising theory. 
However, there is still be a long way to go before we can be confident that naturalism is the 
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correct metaethical theory. To establish that we would need a particular account of which natural 
properties are identical to which normative properties, which makes good sense of the way we 
use normative language. This will be a very difficult task, but none of the arguments that I have 
looked at from Moore, Parfit, Horgan and Timmons, as well as other philosophers, should deter 
us from trying to complete it. 
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